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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
I 
I 
STATE OF IpAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




INTERMOUNTAIN ANESTHESIA, P.A. and 
MARCUS E. MURPHY, M.D., 
Defendants. 
STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV 06-7149 i 
! 
AFFIDA VlT OF JEFFREY Rj. 
TOWNSEND IN SUPPORT qF 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 1 
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE,;OR 
ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR 





I, JEFFREY R. TOWNSEND, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and stktes: 
I 
I 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Idaho, and am an attorney of 
I 
I 
record for Defendant Intermountain Anesthesia, P.A. and Marcus R. Murphy, M.D. in fhe above-
, 
referenced matter. 
2. I make this Affidavit on my personal knowledge and belief of the ma~ers stated 
herein. 
I 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY R. TOWNSEND IN SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM~ 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DTSMTSS FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE. OR 
AL TERNAT!VELY, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
9. 
HALL FARLEY 14] 003/015 
I 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit is a true and ~-~r""' copy relevant portions of 
report of.November 1975 on study medical malpractice.I 




the transcript of the hearing on Defendants' 
Judgment dated September 7, 2010. 
Motion to Dismiss and Motion for !summary 
I 




SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 2S day of October, 2010 
, ........... , ... . 
.... •t t,., "E.HRel>~'•, .... 
.... A.'~ ........ ,. ~ .,.• _,T •. '-
~ ....,,, • # 
:""' ..-1\,RY ., -:. 
"' ...i O" • 
: f ~ ~-- i . . ..... ,. . ..• \ ,..., I • 
\ -., f>U\\'-' " o / 
\ .. ···~ ~ .... J' ............. {J,. .. ~ 
, .... , l',4 TE Of\: , ...... ,,, ,,, ,,,,, ....... . 
otary Public for Idaho 
Residing in Boise 
My commission expires: 08/18/2010 






I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2 S day of October, 2010, I caused to b~ served a 
true copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY R. TOWNSEND IN SUPPORT OF 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOtION TO 
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE, OR ALTERNATIVELY, MOTlON FOR I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, by the method indicated below, and addressed to e4ch of the 
following: i 
Lowell N. Hawkes 
Ryan S. Lewis 
Lowell N. Hawkes, Chartered 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
Facsimile (208) 235-4200 
D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 




AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY R. TOWNSEND IN SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM ~N 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE, OR 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 , 4 
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10 /25/20 10 lj : 58 FAX 
HALL FARLEY 14] 004/015 
@OOO l/ 00 3 1 
~-
Lcgmture of the State of l daho] 

























IN THE SENATE 
SENATE GONCUARENT RESOLUTION NO. 117 
BY STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 
DIRECTING A LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL STUDY OF MEDICAL MALPR~CTICE 
INSURANC:E AND REQUIRING THE COM.M.lTIEE TO REPORT rb THE I 
SECOND REGULAR SESSION OF THE FORTY-THIRD IDAHO LEGISLATURE_ 
Be It Resolved by th~ Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
WHEREAS, the ·cost and unavailability of me!fical malpractice insurance has;resulted 
in hardships to the Jnedica1 profession and health care providers; and : 
WHEREAS, t!1e cost of medical malpractice insurance is passed on to the *ublic in 
tlle form of fees and hospital costs;·and 
1 
WHEREAS, un&vailability of medical. malpractice jn.surance could res~t in a 
reduction of medkal service available to the public. ! 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the First Regular Scssio~ of the 
Forty-third ldaho Legislature, the Senate and the House of Representatives co'ncurring I 
therein, that the Legislative, Council · is hereby authorized and directed to appoint a 
committee of five members to undertake and complete a study of legislative solutiops to the 
problems inherent in wedical malpractice insurance in Idaho and report to thd Second I 
Regular Ses.sion of the Forly-tltiTd Idaho Legislature jts findings, together with proposed i 
legislation if necessruy. 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the chairman of the House Business C~mmittee 
and the chairman of the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee shall serve on the co:nunittee 
thus created, and shall jointly recommend to the Legislative Council names t4 fill the 




S CA 117 
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_ . . ~. olaa,i~ ;- . &lrii~tr;,r fe-r~ S~as.~vr .: a~1'i1uf the .117.!et:.in!l• t;~ : order: ,-t: 
10::0~ i.r.nr:;< .Ccara1t.~ ·: li&Jllbi,,.!'s ~r~~ep~'.:·•e:·~rs. s.uvtJc··~~ Xl~ln-, .:~. 
Repr~~~t:J.~ Kr~s aoo. T'lrl.Zeg~. Adv.1:~ :n:iembez:-s ·.p:ret9er)t: . ~ .s.n.A~i: 
· JU tchell . a.n,d : Rapr~nt;at;Jves·· 11'1 ~ ,.· .· s-~;. :. JainmwJ.ct.A- Uallliond . and· G.ili:e:Jf.· -; . 
Mptoge11.~~~· .)ll:Jd19!-"~" ,ras a.l~;j ~~s.ent~ .'- ,In additiQn -~ ~~se- ·ta¢1:fri~® 
befpre t:1J19 ~nu:.tt:tse., t:hB :falloirr.i~q ... ~p)a: wei"EI .in -.stten~·t . ·tt.c.·· YJi<J~dJJ, 
•t1:ornoy, · ..tdllho · Jf~pJ. t:al Asan. , · jo1w., ·Bengst:b(i ~· 11'tto.rney, :tda.Jw · St4te Sari, 
L. , tt.· · '(Joithi> ,. -..team~-~ _Idlfhi:l · s.~~ :.sa·t/ .Btmn,~d' L- ~l, E.lt'8C;llt:1.v&, Di.reat4r, 
Id~ . st.ta ~r Jahn c; : H~pwort.k, ··.·ar:.b:n.'J'J,!il• '' JdahQ ·.St,eu:e,· Biu:r · Robert., Ji. : , . ··· u :-e~y ~', NA:,. ,:· 'l'd''/lho lf.wlicJil .:As&lc:¥."i,a·t!l~ . iU · lOJgkfHlda.1.1:i ·11.v ~ 1. , . .t~s. Jt.., 
.. .Jl'*l.t,,g:/ N.-.;D ~ I . Rojf i/·111iiProi:th-,·'· sli, ."/'. ·~~- 'iluitl~ · Jts1;idfil'li-td:otn· · ~--~;. 
Bjr:i~.,.·-. .. ,;.,, ~ HddJc.al: AtiS(tl;:,ia't;.t~t- -F.au1. S. St:net., ~6S,'1·-:~d 
L •. BJrd,. 1~ Ht.41.c«l. ~soc.1~t.:1ant :?,g.Jf.::~~,. Idaho liedic"al Au()Clttf:.$qt.11 
. -- · Sj;'dn~y ._Bll~t:t:1 . abd: .R.Ur:fy -Sarc.filw ~: .~. A'ttomtty· ,G81l&~al.. · ·- $ta.f:i!'-~en; . 
_.. -·-P-N"1ii:" ;...;:e·· van H.oi£ and w:tllut : · · .. ":·, ._.. > ... ' · : · · ·· i: " .. ·., ·. '. ,.:-:: , 
. . .:.. . . .., . ~.. . ' '. ,- . · .. _· .·~: -~ :J.; 
~:· :, • ;, ' ~ : • • -: • • • •} : ' "" I 
DAv.J.d. v:~~gba.ri, ~put:y .Di.rector or . ~, .D9~t of_ Insu,ranoe, : ~J~---
thdl c;z,og.Z ~d open c~B1111 !n£0:t:111«~on ~CUeliJJ·etdd by -t:.he ddpart:ntant ~1't;1at;h!g tns. -.unt:.i 'p«J.d by .. 'J.ni,i.irsrs .ft:rt: -•t:iJ~:Ltiiti"J.pracdce· cl4.f.ive,. '. 1lis ' a1.o881y 1u ,, · . ~~J..•, · r:.J.aJ.•· -~Y,Pense ~ · "1;6J.t:irli.n!£ ,~s :. (ees,. wer9 . :!Jri),ks.rJ qut' of.,:·.'tne: 
£j·~•-' CopJ:tit1··-itf t:hQse fJ..gt.tres ·~ ~.,fiJe :J.n · .t:he LBr,18l-..tJ.V'lf: ... Cr:J'tJne1..1':, :a~f1~-
A ~st:.loii' and llll'Sw'er session .t'ollCMld; . : ., .:,p. 
·. --~. ~-
. I 
•~-Bsttf:hnall·, ?:etteral Cou.rutel .. ot'. tmr De~t-·af HU1~ and Walf~, 
r&pln'ted. on .t:hs. Btdtt:zS of t:he .o:,a;rt h~l!I· invol:.tring th& consd. 'tnti011aJ.:tq1 ,\?-( 
s ;B • . 11 B6, wh!ch :LJ:mJ. t:ed the a,a,dmum . 1:.t.-bil:l..t:g. 0£ ,doct:o.rs· ill .tD41:IJrilCld.CG ·.~asQs. 
7'h6 dth:!111:Lcm o£ the d1st.rlr:t: .cx,urt ruliit!f ' -ts.he '•ct unconsf;Jtut:.iood ·Jias bEf:ell 
cppe-decf·, to 1!llfi snpr~l?Je Court. · · · · 
1 
. .. :: , ·.· . . ' :· ' ·,: ! 
' - : .. Pr. B/ L. ~1..JJcamp. Pres.1&;ilt.', o$ ·~ Idaho ~dicalc As~at.fon.-; ':.$\fbm!Ctiw. 
·' ... :· 11.t•:~Olfft)o.t'·. t;bie posJ.Hon 1:>.f. -~Ei,,·~~.1d:ion;· r;J.ttng ·oont:(naod hl~f¥'. Jn_ 
~imf l;ilbi.- .· and ··tho: ·need for. ~ddi'~i:ind>~tw11;t:t~ ··to the p,::ob1.t!!fll.. -Ile .r;e- · 
v.t:~ what· wag: 1:aJdng .pLac•, ~cti~•l:g,: td'th·., respeot; ~ -~er :rtni!.• lD1fl 
·-prcrl;rdai'J>.ft;,r lliBltbled , pbgtdc:.ianit.··· . .';-~~dnUfiTM £1.t;:;f ..!t$lted·.abz>ui:- t:;bn. ·~--· 
-··pa:isOZ!J •dical'· ,adp,rat::t.tes ::tmiur~:'%'~!~4 :il'f s. El:' • .:11:86. _· ·:Or4 ·~ro1J~ 
· ·i,s:J.d: d,at: be aupparted' ·. the .1-$J:fs.l~~'!tm·i ·:· ~ · . .zi~d'- ·:thc!lt- t:,Jie, · ~ : 0£: MetUci,fne 
h~ by': ~lat:toh ·:,~1de4 for·-th~:.:li,. i a!! . "~niict.i'V~" statllS • .. ~hs · 11:l.c~l1'9 
11~· wculd nof: ·,per,m1. t the liaeru:ee. · fi> pr11-1:ti.:ce .medic::.fng ~ _. .. 'll',te · doctpr &lao 
p;olnbatf out: tlult the board w,; not ··privy. to d.:Ls_clp1Inar!1 aat:ion: taJcJtn b"1 10Cltl 
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I 
Dr. Xom NcDev..tt:t, Pccat:el.lo, noted t;he ssvere i.nci-ea.ae in premi~ 
over the· 14s c :few years, and· ~poke oL the . undes.ir8.b111 tg of f?&-SSJ.ng chess 
;J.nc:reased cost:.s on -to t:h6 patients. ~e waact;1d to go UlJlns.ured and s~bst.i-
t;ut;e banding or s4v.Lngs. '1.'h-1.s .is .:1 . .mpass.1.ble under .current Jaw-. He c:t.idn' t 
believe t:here W-!l!S a .real crisis, and sup;pc,rted the :right; of ps.t.ierits i eo sue 
for whatsVl!lr n,;,gl.igence was involved . .lf.n·:,.tbe llctions of a doctor. Dr, 
~tt rea>mmanded a ahange :J.n the lJtatut~ o.f limitations and the ~psal 
of OO!llpU!s-ory insurance. 
I 
John D. 11.Utchi.son, r'1presentlng t1le Ida.ho Hospit:121 Association, 
1
st:at:ed 
tb41: bosP.i·tal.s Z'f:lquired :lnsu.r;.tnce, c111d that th.1.s imtu.rar1C0 cove.red n~:rses _ 
Be e.sti111at:tuf the- cos~ per bed, .pe.r. dag, of such .inBtJranca at ~tt,.,een . two and 
sewin do11tt11., d.es,en.d:l..ng on ~ oo•pi tal. T.bis cost .must be cansid.Bi:ed in 
·o:m,d,rier.1.ng leg.J.sla.t:i~ p.ropo,pJ_l$. •.Hf• a.lso .&J:id -t;h,!1.t -l.B9"isllt.t.!.cm. "70J.1d be 
requ-:lxed bi!lrora :bQsp::!t:Als cou.ld dJ.scJ;ose .review- informst:.ian tc· t:he c,qar~ . of 
medlcdns £or the purpose 0£ scretJn.!ng doctor13~ He cjt:~ legisla1::l.V'e ,prqpo-
.ea:18 out: of Indiana, Utah llltld. o.regnn as options to be c:xm.t'11dered. 
I 
~d · L.· Bird, execut:iv.u. SQa.ni,tuy . of, t:he: Idaho llo.,f.d of Me(lic~n~, 
expl:ainad the conduce of the board in di.~d.plil;)a.rg aet1ans and nandat9ry . 
insu,;aace p.roblsias. He said thttt :there• tlj:B. cur:rent:.l.9 229 ... i.na.ct.:l~" :11~sea-
throttg-h t=M mtiergency rule p.roaedw:"i9. ~i~d . also ci t.ed 1:hree lru, ~e~ ;.r~re 
ebs naiprace.iaa ~ieis had reSttlted in ret:ixament: from. md1r;1m,-
La.rry Duff, .representing i:he It!iAh(J '.l'r14l· I.a.MJezs. As.soci.at:1on, p~a~ted 
the pos.1.tion of that group. Al}pentUx A ~o thsse minutes con.t=~J.ns th~t st4te-
dnt~ rhfi comzll:i.ttee reces&ed for 1.utJch .tt 1.l:52 a.m., and recom.·.eneq at' 
. l:39 ;.m. 
_Bdv,o:d a Drape:r, .BmUler-B~y.pJ.scrice HedJ.c;a1 Soc19t:y, . .s~id :that 
~.rre . than t:h.reB doctore had ~ti.rod. b:Orrt .practice .:!n 111rhole ,c,r J.n ./"IX1: ~CJt1ure 
·of the mal.practice c-r1s1.s_. 'l'h":1.1!1 did not: . include tlJS nwnoo.r who c:ho.s~ not t:o 
conie t:o Idaho .be.cause of t:be un:t'a.v,n.able .:µisursnoe allmsee.. .t1"'m if 11.e.gls-lat..t"' gcsls are achieved 1n t:bt!l n~t sessi.an, a ~i.Jn po:rjod follows "befoz:a 
i.~-w:l.ll get btiltt:e~. 11.e h1.msel,f ·NJt:.1red txam the praot:J.ce· in . JtUJft~ tj.riJIISXY 
co:nw~a.J.nt!f w.re reglst:ered ag,airJs~ -t:he nandawry insurtltlce regu1.re1lll!l~t.:s 4!1d 
·the .... claiZlt.9· mda" policim.t now i.s~ed. , 
I 
I 
Gane Thomas , 11 t:torn&y f'or the Idaho Nedi co.l bsoaiat:iao, cl t;ed the 
DB8d to mllks J..nsur-11nC'e l!l.\l'a.11able o!!-t a rBascmab.1.e cost. There is much la~ 
oii,,~ ~- ncM which p::-ovidss :for p:,1:tclng lUld re9ttlt1t:.fon. The as~oc:l.atlon 
1.il-~·.n·.thin mQIJths of ~ettlng· up , 11. . capt.,i v.e . in.S"Uran~ ccmpang to prov:1.dei. a measure 
r,,f sel£ insur,uwe thr'Ougll a co~,P,!lnY · osmed by t:hs attsoci,1J,t;fon and hos~.t tals. 
Be also rev1ewed·t:o C!llr.r:en.t ·statµs,of·.thl!I suit on s.~ .. 1186. ·Thomas -,tbtsn-
~Sl31lt".t!ki .the connit:t:Bs fllTit/l rough d~afts of four pif!!ces of leglslat:.ipn -t~-
tat.twlg .racol1llll!:1Dded bl) t;he c19-9ocJ..atia1. TMty are at:t~ahed to · these :,n1.n~t:ea 
·-a, .. ·Appsnd.!r B·, mid · prcnf.i.dfl bills cm: l, ~Bn Ipst; ]J)q.ai.-torr 2. Earty not::l.co 
-- o-P.·clai11S1 3 • . RB1rov11l. of t:m:t lld ·damum. c1c'J.USe from comp:le.fnt:s, a.od_;4• ·Pre 
· l:it:.:J.<jation screaning of· cla;ims. , 
I 
i'he 4Jlsociatton i.s also c,;:,nside-r:i~s, J.eg.J.sl.a.t;io.n an i.ncrement:al l-¥1!/mt!Ults 
.as 1011J!Je/!!J occur , ru~r ehan .a ltJ11W ,9"Um. judgment , and %'elb!opeing po:cif;,ns of 
-2-
~ ~~.-: -: :.- ·· 
. . ~. 
643, 
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I.- !,JI. \_, 
s.B. 118~ wldcb aN not. con~~p ... _. &l10SM4. . '" •' . 
i 
.2 9t,l~~t:1Cll'l and ans~x- B$SBloo l 
l 
I ,PaVIS', .vasagban presen~ 't:hs. ~.t'bk!: ~-H·h. a ·.~ii of. legisl.atiW1 ~ rb!J· ·~thfli':,s:taUJS., 1Wd..,, .. -~·~,~thil,i-;-'.e:ld~s;: pol.~1*i· out :tmtt ;ra;_~o . 
,~~r=:~1::1:::~~ ,:, .. ~,. {.~;.~ , ..... ~.::! ~·-·~ ~-- yvp,,OU;' .. d.~. ~.~.}:-~~~,~~~~!f~:~~~t~$~~~~~~~~:;~}~d 'be .~~"4 ·1.~1 .. and· 4fd$~~ ~ ~CJi-'.ilr.Jtil 'dle. £!,..s't Wtio!t.· ~ '.the · Rlfilior1o . · · . · . . ' ... g · · . . · . ' '· .. : : .. : . . . · . . ! . , . 
- · .. , . :. _. ~- ·_ . . . . ·, . . -~· - . : . . : . . . . <= :· :· • ...... ~ . : . .. . \\ .• :. . . . , . : . . . . I : · ~{CY.dn!i_ .. .a: _dt~-pn.-., · ~~::~:1:1-~~·,:cqnsensus.· ·t:bat -~Ji&. ~.,i~y :!asUEJJ.ni;;'e ~(l.~lli~ ·tn S.B,. 1.;J.8'6·:~ld ~.'l"l!l~lliK.L .. · · ::· .. - . ::·:. .~_ . :· .: . .· . . . . . . . . :· .. . -.:· . '-.·~.' ·.: .-: '' - , ' .. ·< ,<' ,, \ : . ~~ta~ ~t;,.k ~J't;e¢:4£t~OU![;,t; pz:'Qb)-ems:.:w-:t;t.f,.t;.:°~: ClcU.mS; IJWdEI J>C)l:lcl~s..:·~t..t!f be:ti{g W:E.!t~.~,: :){~f'~.id ·:t;hiJt.'1.f 1i r~1proc~l ·:lM~ltnCS . ,.:t~y-.:~.t(·-.h;,~·tab!..f,·6-Md~:,;:~~~,:.• :~•n·~s_ ·~..tttJ;op :ttpl?,i:o.s.ab :,r~a.-1:e ::~~·~r,Jd.. . · ...... . :. ·:. , .. ·:<.·: ,. .... : . :· . . . : . . ,: ... : ·l1 : 
· s~i,/tor · Br1t:sl!le9 ·t;tltid·. t:M,J:..; .t::btl!~i.~ ·:··~ii-~ .io the. counctii · wi1+ ·. b6: 1:hat t:be. -~~ ·1uur··~t; ~ ,d.;1.1, ~et)llt~, ~'ailV. .in ~- Jia~on ro ()Ol181de:z;, . . ~ .. ,eg.J.i,~on.·:~tiu:~d at-. ~.if.;Ltif~,:~~~-.~t: ~1~~;-;:.u.ti¥t!l.~~ :i.fP°ssibl~. 
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''.· .. "·., .. :., :., .. ,;··, . , .. -' · ··· ... ::,::i;;.~~-~',;.}('"\) ·}f:"'/J,.,\.· '·' . . \'<?· :·_:·;.· ::~/(:.. i, 
Id,~: i:.,/ .. : ,':, .'·"_::):-·,· !~-/'; .. , ·. ::;, ,,Y 
. . . ..· . . . :'· ?:i:;.:··: . .:..:; >. :: ·\ ~ ... : : .  ~ .- .. .,' l.:-: . ' . ·: . ~: -: 
$~i<ili 1. Findi.ng,s:, ·. P.U:r.po~e .. ~-n.d :pefini~ioits. 
. ' . . . -
· .. ·:r .: . ;:;; ;-,.·: ..  ..:_:· _·.).~ > /:·J:;_;:· ... ·.<~f. J~:,:11;t~f!!~::t~~(}::?::.:;i:/;/;, .... : ·.:: ·. ·:·_;./_: .. ~. ~:....,, •. ·. ·-\~.: '. . 
: ·,;_:)·. :Se~~ ·, 2, .. . , ,;, .,.I,Ji.·' any:.· ~~lt®<·~·,,n~e.9..ea _d,Q,~ ' to~ :in.~.t';l(i..-0·~ · · ' . . . : ·.; ···:~ .... ;. i- ;• /:.:.: ··'!:~: .::_. . . ,:~ •: ·, .. ;: ·I; ... :: . • ~. :·: ·-= ;~·/:,.~<:_ ., .. · '·i :\~~~~}"'··~~-~ ~;~~ .. ;:: ) :,;_~ .. :·, ~ .t :: . ;·,.::: : ' ' ·:' • ,' :-:·':11 ~--/ '!: -~~ 'I • ._ ; ' .. .' . 
. ·d-~tj,.- ,of' .a.ny . pe.r;s,,;iri; J;Jrqµght:. -.~~a.:i,ri:~.i·,'.:atry.·: '.l·i~h'sett-(, pl'fy's-c!tan· 'and. 
'~~:t:::::::·:1;:,:;;:11~~:1:r:~t:::;i£:~::c;~t 
a~t:S· ~r ,t)m:is:slem'fl·. iP- t;.bc;i: ..,~~~fJi~~/-i(.:h~~p,i,.bal; ,_-~0~·1;.cal. o.r . 
. · :· · :'. :: :·1· · ·.!· .. · -~- ·.·. _ '.': :..;-_~ .. · "::-~ ... · ·:: •~ • .,. __ . . 
.any·. oth-ef.::.kiiicf ot_ ti.ealt)_t,)'!_~lt~;;,-};~:e:"·~;;~.~ri~.ii.ff. mµSt-r · ·as an 
• : •• _· , . : • • : li •• ' •• -~:. • ' , • : - - :. .. ... /. :~---~-!..·--~-->.,··· .~: ~~--~-·· · .. ..... ,. '. •:,- .· 
· e.~·~~n~:ta:1 part · of tHs or. "h~t· ,·'.<='~·~.e · .in· :C!h'.ief, affi1;ma,t.ively pJ;"ov,e 
.13~, d:i~·:ec:f:.·~~~*·+/.t~st~it{;;,ri~(·~u.d}~ :.~,. j~;.~P:oiid~+_an~e. · ol;.' a:ii. ·th1 
. ·.~emp,e.~ent., ~Yid~p.q~, .that, ·.as.· r~.~p~c.ta s,q.ch an actio.n against a 
. . . . . ... . , . . . • . . .. .... . . ,~ ,: .. >'.,·:·,-·· . " : . I 
, · , • ·.· . 
:·~Th~~.~~;. he.: ~:~nded .:·to··j,~pt.ri~t{~uch .·aL1ditional- ~r6.v,i.ders ~£ 
. : Jr.~:lth ~'"-'.e· ·a:s . pr~fes.~ir;:inal ~.er~}<;e. cotpora:t,io11:s .mad(!. up of.'. 
· ':~y;a>.I,:.c:i.ap:~,, q:z: .:.,- a:ent:i .sts·, ··p~,t~.t,aai!:;_~:S$i·sfants.:,;::· ~u~.se .. p.;i;4.~.t:}:t:ianer s, 
._··:i~~!~it.!(~:;:f$9i'~(t:~~-~cl. -·~!ir~#f .. ~?}ti~.~~it:'.'ir?-~'s~-n~~:i.~-~~, .. ·;'}jh.yr,;;·i9.i;ew· ~b-0.rapis~s, 
.. ·, .¥.4:~~;edi j~~:«:J:ct.'.1,~:;iio~e.~ s , . ·.-E;1.t~ ; ·: -~~~iJ. :.::iia.r,E1ol)i.f. -srJ:.'.cax-•1:0\l $:ly ·· ,); ~a~Jl. e .·for.: •t.he ,u: 
,. , ·. •. '•• r ... ,•, .... , '•1- ,• ," ,, ., • ,,¥ ,, ' •, ',<, \ ' ' ' ', ',;_::n:~~-:1.'gl(\m,=:8. . . . . . ' . , 
:· . . , 
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.. ·· I 
:--\· :,-~:1:--:".,. '.;:·;·;;- ·. ' · .. . .·. i 
.=p~i~tq.~~:-a;,~ -,~,,rr.g~~n_,:·· sucir\I~#~~a~~:· }:hen·. and-. th~re 11~ll~~r:~y 
. f ~:i:J;:E;'d. t:'o . '.m~"7 t : t:h~:. ·s.tand.a~q, ·::~(;·.:~'.di ~!/~ .·.p1;~ct.ice .. of .t:he · c;?~ll~Lty 
· k ., rt~i -::fo,"~;,: tl1"fr~f Ati}i1f ;1i ha;~ ."".?~ ~JSf F " 
or., . a:s: re:ewects . s~$!h· ·qn · aA,~ii:>;r;i·-,_:ag-~~$t·. a · hospi ta+., th~t .it . \ · . . 
the~. :.;;a; 1;,hg;~.,- ~~;li~~~~~/::·~tr~~~:·:~1\~;;~:_·the -~.t~:~a~i~-;~£-_:: · ·i,7r -~,~:;,•:· 
' . , ' • :··, • -.'~:· ; ·-.. ':.,: .. : : ,. .·. '·:·_ -~<..! ·. ~~-;)}~·~~t:,:~:\~ ...... ·,:~_:·,: --~·- ··· ·. :,1 •\. , · .. . ; .. , ::~: : ·.· <. /' . • .·: ·,. · __ ;:!°_::, -·;, t;:~·-;-_ :-: 
· ac~te ~-,;tr'e ,-h~s.p~-~l pra.c.tie.e :·:o;f, :the __ .co~u-i1ity ·1n which sw::h .. 
. · · ,. _\.).r~. • .... '· ·:~· i,.· .. _ .:::-~.:. · · : .. )·~ \ .' : .:,. , ·• ·. · y.~ ·:. <· :.:: ~. · : \\.:'~?~ _ !:?.;::~ ... ~ ~ ~ ;.~· ... :. : · : : - , :: · :: '-~ > ·:.-... ···.~ : { ,.· ;: . \ .. :~, ~ .{ ~ ·. : :· · ; · 
Cil-1:"e al:J,._e~4ly Waa_ .9r- .sh0,-ul,~ -?,~V.~--)O!f~l\, pr.oVi?,-e~~ . .-tri.~ ~n .eith~* . 
• • • • ::., ' ·: J.., • • ., • • h·'":,,\·: .. ' .,,~; .. ·,·;'_,;. :.-·· . · '" . ... · , _. ' . ·:; ' . . ::~·- ~ • ·.,. , :. ::· J • ~ ~ .. :~-;~;.: 
· ca.se ·tha.t. suqh . failtlre -p,roxin\~.-~Ji(ly_ ,9au,sed. the dama,ge5: ·1: 
· ~ :~• / • ,_ ~ ' . '.-_•, 'I, •, ~. 'f; ' • ''~• .• ~.:_,:{;, ... .'.('• t', .... ~.:·:~,=~~•' • • ' • ,, ,_.= ... ,_,~:, •, •" • -.:-~:-,,:, l•tn 
-conipl~i.1:r~~- o~.' .. _. · · · . I 
· --·-· .. ·- . ·. -~. ·· ·i , .. ~·;.· ~~-;/:2~ .. ;-.:~;·\·r":· :-~ · . ::. :· -·<:·":.~. ;~.' :-~rf~1L: ·:.-. :· ··.t:1 ·. :.sec-t'i.o~.:· 3 .• , .. , ~he- a1f~+J;,tj\~4~:,_-:~;:;-~?"3.:Cd_ of. pra.cti-ce~ : the ; 
,t~;"r~1': \:1;t i;~.l f? ~;.;~;Jf i~i~;~i~ · .;.d, 1'5:~~~ ;:'.'"t:· "' · 
11.; ·, ' ~~:la.ti(;mship ,of ~µch fai.l.µr,¢' ··:ti;(,Ul~=t'- A,1l.j,ury, or . hea~t.h -,(:;o.t1dj,._'.i::;to:r,i, . ,. 
t·· .~ , , . :."1·-~L .:·' •.. .':·. :-:·,\\::·. . : .. :~:·. ~~;\~z~::1~J~ ·:·'~j,,/; .··:./·.: , :· • · . . " .. :. :·~ . .::....:··.":-;.;:f> . 
C9m.Pl~;in~ -of:, _ptu~_f:. l::!e _~s,ta:bJ.i,.~~~;._,~y.:·,s-qch a plain~i~f by_ . . \ · 
. . . .r . ·. ·.' ·· . . :. · ,:: ,,··.'. . ·:;. · ·, :· .. ' ,:'.:;,:.: .,.;"', ,,: :;· ., . ·\ : : ::-';, .: i::· ',. ·=>: ,: :. : · :· -' ·.-... 
clir.ect te,,at:µnqiiy<qf: o.ne' -0:~. 111.c:i-r~:.:lti}:6,~.1..~~geable. and_.· q.9ntp~tem: ... : 
. ··:it;~~t.:s~i-~:::*t:;f ~ii;r1t}tr~:\:;11tt;ir;J1~i'.::• 
· . (aJ .. ~-~~t ·: ~~~ a.'.1- .opin_i?~ Js·j:i-c;Ji~~,~~Y,i,~~lq · ~Y- th~ .<:'*-P:~rt_ . 
~. ' ,· :· ·. ·: ,..,= . :·.· , ·1 · · , . , ;:=·f-~:,.· .. ·.:.:,.:·~~~·:, :: ,?,: . .,···~:~··:,,·,." .. : · ·,_. · t·t·:.::. :";: .:;:. ::·: ,,.~~·.\.~ . .. ·. 
w-i tn'El$S ~- .{pf. . tJ1a;;_ "(tie ·.S:aifl :,Er~PE;r.t '. ~p-i:µ_ipn· c~n "be t.es ti~ied tq, · 
•' ' .. ' ' : ' 0 ., • ... , • •' • • ' • •, , '• '• .: '' • ·: > -,,. ,\ •"' :• ' ' < • •• ' ' < : ,• • - · •, ·... ! ~~ R ~ ... 
·with ·r,e.,:i;s.onabi~ -Jl!.~:i'c~l cet:i;a:,i~.ty,;>.M!,1,(-Cc) .. tbat ._s~ch ·:.iitn~1i~ i---- ·,, .. 
::.~~-s~~=~~; ··:px:o;s~~i~ria1 k~o~{~~~~---::1~~'.'::~:~pe;ti-~e · c:ou~led wi.th 1 • 
. . ' . . . . . . . . ~.... . . . 
~ctl:lai kn.-o~l:edg_e r~specfin1 ·.t:.~e -i~?~lin,i:ty ~ud the t~ch,n,1ci).l 
... . . .. 
. ma;t:t\3.is .-to· wp-icl{ ._:t;he. ;ques.t.ion, .is· .:~4ii:~s:sed .. . 
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. . : · .. -: ' ,- " .. ·' · - :,,· 
.· .. . 
':\ : .. .... . · .. ·. ·.: . 
·. 'it~~~/;' :j/".' 
.1 
·._ .. :. 
. : . 
,,. ·, . :· ~ . . . . .. : ' . .. :: . .. 
. . . . 
' ' . ' I , , ' ·,. ' , ' ·i,.<,'.~;t·:,/(:·:-::::,: · 
't::;f ;if,¢,~J;~\ , t ~~ ~~~~Jft;f ~t~~· OJ, Pi~:t~~e·~~ '~;f; -, ; :c, , 
,9µGh;;a.cit:io1{'. Jbilll> ~ the ~tAftd~:t~LJ~:_:t-~-; ::P~r-t{~iii,:1/ -g~~g;a;~i~.;_'1 · 
-~---· _···:·.: ·_. <· ... :.::· -./:) ... :·~_- ..... :,··.·_: _ _._._:·.-.· .. :_. .·i _~-:-'.'-~f1~~\~:~:·i'·>.:t .. \·~·:: ·.-.t: ·.·. ;<_,:_:'.-°:':!'.=-~;. ,:_ .. ·-_ .- , )~i~_.;, ~· ;;.·::..- · .. 
a-t~a ·,Qi!i'.d:f,tjat;i,.ly served. -l:1y -:·i~ ·- 1i-o:e.6.s:~d, .igeilera1·· hq . .sp:it~'l .a_t .or . · 
... ' " . · .. ~-.:~- \,:::,. ·-:: .. -. ·' .. ·-·.' ;-:··,,:>·t: .. ·>~ .. :'.~· .. ::~_~· ;:~:~-~:-}~-::-:: ~-< : ·: ·.: .. . ·~-.~- ·. -~ ;:.., .. ~'. !:} 
tie~~J~' to·. w~:i,C'h · t .4e· hoi3p:i:tcfl!l ·, ,t:ll~:i~i. ,.:o:r· heal ~h : ca:re .in · . . 
.::,..··> ...... -~ .~:~.j.~·::~. =_·:;.:: ... ·:.·~··';:;::···· :_·. ·.: ._-.. : .... :·/ :,·t/~~(.:.~jf(:i ~- .}_;:,~· -·:~./~·;·'\: .. . : ... - j° ... ;;.-~·, •• : ... . .... ·:~:. :'-.:,;··· -: i· : : 
: At~s~i~ .,-~11:¢g~dlr- was O.J? ·: ~hP,l:i,{ct·~'ye;_. ~~eh (leliv~red,·_ ~s sµc:h 
'. ·:~ .·. . ~='-/\-_':\·~ .. ~· '': .·:··- .-: .. :-_.,::·. . .... .. :. : ·.-.. ···:. ::- :! :. }\::'· ;.:: 1-:-_·~-~.:. _.::::; ~' ·.,;:' : ' . . ·. · . ..... :-··:; ; ... · . . : : .. : .... . ' '· . ·.! :,'., 
. · · ... ~%· :;•is:;ed.\ an tbe · d:~t-e:·.·~t: ~e:,: ;.i.l,l-tJge,d p,;ovfsion . 9r ·. ; 
'.· ·<: ·. ,; .. : .. -.> _:~.:· .·.)·,.:~ ·r· .. :./·~·~r,:/! .:·r: . :-'=::;":)-::· \\~ .. -;~~~~~~-i;-'.:f.t~~~~:~· ... ~·.~: :· .. ::·:t2;' .;··-·: ··:·. ,: •, i'.·---!. ., ~- · ... -,,·,~ · ,· · 
. · :~ji:~e .::~~'\t,jJ:-Q~i'dg ·th~ di_GF\f~~i,t:~~~~,:- ~~ic'h,· tim~ $hall· n(?t ~~ 
., -"·.~~?{~.{~:": <" · .. -';:, ,.: '·:· .. • ... ! .... •: '· : : ' . • • ' . ·., :_· ~'.': :.:.?: . ·._.", ·. ', ' •,: ··:·,}- : •l •P". •. it :~ , !' I 
~~~fl~ :~y _·r~~SOn_. Of ~ CQ_n_~jmtj;~ . ·~µr,~~ Of . ca.re, . b.y a d~l~y 
. ; . ·... . ·,. ... \ . .'· \-<·:~ .. . ·.. {':!-:,.s~ .... ·. ; -. ~-· ::, :.r - . ~ : _,. _.: -~.::. l·~f· ·:~~7~!~ _;._.; .. ;'._:{ .... \~: :(·~ .. >~\:..=-. : ~ ~ :·~ _. .. :- . , -~· . .: ;. . :· ~ 
l :· ... . tn :di'i(~ery or· awareness or,·:the-,.c:l;!!inCc;,r by a.ny. ~ther . 
-·~·r, :·: .·~: -. ·=: .. >, :·.r:_::·~ ~.:: · .. . :=-1·:,>. · . ,.:·-:(:\:-!}:~,;~/~~]/:~::\:\: .. ~;·~;: -~.:· ... -. : .. ·: -~ .. ;;\<.·· :. : .. ,.· ,\ t .. •, 
·~ . . -: ,, 
,::·,. 
:dJ'ndd~raJ:.i9ll'.·; ·p~pv-ided, ... ·tf. t:~e(~~~- :i:s:.agaii:1.s;t ,,?' ho_spita.l I 
. ·. ;·· .. · · .. -~·~i~ .~·;°; :?}-;·;:··, ~- · :-:"~ .. ;·: .. ;; < :~- · .., · ·: . ~:· ·-,:< ~:. ··rf.:_ -)~:.}~=:· ::~~·· _: . ·. · .:i ::·!·. . · .: · • · · : : ·:~ · -' ; · • ~. · ·:-. ~. · ~ . ..( .~ . _ .. 
. ·- 9~, ,phy~i~~~~ ·.·,ryd;·.SU'.l'(]~on.- ~~0 - a.tf _'t~~: p~t:i:nent date :was · the - . 
·.-<-:·:. -::- _. .,··,_:"': .. )"-__~-.-·,:.·~tr:. ·-~ ~· . .. :_~ . ·.:'~~- .... ~_r7.i::~--~~ .::; ·· ~~~j-( -~:--.~:'·<: ·7,;(r···· .... . .::··: .' ::·::-., ::. ...... ', --:-(1 ,.;! ;j .} 
s~J;·tf h'9._1ltpi:t.al_· .o~. ~~J.e, such ... pi&.¢.fiit,cipJjer· _in the ·p;alt:icular i 
•, ,• ~ • ~ 1 ' ' ••:,. }:;•.: )?\ • ."'f• '. • ~~~ ;"; -',~• :,.~ ,_. ~: ~ .... I :. • : •- ~~{f,,t· .. . t; .;-p .. ~yr!?/':!.:;:-' .. ~ ,,: •• .' '~• :, ~: ::. \,: '-.. -~ : ,: I 0< I • • : , ~ • 
.-~ni.~f -wti~e · the negl'.ig,e'ti~~ '. ~:i ~~g~~l:y. occu;rr.ed, then_: P!'-"oo.f 
.:·.:.· .... r .·:. '." ~:::_ ... _\. ··::,:~- ·-~ ~- ·:.· .. : .. <· . ~ - z. -~· .... ~ "-- ~.~·!·::'~· .. :.~~·.:·~·.,.'~ ... ;:., -: .. : :.· ... · .. ·~:-·· : w'" , .... ·.. , !: 
· . of .. -c.h'e·. srtandiir.d. ·of care:. in · Stl~:h -:~_ft.er.~ · in similar .Ida.ho 
· :· \ :._.:,·:_r.~;_; 1.~i\>. ,/·{:::··._; ,,:· {.-,-~-·. :, ~<:~-. ·- ... ;:_·:;.:.f.'·.~·.;.:.:.~ ... ::fr:~~<~·<· .. :~: ·· .-: ... "'· : .. ·; ·,. ·.=,·-.. ·, -·{-:,.k:. ' ; ::- ··· ::; 
. ~t.fnities·· .9:f·---coitiparabie· :s ;(ie a~.--~~:(a: timi3 . sha11 also 'be 
• .; : •• ·,· ':, : • 1 •• ····~': ·:,\:< .:'"" :-'\ . ·.~ .. : ·1, :~:. _:l ~~~~\· .. ,;·~:i: !'.··.'{ _: .• · .... ; ·:::.; . ,' 1" 
~i.Gaihla .. ev-id.anc.e to. prov~·.: ~~- _s ,tan,.Q.ard . of care i ·n ·the 
" f;,~~· .)_., : ,;,-~:'(/_.~;:ti:;_;_:~{::::~,~\, ," ~> .. • .. ::. ;,:·.,:_:· : ~·~;f\:.::';':~~~:i~-;.~.j. :( :.-·?:~-.-. . . _1 .w: . ~I 
. ~as.a· .on >t::.-;riaL . , .· .. . .. ,. 
;:· ... . ····).l:·~--~r-.:. -.::·- .. ::J?-:1:_:,. ·-.·:)-.· - .. .':;:~~~;::·t.-;-:/ ..... .-: ..... , 
- ,: 
f:.• 
i •• . . 
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.. =. •' ··;. ·: ·: 
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Idaho: 
~ ' • : i. .-·~· ~ ~ ·_. •,. .. . :.·,. 
T:XTLE' ~ .... _, ... : ... ,\·.>':~:.~.::.,';"< r,.:::·,J.''·. i ' -·':-.:,,:: !:1•: ,.'• :l ;"'·:: ... 1::.~::,·:,.·. : .. ----:-:,-----·-,-.,.,~~-----
. ·,.-: .. : .... :--C::i: :;.;~· : i:·:i-.;f: -· .•. ~ .. ;'. 
BIDL NO·. 
B~ it ~nacte.d·· by ti:..? l,>Ezji&.lature o'f :the state of i 
I 
I 
Section l. Find~gs ,. P.;.:rp,oe.fi: i'.1.nd Oiefini·tions • 
. {to be dr~<fted}. 
The Ida-ho. Stat:e Board of Medici.ne r in 
allag~·. malp:r:Gtctice. cases i;nv©l~J,.~.·claims for dlltmage.s. agai!st 
physicians . and $.ur9eons pr.act:.i.q}~g, .in: the State of Idaho an4 
! 
in such cases against licenaM: .acut1;1: ·eax:e general hospitals 1 
~• I ope,;ating in the ·.state of Idal,19·, .are Q.ir.ected to coopsra.te: 
I 
I 
. in p1;ovid.i.11g a b:ea1zing ~.nel. ~~ :th'"'····"'ature of a special civj;l 
I • 
· gr.and· j\,lr:Y and procedur.e for pni-1:i,:t:tga:tion consideration of 
I 
~An appropriate ·commis~ion ·rep:?;"·e.sentativc ·of Idaho acute. car:e 
hq.spitetls·,. .q.Pi?.Q;i.nte.d .bJ the Go:Veit'nor.: £~om nominees sub!Uittedi by ·t.he Ida.ho Ho.sp.ital As~ociat,ion ·to . ..l:)e-,provided fo:r in final diraft 
0£- legisiation. · · · · i 
I 
· *"'~~il\i may be. expanded t::.Q includ~. $Uc:h additional providers 0£· 
heal.th care as professional SEfct'Vi~e c;orporation~ made up of • 
1?11yed.<:!ians 01:: dentists, p:ysiciana! .a.ssistants, nu:i::se pr.acti tliohers, 
denti6t'S, registered hurs~s ,. ·ru1r$.€l' .on1~st·hei;.istsf physician t
1
b:erapist.s, 
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. -P~iJy. -4-njut-1· ana wrongf~J:° ·diaA tn_: c:1~4n1s tor. dqma9es . ar:i.sing: (,::~: ';~!Y.~· , ,_.Ii:_" ::s::.;,, : ::•{: • : • ,,: : ,'; :.:.~:,, ~:-,~~· .. ::•;·•;,··/-) ,· . .. ·:•: •:·: <, ·.: : .. ~.- ::,, .,;:. • .:·,;, ,•·,:'\, ;:\• :1· ~-,,,>1' 
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Appendix: L 
MEDICAL MA!,PRACTIC:E 
Summary of Report 
The Legislature directed the Legislative Council to undertake and complete a study of legislative solutions to the problems inherent in medical malpractice. Senate Concur-rent Resolution No. 117 directed that a report be made to 1 the Second Regular Session of the Forty-third Idaho Legislature with legislation if necessary. 
As soon as the committee ~as formed, various interes~ed groups were contacted to provide resource information. Aithough representatives from many groups of£ered testimony, inform~tion and opinion, the result7 we~e inconclusive. Parti cularly
1
nettle-some, however, was the inab~lity to get insu.i:ers to say t~at one piece of legislation or anothe~ would result in increased availa-bility or reduced cost. 
The committee received notic,e :that the tuadical pro:fession was in the process of drafting legislation which they fel~ would provide solutions to the-problem. However, the committee recoromended that those bills, together with any other leg~s1ation which would later come up, be taken directly to the appropriate committees of the House and Senate for consideration. · 
Io ..,i;ts.~-~w::.t.,- tbe . comrni tt-Qe,•d-id--Ho-t;.--3".e(l:~··sGJ: etidg...ee ~a:ny -~xeg,±,s-i-at1.'"0n-;---·~7~e.;;-OL~ea.sure.1.-,;r;e'.J a.t..iJ!g ..;tc rneoi~cl:p:ta:ct±ce~±nsu1:anc:e- ~'"~e. .. .i~duced .. cw.ring =.the....W6 1ess; on, and i~·~e"wefe~~d. In brief, these p,rovide for a change in the expirati9n date to January 1, 197tl, fo'.r any joint underwriting asscciation created because of unavailability of rralpractice insurance; mandatory statistical reporting ;of a number of particulars for roalpractice ·suits; ;ai.iaa~. ~~i,-~-eonuttitt:.-ee befo;i;e.. • ...f,;i,ljn.g ~ce aui t-~ and p-rovisi ons conce.rnj ng .t:he-natur:e .ai:ic. nse. • .o:f.....expe;t.t test i J'Tl$1'l)' -i:n inalpractiee-~ • 
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SEPTEMBER 7, 2010 1 
2 
3 THE COURT: we wlll be on the record In Case 
4 No. CV-06-7149, Strong versus Intermountaln
 
s Anesthesia. Present on behalf of the plaintiff Is 
6 Lowell Hawkes, In the courtroom. Present by t
elephone 
7 on behalf of the defendants Is Kevin Scanlan. 
8 Tt,is Is the time :;et for hearing with rega
rd to 
9 the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to 
10 prci.ecute or, In the. alternqtfve, motion for summ
ary 
11 judgment. 
12 I have received considerable flllngs from
 the 
13 defendant In that regard. 1 have not yet received 
14 anything from the plaintiff. 
15 MR. HAWKES; That's true, Your Honor. 
My 
16 understanding Is this was a scheduling confer
ence 
17 today. The motion to lift the stay was, in the 
18 alternative, with the other. Kevin had flied --
19 THE COURT: Well, I have signed an orde
r 
20 lifting the stay. 
21 MR. HAWKES: Yes, without a hearing. The 
22 practical problem we have here Is that this case was 
23 In bankruptcy, and so the C13Se Is an asset of the 
2A bankruptcy, and I have never been able to get th
e --
25 either the trustee or Craig Jorgensen, the attorne
y In 
4 




1 bankruptcy, to tell me whether the tr1;1stee relea
sed 
2 this case as an asset. So l'm not ever totally 
3 comfortable being here asserting som:e claim ove
r this 
4 case when It was. 1 
5 Now Kevin and I have talked about It candi
dly, 
s and we both have been a llttle frustrated trying t
o 
1 get Information, 1:>ut I do not have anything that tells
 
8 me the trustee released this case wlt~out clalm, 
and 
9 so I had unclerst1;1od that we were here to have a stat
us 
10 conference ahd to schedule It, and th.en hopefully w
e 
11 can figure that out and see If I even ~ave autho
rity 
12 to act. ! 
13 THE COURT! Mr_ Scanlan? 




15 to lift the stay and had an order g ratited to that 
18 effect. And contemporaneously wlth
1that, we filed our 
17 motion to dismiss and motion for surhrnarv judgme
nt, 
I 
18 which has been noticed up to be heard today. 
19 As far as 1 can tell, it's ripe. A~d, you 
20 know, ultimately, this Is a case that has wallow
ed for 
I 
21 over four years since It was originally flied. And
 if 
22 at this point Mr. Hawkes doesn't have·- lf Mr. Hawkes 
23 doesn't have any basis or authority to proceed in the 
24 case, I think that It's rlpe to be dismissed. 
25 And If -- I think that, you know, we have 
5 I 
1 THE COURT: wen, you gave ,tne an affidavit. 
2. the motion to dismiss, 0s well as, If we needed to
 get 
3 to lt, the motion for summary judgment, but l don
't 
4 know that I have ,rnything f1Jrther to add to the 
, 2 MR. HAWKES: Yeah, advising! that, be
cause 
s filings that have been submitted to the Court. 
6 THE COURT: Afl right. WeU, l had anticip
ated 
7 we were addressing the surnmarv judgment dlsm
issal 
8 Issues today. 
9 I have reviewed the submissions of Mr. Scanlan, 
10 and It appears to me, from the PACER report, or th
e 
11 PACER printout, that this matter was discharg
ed and 
12 closed by the BankJ1Jptcy Court on May LS, 2009. The
 
13 trustee was dismissed or discharged, so I don't
 know 
14 what there is left to --1 mean, it's been two y
ears 
15 that the bankruptcy case has been over, 
HI MR. HAWKES! I don't have any problem with 
17 that, Your Honor. This Is a matter of Federal la
w. 
18 This case became an asset, and 1 don't know wh
ether It 
19 was dlsclosed. If It was disclosed, then the 
20 trustee --
21 iHE COURT: Well, you asked for the ma
tter to 
22 be stayed so that the --
23 MR, HAWKES: No, I didn't ask. That's 
Federal 
24 law. It's stayed automatluilly. I probably gave
 tha 
25 Court notice of that, but --




THE COURT: Yeah, 1 underst~nd that. 
MR. HAWKES: And I don't ha~e any beef with 
7 Craig Jorgensen, but even Including :facl!~to-face
 
8 efforts, I've said, l need to know, da1g, was this 
5 
6 
9 case dlsdosed as an asset? Becaus~ It Is an asset, I 
10 whether disclosed or not. · 
11 And the way I read the motloh, or what my
 
1:Z onderstandlng was, ls we were simply going to have
 
13 some scheduling t,ere today. I don'~ think just 
14 because a case Is dismissed that I sµddeoly hav
e 
15 authority and ownership of this casi, 
16 I've seen people -- certainly ~ead cases 
where 
17 people go to jail for not disclosing ah asset and 
18 treating it as their own after a bankruptcy. And 
19 that's my concern here, I don't want to get In that 
I 
20 bOX. 
21 THE COURT: Well, the trustJe 
didn't conduct 
2:2 any supplemental proceeding. 
I 
23 MR. HAWKES: No. It's my Jnderstanding
 it got 
24 dismissed, but if they don't dlsc\osJ the cese as an 
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1 serious trouble down the road if somebody pops up and 'I 
2 says, hey, here's an asset that we didn't get to deal 2 
:J with in the bankruptcy, You go to jail. 3 
4 THE COURT: I have now lifted the stay~ ,4 
5 Whether your client's In trouble or not, I don't know, s 
G but we're going to proceed. 6 
7 MR. HAWKl::S: That's your can. 'f 
8 THE COURT: Yeah, it's my call. D 
9 MR.. HAWKES: It's the Federal overlay that I'm 9 
10 concerned about. 10 
11 THE COURT: And l'm sure Jirn Pappes wlll let me 11 
12 know If I'm out of line, but th.it's mv order. 12 
13 So where do we go from therer 13 
14 MR. HAWKES: Well, ff that's where It is, I 14 
15 would request a reasonable amount of time, If I've 15 
16 got to deal with a c;ummary judgment, to get 16 
17 authorized, so that the Court, this Court doesn't put 117 
18 me In jeopardy of asserting ownership over an asset 1£1 
19 that I'm making a record here today I am not asserting 19 
20 ownership over, In the absence of clear authority 20 
Z'I frorn the Court that this clalm -- that any clalm to 21 
2.2 this case has been released. Give me some reasonable 22 
23 time to-· 23 
24 THE COURT: How much do you need? 24 
25 MR. HAWKES: Give me 60 days. 25 
8 
1 with nothing occurring as far as anyone either 1 
2 involving the bankruptcy trustee, getting -- making an 2 
3 effort to reopen the case or doing anything of that 3 
4 nature, at this point, we have now got a case that's 4 
5 more than four years old, and it's two years post the 5 
s closure of the bankruptcy. We've got witnesses who, 6 
7 one, we've lost track of and, two, have moved out of 1 
l.l state outside of our jurisdiction. 8 
9 We think at this point that It's appropriate 9 
10 for the Court to evaluate this case and make a 10 
11 detennlnation on the failure to prosecute. 11 
12 THE COURT: All rtght. Well, l'm going to 12 
13 reset the dismissal summary Judgment Issue for the 1st 13 
14 of November at 9:30. 14 
15 I'll give you that much tlme, Mr. Hawkes, to 15 
16 get a response. That's 60 days roughly. 16 
1T MR. HAWKES: Okay, 17 
18 THE COURT: And we'll -- this has been lying 18 
19 dormant for a long time. Sixty days Isn't going to 19 
20 hurt anything. I'll give you 60 days to figure out 20 
21 where you are. We'll hear this thing at that time, 21 
22 9:30, November lst. 22 
23 All right? 23 
24 MR. SCANLAN: Thank you, Judg@. 24 
ZS THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 26 
10 
083958585 P.6 
THE COURT: Do you have any qrobrem with that, 
Mr. Scanlan? i 
MR. SCANLAN: Well, Your Hondr, I actually -- I 
think that at this point In time that the Court should 
be in a position to actually make the d~terminatlon on 
I 
the -- i 
THE COURT: l understand that~ Mr. Hawkes is 
I 
saying that he feels like he is comprorpised because he 
doesn't feel llke, without confirmation ithat thls 
I 
clalm Itself has been freed up by the Sankruptc;y 
Court, that he has authority to proceetl, even though l 
' 
have lifted the stay. i 
MR. SCANLAN! Well, I think th~t the --1 think 
. I 
that the rnaterlals that we submitted demonstrates that I 
the asset wasn't disclosed In the bank'ruptcy, and that 
for that reason judicial estoppal should cause It to 
be dismissed. : 
I 
But more slgniflcantly, we have hl!d more than 
two years, and I have made efforts fdr appro):'.imately 
a year now to take steps to try to get
1thls thing 
I 
moved along, which rec1lly shouldn't qe tny burden; it 
should be the burden of Mr. Hawkes, 'Mr. Strong's 
I attorney. 
By contacting Lowell Hawkes, Jpprising him of 
I 
my concerns and trying to push this ~hing forward, 
9 1 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF rlE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS L. STRONG, and BRIAN K. 




lNTERMOUNTAJN ANESTHESIA, P.A. and 
MARCUS E. MURPHY, M.D., 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO 11 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE Ti 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE, R 
ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT I 
Defendants. I 
I 
COME NOW Defendants lntennountain Anesthesia, P.A. ("lntermountain Anisthesia") 
and Marcus E. Murphy, M.D. ("Dr. Murphy"), by and through their counsel of record, Hall, 
I 
I Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., and hereby respectfully submit this Reply to jlaintiffs' 
Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute, or Altemativelri, Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
In this motion Defendants seek the following orders from this Court: 
1) That Plaintiffs' lawsuit, including the claims of both Brian Hawk and Thomas 
I 
I Strong, be dismissed in its entirety for failure to prosecute; I 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE T!D PROSECUTE. OR ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT· l j 
I 
10/25/10 15:32 FAX 208 395 8:'i.115 HALL FARLEY [4J OO:J/01:J 
I 
2) That Defendant Intermountain A~esthesia be awarded summary ,
1
1 judgment 
because Plaintiffs' Complaint was not timely filed as to and 
I 
3) That all Defendants be granted summary judgment with regard to the claims of 
Brian Hawk based on the doctrine of judicial estoppel. I 
In opposition to Defendants' Motion, Plaintiffs fail to identify any disputed material fact, 
and offer Il.Q legal argument or authority in opposhion to Defendants' Motion to Dlsmiss for 
Failure to Prosecute, or to Defendants' Motion for Summ~ Judgment against Bjan Hawk 
based on judicial estoppel1• Accordingly, Defendants respectfully request that Plaintils' lawsuit 
be dismissed in its entirety pursuant to Idaho Code.§ 4l(b) for failure to prosecute, Td/or that 
the claim of Brian Hawk be dismissed based on the ·doctrine of judicial estoppel. Witl regard to 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment based on Plaintiffs' failure to timely file their 
i 
lawsuit against Intermountain Anesthesia, Defendants assert tliat Idaho Code § 6-100 ~ does not 
app I y to claims against lntermountain Anesthesia, and therefo;e the tolling provision o 1 § 6 -1005 
is also inapplicable to such claims. ! I 
I 
FAIL URE TO PROSECUTE I 
It is appropriate to dismiss a lawsuit for fai
1
Iure to prosecute where the plaintiff delays 
prosecution, without justification, and the defend~t is pref udiced thereby. As sel forth in 
Defendants' moving papers, an unexplained delay of 16 mon~~ justifies dismissal of a riaintiff' s 
! I 
lawsuil Day v. CIBA Geigy Corp., 115 Idaho lO 15, 712 P .2d ~11 (1985). i 
In the instant matter the following facts are ~disputed: I 
I, 
I 
I) The prosecution of Plaintiffs' action was stayed pending resolution of Br~in 
Hawk's bankruptcy petition; I 
1 P~aimiffa' len~hy fact rendition (signific~nt portions of which ~re disput~d by defo?dants) a~d the variohs 
affidavits submmed are not addressed herem as they are wholly irrelevant to rhc motions pendmg before tre Court 
and appear to simply be an effort by plaintiffs to distract the Court from the issues that have been present1d in 




DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO MOTION ·1~p D1SMISS FOR FAILURE Tp 5 4 
PROSECUTE, OR ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR SUMMARY ru9rMENT. 2 I 
' ! 





The bankruptcy petition was dismissed on May I 5, 2008; 
The Plaintiffs did nothing to prosecute their claims for more than mpnths after 
the bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed, despite repeated inquiries by 
D~fendants' c~unsel regarding Plaintiffs' inte~tions; . I . 
Witnesses Waid and Schmalz are no longer w1th Intermountam Anesthes1a; Nurse 
anesthetist Waid's whereabouts are unknown.and Nurse Anesthetist Sc
1 
aJz has 
moved out of state; and 
5) Witness Robert Hague passed away. 
Plaintiffs have delayed prosecution of the; claims for over 2 years after resrlution of 
Hawk's bankruptcy. Plaintiffs have offered no justification for this lengthy and u1ecessary delay. The delay has prejudiced Defendants' ability to defend against Plaintiffs' claims: ii is 
• I , I I 
now over 6 years since the incidents occurred; it has been ov'er 2 years since the blptcy was 
resolved; memories are obviously stale; Mary Waid's whereabouts arc tmknown;.l.Christian 
Schmalz is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court; and Robert Hague is deceased. AH of these 
prejudices are a direct result of Plaintiffs' delay, and could have been avoided had Plaintiffs 
diligently prosecuted their claims. 
Pursuant to Rule § 41 (b) of the Idaho Rules: of Civil :Procedure, and the IdahoJ Supreme 
Court's decisions in Day v. CIBA Geigy Corp., US Idaho 1015, 712 P.2d 611 (lr85), and 
Roberts v. Verner, 116 Idaho 575, 777 P.2d 1248 (1989), Defendants respectfully re uest that 
I 
Plaintiffs' lawsuit be dismissed in its entirety. 
: I 
FAILURE TO TIMELY,:FILE LAWSUIT i 
AGAINST INTER.MOUNTtIN ANESTHESIA I 
It is undisputed that the statute of limitations ror filing a medical malpractice claim is two 
years, and that the statute began to run on Plaintiffs' claims .. from the date of their prpcedures, 
. I 
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i 
December 20, 2006. Plaintiffs' lawsuit was untibely filed, as to Intermountain Lesthesia, 
I ,, I 
.· .. · I 
unless the statute of limitations for the plaintiffs ~laims ag~inst Intermountain Anes~esia was 
tolled pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-1005. ! 
The tolling provision of Section 6· l 005 1oes not . apply to Plaintiffs' claims against 
lntermountain Anesthesrn because lntermountain ;\nesthesi~ is not a physician, surg~on, or fill 
acute care general hospital. Pursuant to its expres~ terms, Idaho Code § 6-100 l applies only to 
physicians, surgeons, or acute care general hospitals. ~t does not apply to p~ofessional 
I: ·I I 
. ' 










The rules of statutory interpretation are weltl;settled in·ldaho. 
,i 
I. 
Where the language of a statute is p\ain and unambiguous, this Court mist 
give effect to the statute as written, withoilt engaging, in statutory constructi. n. 
II 
State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.~d 685, 688 (1999); State v. Burni :ht, 
132 Idaho 654,659, 978 P.2d 214,219 (19.99); State.1,. Escobar, 134 ldaho 387, 
389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000). The laq,guage of\he statute is to be given lits 
plain, obvious, ~d rational meaning: Burnigfit. 13~ ldiaho at 6?9, 978 P.2d at 2l9. 
If the language 1s clear and unambiguous, ;:P1ere 1s rio occas10n for the court I to 
resort to legislative history or rules of statut~ry interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idto 
at 389, 3 P.3d at 67. When this Court must ~~gage in '.~tatutory construction, it ~as 
the duty to ascertain the legislative intent an~ give effect to that intent. Rhode, 1~3 
Idaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688. To ascertain!lthc intent of the legislature, not o~ly 
must the literal words of the statute be examined, hut also the context of thqse 
words, the public policy behind the statut#,l and its ;,!legislative history. Id. It! is 
incumbent upon a court to give a statute an !~nterpreta~lon which will not render it 
a nullity. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 64ip, 22 P.39 l 16, 121 (Ct. App. 200~). 
Construction of a statute that would lead 10!:~n absurd result are disfavored. Stqte 
v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 275, 92 P.3d 521, ~;Q5 (2004~; State v. Yager, 139 Idapo 
680, 690, 85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004). :
1
1 : 
State v. Locke 239 P.3d 34, 35 (Ct. App. 2010) ;il .· 
In this case, the language ofldaho Code § l1001 is JJain and unambiguous. Therefore, 
1l ·· I 
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',, 
I 
and rational meaning. Pursuant to § l prelitigation hearings are rJquired for 
!i I 
malpractice claims against "physicians surg~9ns .or jsgainst acute c,re 
':I 
hospitals ... " By its terms, § 6-1001 does not apJiy to professional corporations, or io medical 
: , I I 
facilities other than acute care general hospitals. i:hcre is no:! occasion for this court tol engage in 
! 'I I 
statutory interpretation to enlarge the scope of§ 61 ~ 00 l beyo*d its expressed terms. j 
i: :·1 
Should this Court engage in statutory intelP,Telation Or§ 6-1001, however, it has the duty 
· I ;II I 
to ascertain the legislative intent and give effect JJ that inteiL Plaintiffs offer no evirl ence that 
: : it! 
I I ',! 
: :1 ::1 
the legislature intended to include professional cotorations,:;J'medical facilities or practices other 
th l h . l . h' h : : f I I an acute care genera osp1ta s wn mt e parameters o § q~ 1001. To the contrary, tie fact that 
I ,,1 
the legislature specifically listed "acute care gene~~l hospital{' to the exclusion of oth~r medical 
• i :i I ' II I 
facilities where physicians and/or surgeons practke:, is evide~ce of the legislature's intent to limit 
; : :II I 
the scope of required prelitigation hearings to onlt rlaims •gtinst physicians, surgeonrnd acute 
care general hospitals. This interpretation is further ,support 11,~ statutory language of§ p-1012. 
Section 6-1012 states, in relevant part, the i! llowing ,'~ I 
In any case, claim or action for dan;i.ages due 110 injury or to death of any 
person, brought against any physician and, •surgeon lior other provider of hea~th 
care, including, without limitation, any ! <ientist, ''.physicians assistant, nupe 
practitioner, registered nurse, licensed practical nurs#, nurse anesthetist, medifal 
technologist, physical therapist, hospitalJ' or nurs:·ng home or any perspn 
vicariously liable for the negligence of th~m or anyi of them, on account of ~he 
~ro.visions of or failure to provide ~1e~It4: care. or:\ on account of any matter 
1nc1dental or related thereto, such Plamt1ff!or claimant must .. , prove ... t~at 
such Defendant then and there negligently :failed to &eet the applicable standfd 
of health care practice . . ,i : II I 
The language of § 6- l O 12 clearly shows thdt the legislature intended to include! all health 
care providers within its scope. Had the legislaturJ;intendedl to include all health careclproviders 
,1 • I 
and health care facilities within the scope of§ 6-iOOl, it cduld have used language d terms 
: I I I, i
1 
, 
similar to that of§ 6-1012. The fact that the scope 'of § 6-10 l2 is so broad, and that the scope of 
l: .ii 1' 
t: ii 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO PLATNTrFFS' RESPONSE TO; MOTION 1f0 DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO 
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§ 6-1 00 I is so narrow, demonstrates the le gis laturl, speci lief 11 y intended to limit the /cope of § 
6-1001 to and acute care hosbitals to the of all other 
i I 
health care practitioners and health care facilities. j i I 
I I 
Furthermore, the legislature selective listinks of cov~red individuals and entitles in § 6-
1 :1 I . 
l 001 and § 6-1012 indicates that the legislature di9 not inte~d to include all medical 1alpractice 
claims within the scope of§ 6-1001. Idaho's MediLI MalprLtice Act (Idaho State Co6e Title 6, 
Chpt. 10) arose out of concern about the cost and ~vailabilil/j of medical malpractice (nsurancc. 
·:1 I I 
In 1975 the Idaho Legislature directed the Legislatiive Council to undertake and compl~te a study 
' I I 
of the legislative solutions to the problems inherit\n medic~ malpractice. As part oi:I the study 
I I !Ii 
lhe medical association submitted some specific bips; incluqing two bills whlch were fltimately 
' I I 
amended to become Idaho Code §§ 6001 and 6tl2. (See,!Affidavit of Jeffrey R. ifl ownsend 




The bill regarding prelitigation hearings pr~~ided, in relevant part: I 
.I I I 
The Idal10 State Board of Me4cine, in : alleged malpractice ca~es 
involving claims for damages against physicians an1'1 surge()ns practicing in the 
State of Idaho and * in such cases agains~i licensed acute care general 
hospit~ls operati?g in the State of Idah~, **/ a~e dfrecf~d to cooperate in provid~ng 
~ ~eai:ing pan~l m t~e nature o.f a _s~ecial c~v1l grand11Jury and p~oced:11'e for Pfe-
ht1gat1on conslderat1on of bodily mJury an~ wrongfi)d death clrums for dama~es 
arising out of alleged negligence of the pr?vision o~ hospital or medical care in 
the State of Idaho . . . :[ ! 
The note tied to the double astrix (">l<*") reads as fotJows: 
This may be expanded to include sJch additi, nal providers of health c· re 
as professional service corporations made up of physibians or dentists, physiciail's 
assistants, nurse practitioners, dentists, r~gistered ll;nurses, nurse anestheti~ts, 
physician therapists, licensed practitioners, 1letc. and I=l~rsons vicariously liable for 
their negligence, ' I · 1· 
J I • 
The Idaho Legislature passed § 6-1001 in 1976 \Vitho~t expanding the scope of µie statute 
I I I 
to include professional service corporations, or other Jedical care providers ~ther than 
i !I I 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE Tj MOTION t DISMISS FOR FAILURE to 
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i ii I 
physicians, surgeons and acute care general ho~pita!s. lonversdy, the bill regcil-ding the 
\ I I 
requirement of proof negligence by expert testi~ony also was drafted to include o1Iy claims
 
against "any licensed physician and surgeon or against any licensed acute care hospital* ... " 
: I 
The astrix included language to expand the scope t~ other m ! dical care providers, just las did the 
b·11 ct· 1· · - h - , I I 1 regar mg pre 1hgahon eanng panels. Idaho qodc § 6-1 i1 12, however, was enacter with the 
., I 
broader language. . i I 
1 
ln enacting the medical malpractice act, th~ Idaho leJ1slature was obviously cognizant of 
the option of broadening the scope of § 6-1001 an6 6-1012 {b include professional co~orations I II I 
and additional medical providers, as well as thdse who J ay be vicariously liabl9 for their 
i I I 
negligence. The legislature chose to limit the scope of § 6 1001 to physicians, surgeons and 
_: I I 
acute care general hospitals, to the exclusion ofl all otherJ - including "professiodal service 
; I j 
corporations made up of physicians or dentists~ physicif' s assistants, nurse pr ctitioners, 
1 
!1. I 
dentists, registered nurses, nurse anesthetists, phys.cian thertsts, licensed practitione1s, etc. and 
persons vicariously liable for their negligence.\' The jegislature did not inten~ for the 
prelitigation hearing requirements of § 6-100 i to appll to claims against pLfessional 
· h . h . ) . 1 II 'bl " h · I 1· COrporatIOilS, nurse anest. ehstS, Or t OSe VlCilOUS y rsponst e 10r t CIT neg 1gence. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs' claims against Jntermounjain Anes· esia, and any claims b~ed on the 
alleged negligence of the nurse anesthetists, are no~ subject t11 § 6-1001. i 
.I I 
The tolling provision of § 6-1005 applieJ only 10 • ·!aims subject to the prtlitiigation 
hearing requirement of § 6-1001; claims against. bhysicianJ surgeons, and acute cale medical 
hospitals. The tolling provision of § 6-J 005 ~ocs not I pply to Plaintiffs' clai4s against 
. h . I II t· i . ilil . h t" b I h Intermountam Anest es1a, or to t 1e a ega ions _against · nurse ariest e 1sts, e~ause sue 
· I I 
claims are not subject to the prelitigati on hearing/ requircm ! nts of § 6-1001. P laintif s did no! 
I 
. I 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TJ MOTION I ·o DlSMISS FOR FAILURE ~o ·1 I 
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claims against Intermountain Anesthesia, or the n 
I 
se anesthetists within thd two year 
t f 1- . t' A d' I I • . Al h -i - . l d . d I statue o 1m1ta 1ons. ccor mg y, ntermountain nest es1 1s enht e to JU gment as a matter 
I 
I I of law. 
Plaintiffs are attempting to bootstrap •!legations· of negligence against f he nurse 
anesthetists to Dr. Murphy for purposes of avoidlihg the st1,ute of limitations. As set forth in 
1 · rff: ' · · h' · h · 1 · ! 1 - d · · 11 hi 11 d p am 1 s oppos1t10n to t 1s motion, t elf c anES are pr n11se pnnc1pa y on t 
1
e a ege 
negligence of the nurse anesthetists, that CRN~ Christi4. Schmalz allegedly tumtd up the 
volume of Propofol and left the operating table dting Mr. ~trong's procedure, and t1lat CRNA 
Jeff Taylor did not give Brian Hawk enough rnedic~tion duri~g his procedure to conj! his pain. 
Pl - -ft' , l . fi . . . . . f h : lJ d )1 f h 11 . . amt! S C aims or lI~Unes artsmg out O . l e a rge neg (gence O t e nurse anest(l1S1S are 
not subject to § 6-100 I. Plaintiffs are attempting an end rn around the two year i statute of 
limitations for claims against. nurse anesthetists by namibg Intennountain Ancsttlesia as a 
: f I I I 
defendant. The tolling provision of§ 6-1005 ~vas fnot inten d to be a loophole for plaintiffs to 
I I I 
! I I 
I I avoid compliance with the statute of limitations. 
I I 
Interpreting the term "physician" to incl1:1~e any m ical facility where a p~ysician or 
surgeon is employed is inconsistent with the l.:,gu~e of§ 6: 1001. By way of example, the fact 
that registered nurses and nursing homes are specl fically I ird in § 6-1 012, yet left .Jut of § 6-
1 00 I , indicates that the legislature did not intend t~ impose t e pre! i ti gation hearing rejuirements 
of § 6-100 I to a claim of medical malpractice: agf nst a re11·tered nurse in a nursing! home. If 
"physician" is defined as any facility that employs ·a physid n, however, then the clalm against 
' I: I I 
the nurse and nursing home would be subject t~ § 6i 100 I; a r;J sult not intended by the Ibgislature. 
: I I 
• 1 
Idaho Code § 6-1001 was not intended tb apply ti professional corporations, or any 
medical provider other than physicians, surgeons land acut~ care general hospitals. ~he broad 
• I I 
I I I 
i I I 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE T(? MOTIONf O DISMISS FOR FAILURE ITO 
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. l I 
expansion of § 6-100 I proposed by plaintiff las 
I 
spccifi J( considered, and rej eJd, by the 
Idaho Legislature. Expanding the scope § 001 to allow a plaintiff to maintaln a claim 
against a professional corporation based on the; alleged heglitnce of nurse anesthetist was not 
. : I I 
intended by the legislature, and would permit thr plaintif: to avoid the applicable II statute of 
I • I 
limitations for claims against nurse anesthetist;. In th' s case, Plaintiffs' claims against 
. th . . . :I I 







Plaintiffs fail to offer any legal argument or au,rity in oppos1t10n to D~fendants' 
Motion to dismiss Brian Hawk's claim based on th~ do~trine of judicial estopp~l. Indeed, 
Plaintiffs do not even address the issue in their opposition brJ f I 
; . :I I 
Plaintiffs' opposition fails to address the ~ery i_ssue: ror which this court co~tinued the 
I 
hearing on this motion. When this motion initialJY cam~ u for hearing on Septembdr 7, 2010, 
: · I I 
plaintiffs' counsel acknowledged that Brian Hawk's· civil claim is an asset subject to the 
bankruptcy proceedings, but st:ated he did not knor if the cl ·ii matte, had been discltl sed in the 
bankruptcy proceeding or whether the bankruptcy trustee ha released the civil claim s an asset. . . . . 
Plaintiffs' attorney requested 60 days to disco~er/whether • ere was any claim to Brian Hawk's 
civil action. (Townsend Alf. 1 4). Plaintiffs' b~position ! ails to identify what stets, if any, 
plaintiffs' attorney took to resolve the questions ,Jised ~uri1 the prior hearing. The ,bpposition 
offers no evidence that Brain Hawk disclosed l~is civil cl im as an asset in the Ja.nkruptcy 
proceeding, or that the frustee released the: cJJim as all asset prior to terminatjon of the 
I 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO PLAlNTlffS' RESPONSE TO MOTION'. 0 DJSMTSS FOR FArLuRE/To 
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Brian Hawk filed a request for a prelitigation hearing ~ medical 
malpractice claim against Dr. Murphy n May 24, 2006, approximately 4V:i months 
2. 
3. 
prior to filing a petition for bankruptcy on October 9, 2006. I , I 
I 
He filed an amended property schedule on November 11, 2006. I 
i 
He failed to identify his claims; or :potential claims, against Dr. Murphy in the 
schedule of assets, or the amended schedule of assets. 
4. He filed this civil action on Dedem6er 20, 2006, approximately 2:4 molnths after 
filing his bankruptcy petition. . 1 
In general, judicial estoppel precludes a:party from gathering an advantage by tlking one 
position in a legal proceeding, and then seeking a :second a~vantage by taking an inclmpatible 
position in a second proceeding. A&J Construction Co., In;. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682j 116 PJd 
. . I 
12 (2005). In the bankruptcy context, the doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes a Plaintiff from 
asserting a cause of action in a civil action: if .the Plaintiff knew of the claim ~uring his 
bankruptcy proceedings and failed to identify: the: claim in: a reorganization plan or Ito list the 
claim in his schedules or disclosure statements: A &J Constf uction Co .. Inc. v_ Wood, 1141 Idaho 
682, 116 P.3d 12 (2005). The duty to disclose alliassets and potential assets continJs after the 
' I I 
initial filing, since a debtor is required to amend his or her financial statements if circ}illlstances 
. I 
change, and judicial estoppel will be imposed whe~ the debtor has knowledge of cnouph facts to 
I ! ! 
' 
know that a potential cause of action exists during the pendency of the bankruptcy, l}ut fails to 
: : I 
amend his schedules or disclosure statements to identify the cause of action as a contin~ent asset. 
A&J Construction Co., Inc. V. Wood, t 41 Idaho 682, 116 P.3d 12 (2005). I 
I 
It is undisputed that Brian Hawk knew of his potential, and actual, cause of action against 
Dr. Murphy and Intennountain Anesthesia during; the pendLcy of this bankruptcy, kd that he 
failed to identify the claim in his schedules, or disclosur~ statements. Therefore, I under t
he 
I 
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doctrine of judicial estoppel, Brian Hawk's claiins ~hould be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts set forth in Defendants' Motion: are undisputed. Plaim.iffs did not file their 
Complaint against Intennountain Anesthesia, within two years of the incident jd alleged 
injuries. Plaintiffs failed to prosecute their claims for over two years after the resolutioh of Brian 
. : I 
Hawk's bankruptcy despite every right and ~bli~ation to do so. The delay has f rejudiced 
Defendants' ability to defend against Plaintiffs'I allegations. Brian Hawk was aware of his claim 
: I . i I 
against Defendants during the pendency of his bankruptcy, yet failed to identify it in schedules or 
I 
disclosure statements. I 
For !he reasons set forth above, an~ "7 set forth in Defendants' moVi~g papers, 
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l HEREBY CERTYFY that on the 2_$/ ct~y of October, 2010, I caused to b~ served a 
1 ! I 
true copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' jREPL Y TO PLAINTIFFS' RESPqNSE TO 
, I I 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE ~o: PROSECUTE, OR ALTERNATIVELY, 
. : I I 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
I • I I . 
each of the following: , 
Lowell N. Hawkes 
Ryan S. Lewis 
Lowe I I N. Hawkes, Chartered 
l 322 East Center 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
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DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS" RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE 6 4 
PROSECUTE OR AL TERNA TlVELY MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT· 12 I 
' ' ! t 
I ; 
Lowell . Hawkes (lSB 1852) 
S. (ISB 
LOWELL N. HA \VKES. C!IARTERED 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello. Idaho 8320 l 
Telephone: (208) 235-1600 
FAX: (208) 235-4200 
Allornf.!ys/<>r Plaimiff\· 
IN THE SEVENTH .JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY, IDAHO 
The Honorable .Jon .J. Shindurling 
THOMAS L STRONG and 
BRIAN K. HA WK. 
vs. 
INTERMOUNTAIN ANESTHESIA. P.A. 
AND MARCl JS E. MURPHY. M.D .. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-06-7 l 49 
NOTICE OF REOPENING OF 
BANKRUPTCY and 
AUTOMATIC STAY ORDER 
(11 u.s.c. § 362) 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE TI IAT pursuant to the Order of United Stales 
Bankruptcy Judge Jim D. Pappas entered October 29. 20 IO reopening the bankruptcy or 
Brian l lawk the automatic stay provisions or 11 U.S.C. ~ 362 arc in effect. 
DATED this 29111 dav of October. 20 l 0 
NOTICE OF REOPENING OF BANKRUPTCY AND AUTOMATIC STAY ORDER - Page 1 
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THOMAS I~ STRONG mKl 
T!l<IANK.J!AWK. 
l'tamtlffe, 
IN11,RMOUNTAIN ANR<;TIJR<;IA, l'.A 
AND MARCUS fc MIJRl'!IY, MJ>~ 
Case Nu CV./lt,. 7149 
NOTICE OF REOPENING OF 
BANKRUPTCY and 
AUTOMATIC STAY ORDER 
(11 u.s.c. § 362) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 






INTERMOUNTAIN ANESTHESIA, P .A. ) 
et al, ) 





Defendants. ) .~ 
\0 _______________ ) 
On November 1, 2010, at 10:05 AM, a Motion for Summary Judgment came on for 
hearing before the Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, sitting in open court at Idaho 
Falls, Idaho. 
Ms. Nancy Marlow, Court Repo1ier, and Ms. Grace Walters, Deputy Court Clerk, were 
present. Mr. Lowell Hawkes appeared on behalf of the plaintiff. Mr. Kevin Scanlan appeared on 
behalf of the defendant. 
The Court received a Notice of Bankruptcy and Notice of Stay filed by Lowell Hawkes 
dated October 29, 2010. 
Mr. Scanlan voiced his views of the notice and stay. 
The Court stayed this matter until further notice. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
c: Lowell Hawkes 
Kevin Scanlan 
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Richard Hall 
ISB 111253; reh@dukescanlan.com 
J. Scanlan 
ISB #552 l; kjs@dukcscanlan.com 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
1087 W. River St, Ste. 300 
P.O. Box 7387 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 342-3310 
Facsimile: (208) 342-3299 
V'.Cli1~1 f>!t1•:U•'.l6-0Dl llawk 1· S1t,nf.l'LEADr:~G~•Rtt1•\\'0tr1w1-MSJ-Ddmll:o:llJ.-h'OU..C.,..,,.:uoM 1b, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVTLLE 




INTERMOUNTAIN ANESTHESIA, P.A. and 
MARCUS MURl)HY, M.D., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 06-7149 
NOTICE OF HEARING RE: 
DEFENDANTS' RENEWED 
MOTION TO DlSMlSS, OR 
ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
[TIME CORRECTION ONLY] 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, Defendants have set for hearing before this Court their 
RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS, OR ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. Said motion shall be heard on the 12th day of May, 2014 at 10:00 am before the 
Honorable Jon J. Shindurling. 
DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS, OR ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT !TIME CORRECTION) l 
4/11/ 4 F : 0 7 
71. 
2014/04/11150718 /3 
Ith April, 14. 
& 
CERTil1CATE OJ<' SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11th day of A.pril, 2014, T cause<l to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
followfog: 
Lowell N. Hawkes 
Ryan S. Lewis 
Lowell N. Hawkes, Chartered 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
Facsin:tik (208) 235-4200 
[J U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[] Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
·g] Telecopy 
DEF.END.ANTS' RENEWED MOTION TO DlSMfSS, OR ALTF.RNATfV)LLY, MOT.ION HJR 
SL MM.ARY .nmGM.ENT (TIJ\fE CORRECTION]-· 2 
0. 3 8 04 / 1/ 4/ 7PM 
72 
Richard E. Hall 
ISB #1253; reh@dukescanlan.com 
Kevin J. Scanlan 
ISB #5521; kis@dukescanlan.com 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
1087 W. River St, Ste. 300 
P.O. Box 7387 
Boise, Idaho 83 707 
Telephone: (208) 342-3310 
Facsimile: (208) 342-3299 
V:\Clienl Files\26\16-00 l Hawk v Slrong_\PLl:ADINGS\Sul>,t1tutio11-Notice,doc 
Attorneys for Defendants 
i \' / 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that during the course of the stay of this matter, the law 
firm of Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A. dissolved and counsel of record for Defendants, 
Richard E. Hall and Kevin J. Scanlan, are now with the law firm of DUKE SCANLAN & 
HALL, PLLC. The address for Richard E. Hall and Kevin J. Scanlan has changed, and it is 
hereby requested that all pleadings, correspondence and other matters be served on said counsel 
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at following: 
DUKE SCANLAN & 
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INTERMOUNTAIN ANESTHESIA, P.A. and 
MARCUS E. MURPHY, M.D., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 06-7149 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' RENEWED 
MOTION TO DISMISS, OR 
ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COME NOW Defendants Intermountain Anesthesia, P.A. and Marcus E. Murphy, M.D. 
( collectively "Defendants"), through their counsel of record, Duke Scanlan & Hall, PLLC, and 
submit the following memorandum of points and authorities in support of their Renewed Motion 
to Dismiss, or Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment. 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Although Plaintiffs Thomas L. Strong and Brian K. Hawk ( collectively "Plaintiffs") were 
successful in convincing this Court to stay this action after Mr. Hawk's bankruptcy proceedings 
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were reopened, Defendants continue to be entitled to dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims against them 
with prejudice the reasons cited originally filed briefing. See Memorandum in 
Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute, or Alternatively, Motion for 
Summary Judgment (June 26, 2010); Reply lvfemorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute, or Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment (Oct 4, 2010). 
Mr. Hawk's claims should still be dismissed on the basis of judicial estoppel. Although 
Mr. Hawk placed this suit before the bankruptcy court after he was granted a discharge, the fact 
remains that this suit is not listed in the asset schedule upon which Mr. Hawk's chapter 7 
discharge was based, nor was that asset schedule ever amended to reflect these claims. 
Accordingly, because this claim was not properly disclosed to the bankruptcy court by Mr. 
Hawk, he is now estopped from pursuing it before this Court. 
Further, because the record before this Comi still demonstrates a lack of any prosecution 
of this matter for a period of more than 12 months since Mr. Hawk's bankruptcy proceedings 
were again closed, as well as a failure to prosecute the reopened bankruptcy proceedings and the 
claims asserted in this matter by Mr. Strong that are unaffected by Mr. Hawk's bankruptcy, 
dismissal of this matter is warranted pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ("IRCP") 40( c) 
and 41 (b ). Dismissal pursuant to Rule 40( c) is warranted because Plaintiffs will be unable to 
demonstrate good cause for their failure to take reasonable steps in causing either Mr. Hawk's 
reopened bankruptcy proceedings or this action to be prosecuted in a similar fashion. Similarly, 
dismissal pursuant to Rule 41 (b) is warranted because the record also demonstrates that 
Plaintiffs' lack of prosecution of claims has resulted in prejudice to the Defendants, including the 
inability to conduct any discovery concerning an alleged injury that happened nearly ten years 
ago, the death of a key witness who passed away before he could be deposed, and current 
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absence of several other key witnesses from this jurisdiction. This prejudice flows from 
inaction and provides ample basis 
pursuant to Rule 4l(b). 
this matter to be dismissed its entirety 
Finally, the claims against Intermountain Anesthesia should be dismissed on the basis of 
the applicable statute of limitations. Although this matter is thoroughly briefed in the June 26, 
2010, and October 4, 2010, memoranda referenced above, Defendants have provided new 
authority showing that because the claims against Intermountain Anesthesia were not before the 
prelitigation screening panel and, thus, the statute of limitations applicable to those claims was 
not tolled by Idaho Code § 6-1005, Plaintiffs' claims against Intermountain Anesthesia were not 
timely and should be dismissed with prejudice. 
II. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This is an action for medical malpractice in which Plaintiffs Thomas L. Strong 
and Brian K. Hawk ( collectively "Plaintiffs") generally allege negligence in the conduct of 
Defendants relative to anesthesia care provided to plaintiffs on June 25, 2004, when each 
plaintiff underwent a separate surgical implant procedure to place a neuron stimulator. The 
surgeries were performed by Catherine Linderman, M.D., at Eastern Idaho Regional Medical 
Center in Idaho Falls, Idaho. (Complaint and Jury Demand, 1 5.) The anesthesia was 
administered to plaintiffs by certified registered nurse anesthetists ("CRNA") Christian Schmalz 
and Mary Waid. On May 24, 2006, both Plaintiffs filed separate prelitigation screening requests 
against Defendant Murphy with the Idaho State Board of Medicine, pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-
1001 et seq. (Affidavit of Kevin J. Scanlan in Support of Defendant Intermountain Anesthesia, 
P.A.'s Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter "First Scanlan Aff."), Exs. A, B). Defendant Intermountain 
Anesthesia was not named in the prelitigation screening panel requests. (Id.). 
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On November 10, 2006, the prelitigation screening panel hearings were conducted in the 
and on November 20, 2006, the panel's 
Idaho State Board of Medicine. (Id, ,r,r 5-7; 
opinions on both matters were issued by 
C, D.) Thereafter, on December 20, 2006, 
plaintiffs jointly filed a complaint for medical malpractice in this Court, naming as defendants 
Intermountain Anesthesia, P.A. and Marcus E. Murphy, M.D. (See Complaint and Jury 
Demand). No lawsuit had been filed by plaintiffs against Intermountain Anesthesia concerning 
plaintiffs' alleged injuries in this matter prior to the filing of plaintiffs' Complaint on December 
20, 2006. 
Plaintiff Brian Hawk filed a petition for bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, 
District of Idaho, on October 9, 2006. (First Scanlan Aff., ir,r 8 and 9, Exs. E & F). He filed an 
amended property schedule on November 11, 2006. (Id, ,r 10, Ex. G). Mr. Hawk failed to 
identify his claim, or potential claim, against Defendants in the schedule of assets, or the 
amended schedule of assets, despite previously filing a request for a Prelitigation Screening 
Panel hearing, and then filing the civil action less than two months after filing the amended 
schedule of assets. On January 23, 2007, Lowell Hawkes, Mr. Hawk's attorney in the civil 
matter, informed defense counsel in the civil matter, that he was "in touch with the Trustee," but 
had not been authorized as special counsel (Id, ,r 12, Ex. I). 
On March 7, 2007, this Court issued a stay pending Mr. Hawk's bankruptcy proceeding. 
On April 23, 2008, the bankruptcy trustee issued his Supplemental Final Accounting, certifying 
that the estate had been fully administered, and requesting that the case be closed and the Trustee 
be discharged. (Id, ,r 11, Ex. H) On May 15, 2008, the Bankruptcy Court issued an order 
approving the Trustee's Supplemental Final Report, discharging the Trustee and closing the case. 
(Id., ,r 8, Ex. E). 
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Based on a subsequent period of inaction (more than 24 months) since the bankruptcy 
estate was closed, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment on the 
basis of failure to prosecute, judicial estoppel, and the applicable statute of limitations on June 
29, 2010, along with a motion to lift the stay. This Court entered an order lifting the stay on July 
20, 2010. At the hearing set for the motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment on 
September 7, 2010, Plaintiffs' counsel appeared and raised, for the first time, issues concerning 
non-disclosure of this litigation as an asset in bankruptcy. (Affidavit of Kevin J. Scanlan in 
Support of Motion to Lift Stay ("Third Scanlan Aff."), Ex. G, pp. 5-10). Based on these 
concerns, this Court granted Plaintiffs' counsel 60 days to address issues concerning the 
bankruptcy proceedings. (Id., Ex. G, p. 10). Subsequently, Mr. Hawk's counsel appeared in 
bankruptcy court and filed a Motion to Reopen Chapter 7 Case and supporting affidavit on 
September 27, 2010. (Id., Ex. E). On October 29, 2010, the bankruptcy court issued an order 
reopening Mr. Hawk's chapter 7 case. (Id., Ex. F). Shortly thereafter, during a November 1, 2010 
hearing, over Defendants' counsel's objections, this Court orally ruled that this matter was 
stayed until the underlying bankruptcy matter was resolved and issued a minute entry reflecting 
that ruling. (Id., Ex. H). 
As the docket history of the bankruptcy action reflects, Mr. Hawk's counsel took no 
action to further the bankruptcy proceedings until October 22, 2012. (Id., Ex. F). The docket 
history shows that the bankruptcy court ordered Mr. Hawk's counsel to produce a status report to 
the court on September 14, 2012. (Id.). Shortly afterwards, on October 11, 2012, the trustee filed 
a motion for turnover, stating that Mr. Hawk had wrongfully refused to tender this action to the 
bankruptcy estate. (Id., Exs. D, F). On October 22, 2012, Mr. Hawk made his only filing in the 
bankruptcy action since the case was reopened, opposing the motion for turnover and contending 
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records concerning the medical malpractice action were readily available to the trustee. (Id, 
Ultimately, the trustee determined that action was no value to the bankruptcy 
estate and the bankruptcy court issued an order closing the case. (Id, I). 
Relevant factual and procedural history is also fully set forth in the Memorandum in 
Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute, or Alternatively, AJotion for 
Summary Judgment (June 26, 2010) and Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute, or Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment (Oct. 4, 
2010), which are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full. 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
Because the majority of the arguments in support of Defendants' motions were fully 
briefed prior to the stay, which briefing is incorporated herein, Defendants only write briefly to 
address additional issues that have arisen since the reopening of the bankruptcy matter and 
imposition of the stay of this action in November 2010. 
A. Standards for Decision 
"The doctrine of judicial estoppel sounds in equity and is invoked at the discretion of the 
court." Mowrey v. Chevron Pipeline Co., 155 Idaho 629, 632, 315 P.3d 817 (2013) (quoting 
McAllister v. Dixon, 154 Idaho 891, 894, 303 P.3d 578, 581 (2013)). A court acts within its 
discretion when it: (1) correctly perceives the issue as one of discretion; (2) acts within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices available to it; and (3) reaches its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. (quoting 
McAllister, 154 Idaho at 894, 303 P.3d at 581). 
A decision to dismiss a case for inactivity pursuant to IRCP 40( c) is partially 
discretionary. }.;Jorgan v. Demos, Dkt No. 40170, 2014 WL 1053321, at *5-6 (Idaho Mar. 19, 
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2014) (slip op.). The determination of whether good cause has been shown not to dismiss the 
case is discretionary. Id the court, its discretion determines that good cause has not been 
shown, dismissal of the action is mandatory. Id at *6. 
The determination of whether to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute pursuant to 
IRCP 41(b) is also discretionary. Gerstner v. Wash. Water Power Co., 122 Idaho 673, 677, 837 
P.2d 799, 803 (1992). 
B. Recently issued authority by the Idaho Supreme Court confirms that Plaintiff Brian 
Hawk's claims are barred by judicial estoppel, regardless of whether the 
bankruptcy estate was reopened to address those claims. 
As the Idaho Supreme Court recently ruled in two cases, where a debtor in bankruptcy 
omits a cause of action from his initial bankruptcy schedule of which he has reason to know at 
the time such bankruptcy schedule is filed, he is barred from later asserting that claim by the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel, regardless of whether the bankruptcy schedules are subsequently 
amended to include the claim. See Mowrey v. Chevron Pipeline Co., 155 Idaho 629, 315 P.3d 
817 (2013); McAllister v. Dixon, 154 Idaho 891,303 P.3d 578 (2013). The facts of these cases, 
which are strikingly similar to the case at bar, demonstrate that Mr. Hawk's claims against 
Defendants are barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel. 
In McAllister, the plaintiff, Doherty, brought a medical malpractice claim against a 
medical clinic and a general practice physician, Dixon, based on Dixon's alleged failure to 
perform diagnostic tests that resulted in the loss of Doherty's eye. 154 Idaho at 892-93, 303 P.3d 
at 579-80. The treatment was sought on September 12, 2004. Id. at 892, 303 P.3d at 579. Doherty 
filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy on July 25, 2005, and his bankruptcy plan was confirmed on 
September 6, 2006. Id. at 893, 303 P.3d at 580. Doherty did not list any potential claims against 
Dixon on his asset schedules. Id 
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Doherty commenced an action against Dixon and his clinic on September 6, 2006. Id. 
Doherty received a bankruptcy discharge on January 21, 2009. Dixon's counsel learned 
Doherty' s bankruptcy in August of 2009 and raised the issue of judicial estoppel. Id. As a result, 
Doherty reopened the bankruptcy estate on August 26, 2009, amended his asset schedules to 
reflect the suit against Dixon, and joined McAllister, the bankruptcy trustee, as a party plaintiff. 
Id. Dixon filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis of judicial estoppel, which the 
district court granted. Id. 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, finding that Doherty was 
fully charged with knowledge of his claim against Dixon at the time of the filing his initial 
bankruptcy schedules. Id. at 896-97, 303 P.3d at 583-84. In doing so, the court also rejected 
Doherty's argument that the amended schedule cured the initial non-disclosure, noting that such 
a ruling would create incentives for non-disclosure because it would allow the debtor to 
potentially avoid proper disclosure by simply waiting until the issue of judicial estoppel was 
raised and then amending the asset schedule. Id. Under this scheme, if the issue of judicial 
estoppel was never raised, then the debtor would deprive the bankruptcy estate of an asset. Id. 
Finally, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the non-disclosure was the result of 
mistake or inadvertence, finding that Doherty was fully chargeable with the knowledge to make 
the appropriate disclosures on his asset schedule at the time it was filed. Id. at 898-99, 303 P.3d 
at 585-86. McAllister is nearly indistinguishable from this matter. 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently reiterated the McAllister holding in Mowrey. In that 
matter, the plaintiff, Mowry, was injured during the course of his employment with a trucking 
company while at defendant Chevron's bulk petroleum facility. 155 Idaho at 630, 315 P .3d at 
818. Based on loss of income as the result of the injury, Mowry and his wife filed for bankruptcy 
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on September 8, 2005. at 630-31, 315 P.3d at 818-19. No claims against Chevron were listed 
on the Mowrys' property schedules. Id at 631, 3 5 
advised that he might have a claim against Chevron. 
at 819. July 2006, Mowry was 
Mowry did not amend his property 
schedule after being informed of the claim against Chevron. Id Mowry was not represented by 
counsel in bankruptcy court, but his bankruptcy filings were prepared with the assistance of 
counsel. Id On May 4, 2007, the bankruptcy court entered an order closing the estate. Id On 
June 19, 2007, Mowry filed his complaint against Chevron. Id On January 19, 2011, Chevron 
filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Mowry' s claims should be dismissed on the 
basis of judicial estoppel because they were not disclosed on his bankruptcy schedules. Id. On 
January 28, 2011, Mowry filed a motion to reopen the bankruptcy estate to amend his petition 
and disclose the claim against Chevron, which was granted. Id. 
On July 13, 2011, the district court granted Chevron's motion for summary judgment on 
the basis that Mowry was judicially estopped from pursuing his claims due to his failure to 
disclose the claim on the original bankruptcy petition. Id. The court further found that reopening 
the bankruptcy estate and amending the petition did not cure the initial non-disclosure because 
Mowry was chargeable with knowledge of the Chevron claim at the time he filed bankruptcy. Id. 
The district court denied a subsequent motion for reconsideration, brought on the basis that the 
bankruptcy petitions were prepared by Mowry's attorney, and Mowry had cured his non-
disclosure by reopening the estate. Id. Relying on AfcAllister, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed 
the district court, finding that Mov,;ry was chargeable with knowledge of the Chevron claim at 
the time of his initial bankruptcy filing and the failure to include the claim on the bankruptcy 
schedules was not sufficiently inadvertent to avoid application of judicial estoppel. Id. at 632-34, 
315 P .3d at 820-22. lvf awry is also squarely applicable to this matter and further compels 
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dismissal Mr. Hawk's claims. 
the docket history from Mr. Hawk's bankruptcy action demonstrates, he was well 
aware of his potential claims against Defendants when he sought bankruptcy protection on 
October 9, 2006, having filed his application for prelitigation screening panel hearing for those 
claims on May 24, 2006. In fact, in an affidavit submitted to the bankruptcy court, Mr. Hawk's 
attorney notes that he was representing Mr. Hawk in this action prior to Mr. Hawk's decision to 
file bankruptcy. (Third Scanlan Aff., Ex. E, ,I 2). This affidavit also notes that Mr. Hawk was 
represented by counsel throughout his bankruptcy proceedings. (Id.). Despite his awareness of 
this action and representation by counsel in the bankruptcy proceedings, Mr. Hawk failed to list 
this action on his bankruptcy asset schedules and the claim was not dealt with during the 
pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings. It was only after Defendants successfully got the stay 
lifted that Mr. Hawk determined the need to have this matter dealt with by the bankruptcy court, 
resulting in nearly three years of additional delay due to Mr. Hawk's failure to prosecute both 
this matter and the bankruptcy matter. 
This factual scenario presents an even better case for application of judicial estoppel than 
that in McAllister or Mowry because, in this case, Mr. Hawk had already taken legal action to 
pursue this claim by seeking a prelitigation screening panel when he filed his initial bankruptcy 
schedules, but nonetheless failed to include this claim. Mr. Hawk's subsequent reopening of the 
bankruptcy estate did nothing to cure that failure. As pointed out in Mowry and McAllister, a 
finding that Mr. Hawk is not estopped from pursuing this action because of that non-disclosure 
would incentivize Mr. Hawk and other similar situated litigants to take a wait-and-see approach 
to disclosure of assets in bankruptcy proceedings. Accordingly, Mr. Hawk's claims against 
Defendants should be dismissed with prejudice on the basis of judicial estoppel. 
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Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 40(c) 
addition to the failure to prosecute m original 
memorandum of points and authorities in support this motion, the nearly three years of delay 
resulting from the reopening of the bankruptcy action and stay of this matter are directly 
attributable to Plaintiffs and has resulted in further prejudice to Defendants, warranting dismissal 
of this matter pursuant to IRCP 40( c ). Under Rule 40( c ), "[i]n the absence of a showing of good 
cause for retention, any action, appeal or proceeding, except for guardianships, conservatorships, 
and probate proceedings, in which no action has been taken or in which the summons has not 
been issued and served, for a period of six (6) months shall be dismissed." Idaho R. Civ. P. 40( c) 
( emphasis added). The applicability of that rule to a situation similar to that presented in this 
matter was recently discussed in the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Morgan v. Demos, Dkt. 
No. 40170, 2014 WL 1053321 (Idaho Mar. 19, 2014) (slip op.). 
In Morgan, the Idaho Supreme Court was asked to review the district court's decision to 
dismiss a medical malpractice action pursuant to Rule 40(c) for inactivity. Id at *4. The plaintiff 
had brought suit against the defendants in that action after his wife allegedly passed away due to 
complications from an angiogram. Id at * 1. Trial in the case was delayed by the plaintiffs 
repeated failure to disclose his expert's complete and accurate testimonial history, finally leading 
the court to enter an order prohibiting the expert from testifying. Id at * 1-3. The plaintiff sought 
permissive appeal of the order barring the expert's testimony, which was ultimately refused by 
the Idaho Supreme Court. Id at *3. While the motion for permissive appeal was pending, the 
district court inactivated the case file. Id The district court was not made aware that leave for 
permissive appeal had been denied until 21 months later, when the plaintiffs son, an attorney 
who had worked as an associate attorney for their original counsel, filed a motion to reopen the 
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case and reconsider the order excluding the experf's testimony. Id. The defendants responded by 
filing a motion for dismissal pursuant to Rules 40( c) and 41 (b ), along a motion for 
sanctions. Id. The district court dismissed the case pursuant to Rule 40( c ), denied plaintiff's 
motion to reconsider, and imposed sanctions against the plaintiff. Id. 
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the court had abused its discretion in dismissing the 
case pursuant to Rule 40( c) because plaintiff did not receive notice of the proposed dismissal 
from the court and the plaintiff demonstrated good cause for delay in prosecution. Id. at *4-5. 
The Supreme Court rejected these arguments, first finding that dismissal under the rule was 
mandatory, not discretionary. Id. at *4-5. The court noted that an action that had been inactive 
for more than six months must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 40( c) in absence of a showing of 
good cause for the inactivity. Id. Any exercise of discretion in deciding a Rule 40( c) motion is 
rooted in the determination of whether good cause existed for the matter not to be dismissed. Id. 
at *5. "[I]n order to show good cause under Rule 40(c), a party must present sworn testimony by 
affidavit or otherwise setting forth facts that demonstrate good cause for retention of a case." 
The Supreme Court then held as follows concerning the Morgan plaintiff's showing of 
good cause: 
At the hearing on [plaintiff's] motion to reopen, his current 
counsel acknowledged that action should have been taken soon 
after this Court refused to entertain [plaintiff's] appeal. [plaintiff! 
put forth only one reason why his case should be retained-the 
neglect of his former counsel, Lowell Hawkes. However, 
[plaintiff! provided no affidavit or other sworn testimony from Mr. 
Hawkes or anyone else that would explain why [plaintiff's] case 
sat dormant for a remarkable twenty one [sic] months. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing 
[plaintiff's] case pursuant to Rule 40(c). The district court stated 
that if no action has been taken for at least six months, it "must 
dismiss this case" in the absence of a showing of good cause for 
retention. The district court determined that good cause for 
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retention was not shown because "the reason given for 21 
months of inactivity was attorney district court 
within the bounds of its discretion and reached decision in an 
act of reason in concluding that a bare declaration 
neglect does not constitute good cause. 
Id. at *5-6. The Supreme Court also rejected the plaintiffs argument that Rule 40(c) was 
inapplicable because he did not receive the notice referenced in the rule, finding that the 
defendants' filing of a motion to dismiss constituted adequate notice. Id. at *6. Much the same 
result is warranted here due to the remarkable similarity of this matter to Morgan. 
Plaintiffs first raised the issue of the potential need to reopen the bankruptcy case during 
a hearing in this matter on September 7, 2010, over two years after the original bankruptcy action 
was closed by Mr. Hawk's discharge on May 15, 2008. (Third Scanlan Aff., Exs. G, J). Over a 
month and a half after the issue of reopening the estate was raised by Mr. Hawk, on October 27, 
2010, he filed a motion to reopen the bankruptcy proceedings to address the status of this case as 
an asset of the bankruptcy estate. (Id, Exs. E, F). It was this action that precipitated this Court's 
decision to stay this matter on November 1, 2010. (Id, Ex. H, p. 7:6-18). 
As revealed by the docket history of the bankruptcy action, Mr. Hawk took no further 
action to move that case forward for nearly two full years after the request to reopen the case was 
filed. (Id, Ex. F). On September 14, 2012, the bankruptcy court finally ordered Mr. Hawk to 
provide a status report, noting "[t]his case was reopened on 10/29/10. Nothing filed since Trustee 
appointed on 10/29/10. Please advise." (Id., Ex. F, Dkt. No. 52). Shortly thereafter, on October 
11, 2012, the bankruptcy trustee filed a motion for turnover of this matter, noting that Mr. Hawk 
had, as of the date of the motion, failed to provide n:~levant information concerning this matter to 
the trustee. (Id., Exs. D, F). Mr. Hawk responded, contending that any information necessary to 
the trustee's determination of the value of the claim was available at any time. (Id., Ex. C). On 
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December 11, 2012, the court granted the trustee's motion for turnover on the condition that the 
trustee and Mr. Hawk's counsel meet and confer concerning the value of this case. 
No. 56). Finally, on February 26, 2013, the trustee made the following report to the court: 
I, R. Sam Hopkins, having been appointed trustee of the estate of 
the above-named debtor(s), report that I have neither received any 
property nor paid any money on account of this estate; that I have 
made a diligent inquiry into the financial affairs of the debtor(s) 
and the location of the property belonging to the estate; and that 
there is no property available for distribution from the estate over 
and above that exempted by law. Pursuant to Fed R Bank P 5009, I 
hereby certify that the estate of the above-named debtor(s) has 
been fully administered. I request that I be discharged from any 
further duties as trustee. Key information about this case as 
reported in schedules filed by the debtor(s) or otherwise found in 
the case record: This case was pending for 28 months. Assets 
Abandoned (without deducting any secured claims): $ 147781.16, 
Assets Exempt: Not Available, Claims Scheduled: $ 195368.73, 
Claims Asserted: Not Applicable, Claims scheduled to be 
discharged without payment (without deducting the value of 
collateral or debts excepted from discharge): $ 195368. 73. 
(Id., Ex. F). A few days later, on February 28, 2013, the court closed the case. (Id., Ex. A). 
As the docket history from the bankruptcy action demonstrates, Mr. Hawk was well 
aware of this action when he sought bankruptcy protection on October 9, 2006, having filed his 
application for prelitigation screening panel hearing on this action on May 24, 2006. Despite this 
fact, Mr. Hawk failed to list this action on their bankruptcy asset schedules nor was the claim 
dealt with during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings. Then, only after Defendants 
successfully got the stay lifted and moved to dismiss this action, did Mr. Hawk determine his 
need to have this matter dealt with by the bankruptcy court, resulting in nearly three years of 
additional delay due to his failure to prosecute both this matter and the bankruptcy matter. This 
period of inaction without justification constitutes grounds for dismissal under Rule 40( c ). 
The same rationale applies to those claims raised by Mr. Strong. In fact, the argument in 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS, OR 
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dismissing Mr. Strong's claims is even more compelling because he was not a party to 
bankruptcy and could have proceeded to prosecute claims against Defendants in 
Hawk's absence. the plain language of Idaho Rule Civil Procedure 20(a) provides, 
joinder of plaintiffs with similar claims in the same action is permissive, not mandatory. Idaho R. 
Civ. P. 20(a) ("All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief 
jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, 
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to 
all of them will arise in the action." (emphasis added)). Here, Mr. Strong has failed to prosecute 
his claim for nearly eight years based solely on a bankruptcy filing by a coplaintiff whose claims 
need not have been joined with his own. There is no good cause for this inaction. In fact, 
Defendants requested that Mr. Strong agree to bifurcate his claims from those of Mr. Hawk, even 
going so far as to provide a stipulation to bifurcate, but received no response from Plaintiffs' 
counsel. (Third Scanlan Aff., ,I 18, Ex. K). 
For these reasons, the claims of both Plaintiffs should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 
40(c). 
D. Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b). 
For all of the reasons discussed in Part III.B, supra, for Plaintiffs' claims to be dismissed 
on the basis of their unjustified inaction in this matter, so too should their claims be dismissed 
pursuant to Rule 41 (b ). Under Rule 41 (b ), "a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or 
of any claim against the defendant" "[f]or failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with 
these rules or any order of court." Idaho R. Civ. P. 41(b). In determining whether an action 
should be dismissed for failure to prosecute "the district court must consider [1] the length of 
delay caused by the failure to prosecute, [2] the justification, if any, for such delay, and [3] the 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS, OR 
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extent of any resultant prejudice." Gerstner v. Wash. Power Co., 122 Idaho 673, 837 P.2d 
803 (1992). "The emphasis of the analysis should on to the 
defendant and not on the length of the delay per se." Id "Prejudice must consist more than 
general concerns about the passage of time and its effect on the memories of witnesses and the 
ability to prepare a case. There must be actual, demonstrated prejudice to the moving party." Id 
"The movant must demonstrate prejudice by actual instances of his or her inability to adequately 
and effectively prepare the case, occasioned by the non-movant's lack of prosecution." Id. at 678, 
837 P.2d at 804. 
Defendants have been prejudiced, and will continue to be prejudiced if forced to proceed 
with defense of this action due the undue amount of time this matter has been pending and their 
inability to conduct discovery due to Mr. Hawk's invocation of the bankruptcy stay and Mr. 
Strong's unexplained failure to proceed with his claim in Mr. Hawk's absence. If this matter 
proceeds, Defendants will now be forced, ten years after the date of alleged injury, to engage in 
fact discovery, querying witnesses and records custodians whose memory of the events 
underlying this claim has been eroded by the passage of time. Further, as indicated in the 
previously filed affidavit of Dr. Murphy, one of the treating CRNAs for Mr. Hawk, Robert Haig, 
passed away on June 11, 2009, robbing Defendants of a key witness due to Plaintiffs' inaction. 
(Aff. of Marcus E. Murphy, M.D., Oct. 4, 2010, ilil 4-6). Also, another of the treating CRNAs, 
Mary Waid, retired prior to 2010. (Second Scanlan Aff., ,I 13). Her whereabouts are currently 
unknown. (Id.). Another of the treating CRNAs, Christian Schmalz, left the State of Idaho and 
relocated to Washington. (Id.). For these reasons, as well as those set forth in Defendants' 
previously filed memorandum in support of motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, all claims 
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by should be dismissed pursuant to IRCP 41 (b ). 
Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Intermountain Anesthesia are barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations. 
Defendants' discussion of the reasons for dismissal of the claims against Intermountain 
Anesthesia on the basis of the applicable statute oflimitations is fully set forth in their previously 
filed Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, .Motion for Summary 
Judgment, pp. 8-11 (June 29, 2010), and their Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' 
lvfotion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, lvfotion for Summary Judgment, pp. 3-9 (Oct. 25, 2010). 
Defendants, however, felt it necessary to bring a recent decision from this Court on this very 
issue to the Court's attention. 
In Woodington v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc., Bonneville County Case No. CV-
2010-2258 (Idaho Dist. Ct. May 1, 2013), Judge Dane Watkins dismissed claims against 
Defendant Intermountain Anesthesia and a CRNA employed by Intermountain Anesthesia based 
upon the Plaintiffs' failure to timely file claims against Intermountain Anesthesia. (Third Scanlan 
Aff., Ex. J). In that matter, Judge Watkins found that the applicable two-year statute of 
limitations for medical malpractice claims, set forth in Idaho Code § 5-219(4), is tolled by the 
provisions ofldaho Code§ 6-1005. (Id., Ex. J., p. 9). Judge Watkins also found, however, that he 
tolling provisions of § 6-1005 only apply to claims against parties against whom a claim was 
filed before the prelitigation screening panel. (Id., Ex. J., pp. 9-10). In Woodington, the plaintiffs 
did not assert a claim against Intermountain Anesthesia before the prelitigation screening panel. 
(Id.). As a result, Judge Watkins found that the claims against Intermountain Anesthesia were not 
tolled by § 6-1005, meaning that although the claims asserted against the defendants that were 
Furthermore, although Mr. Strong was not a party to the bankruptcy proceeding that engendered much of 
the delay in this matter, his claims were subject to similar delay in prosecution after the bankruptcy court entered 
orders that had the practical effect of dissolving the stay. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS, OR 
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before the panel were timely, the claims against Intermountain Anesthesia were Idaho 
§ 19(4). ). same result is warranted in matter. 
absence of the tolling provided by§ 6-1005, the statute oflimitations on the Plaintiffs' 
claims against Intermountain Anesthesia ran on June 25, 2006. Because Plaintiffs' Complaint in 
this action was not filed until December 20, 2006, Plaintiffs' claims against Intermountain 
Anesthesia are timed barred and should be dismissed. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that their motion be granted 
and Plaintiffs' claims be dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this 10th day of April, 2014. 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 10th day of April, 2014, I caused to 
document indicated and addressed to 
following: 
Lowell N. Hawkes 
Ryan S. Lewis 
Lowell N. Hawkes, Chartered 
13 22 East Center 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
Facsimile (208) 235-4200 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
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ISB #1253; reh@dukescanlan.com 
Kevin J. Scanlan 
ISB #5521; kjs@dukescanlan.com 
DUKE SCANLAN & 
1087 W. River St, Ste. 300 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




INTERMOUNTAIN ANESTHESIA, P.A. and 
MARCUS E. MURPHY, M.D., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 06-7149 
DEFENDANTS' RENEWED 
MOTION TO DISMISS, OR 
ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COME NOW Defendants Intermountain Anesthesia, P.A. and Marcus E. Murphy, M.D., 
through their counsel of record, Duke Scanlan & Hall, PLLC, and pursuant to Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure 40( c ), 41 (b) and 56, renew their previously filed Motion to Dismiss, or 
Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment. 
This motion is supported by the pleadings, records, and affidavits on file in this matter, 
Defendants' June 29, 2010, Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute, or Alternatively, Motion 
for Summary Judgment and supporting documents, and the supporting memorandum and 
DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS, OR ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT I 
herewith. 
ORAL 
this 10th day of April, 2014. 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 10th day of April, 2014, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following: 
Lowell N. Hawkes 
Ryan S. Lewis 
Lowell N. Hawkes, Chartered 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
Facsimile (208) 235-4200 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
[] Telecopy 
DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS, OR ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR 
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ISB #1253; reh@dukescanlan.com 
Kevin J. Scanlan 
ISB #5521; kjs(al,dukescanlan.com 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
1087 W. River St, Ste. 300 
P.O. Box 7387 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 342-3310 
Facsimile: (208) 342-3299 
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Attorneys for Defendants 
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INTERMOUNTAIN ANESTHESIA, P.A. and 
MARCUS E. MURPHY, M.D., 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV 06-7149 
AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN J. SCANLAN 
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
RENEWED MOTION OR, 
ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Kevin J. Scanlan, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Idaho, and am an attorney of 
record for Defendant Intermountain Anesthesia, P.A. and Marcus R. Murphy, M.D. in the above-
referenced matter. 
2. I make this Affidavit on my personal knowledge and belief of the matters stated 
AFFIDA VlT OF KEVIN J. SCANLAN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION TO 
DISMISS OR, ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- I 
3. correct copy a March 3, 13, Order 
Approving Trustee's Report of No Distribution and Closing Case from District of Idaho 
Bankruptcy Court Case No. 06-40526-JDP. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy of a February 28, 2013, 
Order Approving Trustee's Report of No Distribution and Closing Case from District of Idaho 
Bankruptcy Court Case No. 06-40526-JDP. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of Mr. Hawk's October 
22, 2012, Response to Motion for Turnover filed in District ofldaho Bankruptcy Court Case No. 
06-40526-JDP. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of an October 11, 2012, 
Motion for Turnover filed by the Chapter 7 Trustee in District of Idaho Bankruptcy Court Case 
No. 06-40526-JDP. 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit Eis a true and correct copy of an October 27, 2010, 
Verified Application to Reopen Chapter 7 Case and supporting affidavit filed by Mr. Hawk in 
District ofldaho Bankruptcy Court Case No. 06-40526-JDP. 
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of the docket history from 
District ofldaho Bankruptcy Court Case No. 06-40526-JDP. 
9. Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of the transcript of the 
hearing held before this Court on September 7, 2010. 
10. Attached hereto as Exhibit H is a true and correct copy of the transcript of the 
hearing held before this Court on November 1, 2010. 
11. Attached hereto as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of a May 15, 2008, Order 
AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN J. SCANLAN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION TO 
DISMISS OR, ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 2 
Approving Trustee's Supplemental Report, Discharging Trustee and Closing 
District Idaho Bankruptcy Court Case No. 06-40526-JDP. 
Estate entered 
12. Attached hereto as Exhibit J is a true and correct copy of a Memorandum 
Decision and Order Re: Motion to Strike and Motions for Summary Judgment entered by the 
Hon. Dane Watkins in Woodington, et al. v. Weber, et al., Bonneville County Case No. CV-
2010-2258. 
13. Plaintiffs' counsel has not contacted me or taken any other action to prosecute this 
litigation of which I am aware since the March 3, 2013, Order Approving Trustee's Report of No 
Distribution and Closing Case was issued. 
14. It has now been nearly ten years since the injuries at issue in this action allegedly 
occurred. 
15. It has now been nearly eight years since the prelitigation screening panel issued 
its report and recommendation concerning this matter. 
16. Defendants were not able to depose either Plaintiff or their witnesses prior to the 
stay. 
17. Defendants were unable to conduct any discovery prior to the stay. 
18. Attached hereto as Exhibit K is a true and correct copy of a February 2, 2007, 
letter to Plaintiffs' counsel, along with a proposed stipulation to bifurcate Mr. Hawk's and Mr. 
Strong's claims. I received no response to this communication from Plaintiffs' counsel. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN J. SCANLAN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION TO 
DISMISS OR, ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR SUMMARY .JUDGMENT-3 
SWORN to before me of April, 20 
Nota y 
Residing in Boise 
My commission expires: 9/6/J§ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 10th day of April, 2014, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following: 
Lowell N. Hawkes 
Ryan S. Lewis 
Lowell N. Hawkes, Chartered 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
Facsimile (208) 235-4200 
~- U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
D Telecopy 
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EXHIBIT A 
1 
Case 06-40526-JDP D Filed 03/03/13 Entered 03/03 3:07:21 Desc Imaged 
In Re: 
BrianKHawk 
1185 Spruce St 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
 Security No.:  
Employer's Tax I.D. No.: 
Debtor 
Mary Ellen Hawk 
1185 Spruce St 
Pocatello, ID 8320 l 
 Security No.:  
Employer's Tax I.D. No.: 
Joint Debtor 
Certificate of Notice Paqe 1 of 3 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPT-CY COURT 
DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
) 
) 
) Case Number: 06-40526-JDP 
) 


















ORDER APPROVING TRUSTEE'S REPORT OF NO DISTRIBUTION AND CLOSING CASE 
IT APPEARJNG to the Court that the Trustee in this case has filed a report of no distribution and the Trustee has 
performed all duties required in the administration of this estate; 
IT IS ORDERED that the report is APPROVED, the Trustee is DISCHARGED from and relieved of the trust; the 
surety or sureties thereon are released from further liability thereunder, except any liability which may have occurred 
during the time such bond was in effect and the case is CLOSED. 
AUDIT NOTICE: If prior to the receipt ofthis notice, the Bankruptcy Trustee took possession of any money, checks 
or other property and that property has not been returned to you, please contact the U.S. Trustee at (208) 334-1300. 
Elizabeth A Smith 




Brian K Hawk 
Mary Ellen Hawk 
Debtors 
District/off: 0976-4 
D Filed 03/03/13 Entered 03/03 
Certificate of Notice Page 2 of 3 
United States Bankruptcy Court 
District of Idaho 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTICE 
User: csomsen 
Form ID: oclose7 
Page 1 of 2 
Total Noticed: 
Desc Imaged 
Date Mar 01, 2013 
Notice by first class mail was sent to the following persons/entities by the Bankruptcy Noticing Center on 
Mar 03, 2013. 
db/jdb +Brian K Hawk, Mary Ellen Hawk, 1185 Spruce St, Pocatello, ID 83201-3927 
Notice by electronic transmission was sent to the following persons/entities by the Bankruptcy Noticing Center, 
NONE. TOTAL: 0 
***** BYPASSED RECIPIENTS***** 
NONE. 
Addresses marked'+' were corrected by inserting the ZIP or replacing an incorrect ZIP 
USPS regulations require that automation-compatible mail display the correct ZIP. 
TOTAL: 0 
I, Joseph Speetjens, declare under the penalty of perjury that I have sent the attached document to the above listed entities in the manner 
shown, and prepared the Certificate of Notice and that it is true and correct to the best of my information and belief. 
Meeting of Creditor Notices only (Official Form 9): Pursuant to Fed. R. Bank. P. 2002(a)(l), a notice containing the complete Social Security 
Number (SSN) of the debtor(s) was furnished to all parties listed. This official court copy contains the redacted SSN as required by the 
bankruptcy rules and the Judiciary's privacy policies. 
Date: Mar 03, 2013 Signature: 
03 
06-40526-JDP D 9 Filed 03/03/13 Entered 03/03 
Certificate of Notice Page 3 of 3 
3:07:21 Desc Imaged 
District/off: 0976-4 User: csomsen 
Form ID: oclose7 
Page of 2 
Tocal Noticed: 1 
Date Rcvd: Mar 01, 2013 
The persons/entities were sent notice 's CM/ECF electronic mail (Email) 
28, 2013 at the address(es) 
R Jorgensen on behalf of Debtor Brian Hawk biggunlaw@cableone.net, 
.jorgensenlaw@gmail.com 
David Wayne Newman on behalf of U.S. Trustee US Trustee ustp.regionl8.bs.ecf@usdoj.gov 
Mary P Kimmel on behalf of U.S. Trustee US Trustee ustp.regionl8.bs.ecf@usdoj.gov 
R Sam Hopkins awilliams@qwestoffice.net, shopkins@ecf.epiqsystems.com 







1185 Spruce St 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
 Security No.:  
Employer's Tax l.D. No.: 
Debtor 
Mary Ellen Hawk 
1185 Spruce St 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
 Security No.:  
Employer's Tax I.D. No.: 
Joint Debtor 
7 Filed 02/28/13 Entered 02/2 J9:53:34 Desc Order 
Closing Ch.7 Page 1 of 1 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
) 
) 
) Case Number: 06-40526-JDP 
) 


















ORDER APPROVING TRUSTEE'S REPORT OF NO DISTRIBUTION AND CLOSING CASE 
IT APPEARING to the Court that the Trustee in this case has filed a report ofno distribution and the Trustee has 
performed all duties required in the administration of this estate; 
IT IS ORDERED that the report is APPROVED, the Trustee is DISCHARGED from and relieved of the trust; the 
surety or sureties thereon are released from further liability thereunder, except any liability which may have occurred 
during the time such bond was in effect and the case is CLOSED. 
AUDIT NOTICE: If prior to the receipt of this notice, the Bankruptcy Trustee took possession of any money, checks 
or other property and that property has not been returned to you, please contact the U.S. Trustee at (208) 334-1300. 
Elizabeth A Smith 
Dated: 2/28/13 Clerk, U.S. Bankruptcy Court 
EXHIBIT C 
0 ' 
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Document Page 1 of 3 
Lowell N. Hawkes (ISB #I 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 8320 l 
Telephone: (208) 235-1600 
FAX: (208) 235-4200 
Attorneys for Hawk 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
The Honorable Jim D. Pappas 
In Re: 
BRIAN K. HA WK and 















Case No. CV-06-40526-JDP 
Chapter 7 
!RESPONSE OF MALPRACTICE 
CLAIM COUNSEL TO 
TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR 
TURNOVER 
OF PROPERTY & RECORDS 
Counsel of record in the pending medical malpractice proceedings in 
Bonneville County responds to the Trustee's Motion of October 11, 2012 as follows: 
1. Of record in this case is the Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Verified 
Application to Reopen (Docket #53) dated October 27, 2010. 
2. That prior Affidavit makes it clear that at no time have the Debtors or 
their counsel ever "refused to surrender" any records or documentation to the Trustee. To 
the contrary, the Affidavit explains that this Bankruptcy was originally closed by the 
RESPONSE OF MALPRACTICE CLAIM COUNSEL TO TRUSTEE'S MOTION 
FOR TURNOVER OF PROPERTY & RECORDS - Page 1 
In Re: Brian K. Hawk and Mm)' Ellen Hawk 
08. 
Case 06-40526-,JDP 54 Filed 10/22/12 Entered 10/2 16:21 :45 Desc Main 
Document Page 2 of 3 
invited and requested a meeting with the Trustee to determine the Trustee's interest, if 
any, in the underlying medical malpractice case. 
3. The entirety of the medical malpractice records are available to the 
Trustee and his counsel at my office at any time during normal business hours - as they 
have always been from the outset. 
DATED this 22nd day of October, 2012. 
RESPONSE OF MALPRACTICE CLAIM COUNSEL TO TRUSTEE'S MOTION 
FOR TURNOVER OF PROPERTY & RECORDS - Pagi:!1 2 
In Re: Brian K. Hawk and Mary Ellen Hawk 
09 
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Document Page 3 of 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of October, 2012 I sent by fax and 
electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system 
which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing or other Notice to the following counsel: 
R. Sam Hopkins, Trustee, 
P.O. Box 3014 
Pocatello, Idaho 83206-FAX 478-7976 
Email: ID07@ecfcbis.com 
Craig R. Jorgensen 
602 S. 5111 A venue 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
FAX 232-8867 
Email: biggunlaw@cableone.net 
James A. Spinner 
Service & Spinner 
13 3 5 E. Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
FAX: 232-1808 
Em~il: spinjim@cableone.net 
RESPONSE OF MALPRACTICE CLAIM COUNSEL TO TRUSTEE'S MOTION 
FOR TURNOVER OF PROPERTY & RECORDS - Page 3 
In Re: Brian K. Hawk and Mmy Ellen Hawk 
o. 
EXHIBIT D 
Case 06-40526-JDP 53 Filed 10/11 /12 Entered 10/1 
Document Page 1 of 2 
Hopkins, Chapter 7 Trustee 
ECF email: l007@ecfcbis.com 
Correspondence 
P.O. Box 3014 
Pocatello, ID 83206-3014 
Telephone: (208) 478-7978 
FAX: (208) 478-7976 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
In Re: 
HA WK, BRIAN K. 








CASE NO. 06-40526-JDP 
CHAPTER 7 
14:31 :02 Desc Main 
MOTION FOR TURNOVER OF PROPERTY AND RECORDS 
AND OPPORTUNITY TO OBJECT AND FOR A HEARING 
Notice of Trustee's Motion for Turnover of Property and Records 
and Opportunity to Object and for a Hearing 
No Objection. The Court may consider this request for an order without further notice or hearing 
unless a party in interest files an objection within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this notice. 
If an objection is not filed within the time permitted, the Court may consider that there is no 
opposition to the granting of the requested relief and may grant the relief without further notice 
or hearing. 
Objection. Any objection shall set out the legal and/or factual basis for the objection. A copy of 
the objection shall be served on the movant. 
Hearing on Objection. The objecting party shall also contact the court's calendar clerk to 
schedule a hearing on the objection and file a separate notice of hearing. 
COMES NOW, The Trustee, R. Sam Hopkins, in the above-entitled matter and moves 
this Court pursuant to 11 USC§§ 542 and 52l(a)(4), for an order directing the Debtor(s) to 
surrender the following property and records, to-wit: 
I. A copy of all documents, the current status and an estimated value of the claim 
against Intermountain Anesthesia PP, Marcus E.; Murphy, and his insurers. 
The Trustee makes said motion upon the grounds and for the reasons that said property is 
property of the bankruptcy estate and the Debtor(s) have wrongfully refused to surrender the 
1 
Case 06-40526-JDP 53 Filed 10/11 /12 Entered 10/1 14:31 :02 Desc Main 
Document Page 2 of 2 
same to the Trustee. You are hereby notified that the Trustee has requested an 
turnover of the property or recorded information listed in the above motion. 
compelling 
Dated this: October 11, 2012 
Isl R. Sam Hopkins 
R. Sam Hopkins, Trustee 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on Thursday, October 11, 2012, I electronically filed the foregoing with the 
Clerk of the Court using the CMIECF system, which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the 
individuals with the term "ECF" noted next to their name. I further certify that, on the same 
date, I have mailed by United States Postal Service the foregoing document to the following non-
EMIECF Registered Participant(s) listed below. 
U.S. Trustee, ECF 
Brian and Mary Hawk 1185 Spruce St. Pocatello, ID 
Craig R. Jorgensen, ECF 







Lowell N. Hawkes (ISB #1852) 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
13 22 East Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
Telephone: (208) 235-1600 
FAX: (208) 235-4200 
Attorneys for Debtors Hawk 
Filed 10/27/10 Entered 10/271 16:02:07 Desc Main 
Document Page 1 of 2 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
The Honorable Jim D. Pappas 
In Re: 
BRIAN K. HA WK and 












Case No. CV-06-40526-JDP 
Chapter 7 
VERIFIED 
APPLICATION TO REOPEN 
Pursuant to Rule 5010, Debtors move the Court to reopen this case for 
purposes of resolving with the Trustee an issue of an unscheduled potential asset not dealt 
with in the prior proceedings. Specifically, Debtors move the Court to reopen for the 
purpose of resolving with the Trustee all issues relative to either abandonment or 
assertion of a claim to any interest in the Debtors' medical malpractice case, Bonneville 
Cow1ty, Case No. CV-06-7149, captioned as Tom L. Strong and Brian K. Hawk vs. 
Intermountain Anesthesia, P.A. and Marcus E. Murphy, MD .. 
VERIFIED APPLICATION TO REOPEN - Page 1 
ln Re: Brian K. Hawk and Mary Ellen Hawk 
1 
Case 06-40526-JDP Filed 10/27/10 Entered 10/27, 16:02:07 Desc Main 
Document Page 2 of 2 
Application is supported by the Affidavit of State 
Counsel filed herewith. 
litigation 
DATED fuis 27th day of October, 2010. 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
---
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me October 27, 2010. 
Residing at Pocatello 
My Commission expires April 21, 2015 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 271h day of October, 20 l O I faxed a copy of the 
foregoing to R. Sam Hopkins, Trustee, P.O. Box 3014, Pocatello, Idaho 83206-3014; 
FAX 478-7976; and Hand Delivered a copy to Craig R. Jorgensen, 920 E. Clark, 
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4904; and James A. Spiimer of Service & Spinner, 1335 E. 
Center, Pocatello, Idaho 83201. 
VERIFIED APPLICATION TO REOPEN - Page 2 
in Re: Brian K Hawk and Mary Ellen Hawk 6, 
Case 06-40526-jDP oc 44-1 Fiied 10/27i-JO Entered i 0 
Affidavit Supporting Verified Application to Reopen 
Lowell N. Hawkes (ISB #1852) 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
Telephone: (208) 235-1600 
FAX: (208) 235-4200 
Attorneys for Debtors Hawk 
i'10 16:02:07 
Page 1 of 4 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
In Re: 
BRIAN K. HA WK and 
MARY ELLEN HA WK, 
The Honorable Jim [JI. Pappas 















AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED 
APPLICATION TO REOPEN 
STATE OF IDAEIO ) 
: ss 
BANNOCK COUNTY ) 
LOWELL N. HAWK.ES, being first duly sworn states as follows: 
1. I make this Affidavit on personal and professional knowledge. 
2. On October 9, 2006 Debtors filed a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy through 
counsel of record Craig Jorgensen. Prior to the filing of that Bankruptcy I had 
represented Debtor Brian Hawk in a medical malpractice case through Prelitigation 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF 
VERIFIED APPLICATION TO REOPEN - Page 1 
In Re: Brian K. Hawk and Mary Ellen Hawk 1 
Case 06-40526-JDP c 44-1 Filed 10/27/10 Entered 1 
Affidavit Supporting Verified Application to Reopen 
/10 16:02:07 Desc 
Page 2 of 4 
at 
the EIRMC in Idaho Falls. Following Prelitigation proceeding that claim was filed as 
Bonneville County Case No. CV-06-7149, captioned Tom L. Strong and Brian K. Hawk 
vs. lntermountain Anesthesia, P.A. and Marcus E. l.1urphy, MD. 
3. When I became aware of the Bankruptcy filing I notified the Bonneville 
County, Seventh Judicial District, State Comi Judge, the Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, 
and a stay on the state court proceedings was put into effect. However, Defense counsel 
in the State case filed Motions seeking to dispose of the case after I had given actual 
notice to them of the statutory automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362. 
4. During the early pendency of these bankruptcy proceedings there was 
some exchange of correspondence and infom1ation from my office to Trustee Hopkins 
that ending with my request for a meeting with the Trustee to try and resolve any issues 
relative to any claim by the Trustee to the malpractice claim as an asset of the 
bankruptcy. However, the Bankruptcy was closed without addressing that issue or any 
formal abandonment to the Debtors of any claim to the malpractice damages case. 
5. I subsequently learned that the malpractice damages claim had not been 
formally scheduled on the schedule filed with this Bankruptcy Court. 
6. Recently Defense counsel in the malpractice case moved the Court to 
vacate the State Court Stay and to reopen the State case and dismiss and dispose of the 
malpractice claims. Because of the uncertain position I had been placed in without either 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF 
VERIFIED APPLICATION TO REOPEN - Page 2 
in Re: Brian K. Hawk and Mary Ellen Hawk 18 
Case 06-40526-JDP c 44-1 Flied 10/27/10 Entered 1u /10 16:02:07 Desc 
Affidavit Supporting Verified Application to Reopen Page 3 of 4 
an abandonment of the malpractice claim back to the Debtors or this Banlauptcy 
authority to proceed with that claim, I asked for and received until Monday, November 
1st as a deadline to resolve the uncertainty issue with the Federal Bankruptcy Court. 
7. Since then, and relative to that November I st deadline, I have conferred 
with both Craig Jorgensen, the Debtors' bankruptcy counsel of record, and attorney Jim 
Spinner, who has been attorney for Trustee Hopkins in multiple bankruptcy proceedings, 
and have been advised by both that the proper procedure is to reopen the bankruptcy to 
formally resolve the issue. In followup, I was advised this morning by attorney Jim 
Spinner that he had spoken with Trustee Hopkins whose desire and request was that the 
Debtors reopen the case as he does not desire to be the initiating party but will become 
involved after the case is reopened. 
8. Therefore I respectfully request tlmt this bankruptcy case be reopened to 
resolve the malpractice claim issue so Debtors and myself are not in the position of 
jeopardy that could arise from any later assertion by the Trustee that either myself or 
Debtors asserted acts of ownership or rights over an unscheduled asset or that I acted 
without property authority. 
DATED this 27th day of October, 2010. 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF 
VERIFIED APPLICATION TO REOPEN - Page 3 
In Re: Brian K Hawk and Mary Ellen Hawk 19 
Case 06-40526-JDP c 44-1 Fiied 10/27/10 Entered 1 O, r /10 16:02:07 Desc 
Affidavit Supporting Verified Application to Reopen Page 4 of 4 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me October 2010. 
Residing at ocatello 
·. ·· My Commission expires April 21, 2015 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 271h day of October, 2010 I faxed a copy of the 
foregoing to R. Sam Hopkins, Trustee, P.O. Box 3014, Pocatello, Idaho 83206-3014; 
FAX 478-7976; and Hand Delivered a copy to CraigR. Jorgensen, 920 E. Clark, 
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4904; and James A. Spinner of Service & Spinner, 1335 E. 
Center, Pocatello, Idaho 83201. 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF 
VERIFIED APPLICATION TO REOPEN - Page 4 
In Re: Brian K. Hawk and Afwy Ellen Hawk 20 
EXHIBIT F 
4/212014 




CM/ECF LIVE- U.S. Bankruptcy Court 
U.S. Bankruptcy Court 
District of Idaho [LIVE] (Pocatello) 
Bankruptcy Petition 06-40526-JDP 
CLOSED 
Debtor disposition: Standard Discharge 
Joint debtor disposition: Standard Discharge 
Date filed: l 0/09/2006 
Date reopened: 10/29/2010 
Date terminated: 02/28/2013 
Debtor discharged: 04/23/2007 
Joint debtor discharged: 04/23/2007 
341 meeting: 11/15/2006 
Deadline for objecting to discharge: 01/16/2007 
Deadline for financial mgmt. course: 01/02/2007 
Debtor 
BrianKHawk 
1185 Spruce St 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
BANNOCK-ID 
 I ITIN:  
Joint Debtor 
Mary Ellen Hawk 
1185 Spruce St 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
BANNOCK-ID 
 /ITIN:  
Trustee 
R Sam Hopkins 
POB 3014 
Pocatello, ID 83206 
208-478-7978 
U.S. Trustee 
represented by Lowell N Hawkes 
1322 E Ctr 




Craig R Jorgensen 
POB 4904 




represented by Lowell N Hawkes 
(See above for address) 
TERMINATED: 12/12/2012 
Craig R Jorgensen 
(See above for address) 




Washington Group Central Plaza 
720 Park Blvd, Ste 220 
Boise, 83712 
208-334-1300 
















CM/ECF LIVE U.S. BaniquptcyCourt 
OF TIIE US TRUSTEE US 
DEPT 
720 Park Blvd., Ste. 220 
Boise, ID 83712 
(208) 334-1300 
Email: ustp.regionl 8.bs.ec@usdoj.gov 
David Wayne Newman 
OFFICE OF TIIE US TRUSTEE US 
DEPT 
720 Park Blvd., Ste. 220 
Boise, ID 83712 
(208) 334-1300 
Email: ustp.regionl 8.bs.ecf@usdoj.gov 
Docket Text 
I 
Chapter 7 Voluntary Petition. Receipt Number 705650, 
Fee Amount $299 Filed by Brian K. Hawk, Mary Ellen 
Hawk (Jorgensen, Craig) Modified on I 0/11/2006 
(Anderson, Clyde). 
Social Security Statement - SEALED Document Filed by 
Debtor Brian K. Hawk, Joint Debtor Mary Ellen Hawk. 
(Jorgensen, Craig) 
Disclosure of Compensation by Craig R. Jorgensen Filed by I 
Debtor Brian K. Hawk, Joint Debtor Mary Ellen Hawk. 
(Jorgensen, Craig) 
Chapter 7 Statement of Current Monthly Income and 
Means Test Calculation - Form 22A Filed by Debtor Brian 
K. Hawk, Joint Debtor Mary Ellen Hawk. (Jorgensen, 
Craig) 
Exhibit D- Individual Debtor's Statement of Compliance 
with Credit Counseling Requirement Filed by Debtor Brian 
K. Hawk, Joint Debtor Mary Ellen Hawk. (Jorgensen, 
Craig) 
First Meeting of Creditors with 34l(a) meeting to be held j 
on 11/15/2006 at 09:00 AM at Pocatello - US Courthouse J 

















10/12/2006 (2 pgs) 
u 
10/12/2006 (2 pgs) 
14 





11/17/2006 (1 pg) 
l1 
(7 pgs; 2 docs) 
11/22/2006 
19 
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CM/ECF LIVE- U.S. Bankruptcy Court 
(admin,) 
Set Deficiency Deadlines Credit Counseling Date: 
10/25/2006.Employee Income Record Due:l 0/25/2006. 
(nl,) 
Financial Management Deadline: - 341 Meeting Date: 
11/15/2006. Financial Management Certificate 
Due:1/2/2007. (nl,) 
Income Tax Turnover Order (Ch. 7) (nl, ) 
Certificate of Credit Counseling Filed by Debtor Brian K 
Hawk, Joint Debtor Mary Ellen Hawk (RE: related 
document(s)1 Set Deficiency Deadlines). (Jorgensen, Craig) 
Employee Income Records (SEALED) Filed by Debtor 
Brian K Hawk, Joint Debtor Mary Ellen Hawk (RE: related 
document(s)l Set Deficiency Deadlines). (Attachments: l 
Supplement Joint Debtor paystub) (Jorgensen, Craig) 
BNC Certificate ofMailing- Ch. 7 Income Tax Turnover 
Order Service Date 10/12/2006. (Admin.) 
BNC Certificate ofMailing- Deficiency Notice Service 
Date 10/12/2006. (Admin.) 
BNC Ce:rtificate ofMailing- Meeting of Creditors Service 
Date 10/13/2006. (Admin.) 
Amended Schedule[ s] B - Amount $40781.16, C,. Filed by 
Debtor Brian K Hawk, Joint Debtor Mary Ellen Hawk. 
(Jorgensen, Craig) 
341 (a) Meeting Minutes - Debtor Present. (Hopkins, R) 
Amended Chapter 7 Statement of Current Monthly Income 
and Means Test Calculation- Form 22A Filed by Debtor 
Brian K Hawk, Joint Debtor Mary Ellen Hawk. (Jorgensen, 
Craig) 
As required by 11 U.S.C. Sec. 704(b)(l)(A), the United 
2;~. 
I 
4/2/2014 CM/ECF LIVE U.S. Bankruptcy Court 
I (1 States Trustee has revi the materials :filed by the 
debtor(s). Having considered these materials in reference to 
the criteria set forth in 11 U.S.C. Sec. 707(b )(2)(A), and, 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 704(b )(2), the United States 
Trustee has detennined that:(l) the debtor's(s') case should 
be presumed to be an abuse under section 707 (b ); and (2) 
the product of the debtor's current monthly income, 
multiplied by 12, is not less than the requirements specified 
in section 704(b)(2)(A) or (B). As required by 11 U.S.C. 
Sec. 704(b )(2) the United States Trustee shall, not later than 
30 days after the date ofthis Statement's :filing, either :file a 
motion to dismiss or convert under section 7 07 (b) or :file a 
statement setting forth the reasons the United States Trustee 
does not consider such a motion to be 
appropriate.Debtor( s) may rebut the presrnnption of abuse 
only if special circumstances can be demonstrated as set 
11/24/2006 forth in 11 U.S.C. Sec. 707(b )(2)(B). Filed by U.S. Trustee 
US Trustee. (Reynard, Janine) 
18. BNC Certificate ofMailing- Clerk's Notice of Presumed 
11/24/2006 (2 pgs) Abuse Service Date 11/24/2006. (Ad1nin.) 
20 BNC Certificate ofMailing- Notice of Abuse Service Date 
11/30/2006 (2 pgs) 11/30/2006. (Admirl) 
21 Reply to (related document(s): 12 UST Statement of 
(3 7 pgs; 2 docs) Presrnned Abuse,,,, :filed by U.S. Trustee US Trustee) Filed 
by Debtor Brian K Hawk, Joint Debtor Mary Ellen Hawk 
(Attachments: 1 Exhibit Child Support Report) (Jorgensen, 
Craig) Modified on 12/8/2006 to note the Notary electronic 
I 12/07/2006 signature is missing ( drh, ). 
22 Objection to Debtor's Claim ofExe1nptions Filed by Trnstee 
(2 pgs) R SamHopkins. Objection to ClaimofExernptionDue: 
12/08/2006 1/8/2007. (Hopkins, R) 
23 Motion to Dismiss Case For Presrnnption of Abuse under 
(13 pgs; 2 docs) 707b Filed by U.S. Trustee US Trustee. (Attachments: 1 
12/22/2006 Exhibit Debtors' Amended Means Test)(Reynard, Janine) 
24 Notice of Requirement to Complete Course in Financial 
(1 pg) Management - (RE: related document(s) Financial 
Management Certificate due) Financial Management 
01/08/2007 Certificate due 2/7/2007. (ems,) 
I 
















CM/ECF LIVE- U$. Bankruptcy Court 
BNC Certificate ofMa Notice ofRequirement to 
Complete Course in Financial Management. Service Date 
01/10/2007. (Admin.) 
Order Granting Objection to Debtor's Claim of 
Exemption 
The trustee in this case required that the Court not allow 
certain exemptions claimed by the debtor pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. Section 522. Notice of the trustees request was sent 
to the debtor and a request for hearing has not been made 
within the time period allowed in that notice. 
Based upon the foregoing and good cause appearing 
therefor, the following exemptions are DISALLOWED to 
This Notice of Electronic Filing is the Ojji'cial ORDER 
for this entry. No document is attached. 
This document served on debtor at the address of record. 
(Related Doc# 22). Signed on 1/18/2007. (ems,) 
Financial Management Course Certificate Filed by Debtor 
Brian K Hawk, Joint Debtor Mary Ellen Hawk (RE: related 
docwnent(s)24 Notice ofRequirement to Complete Course 
in Financial Management). (Attachments: l Supplement 
Joint Debtor Certificate) (Jorgensen, Craig) 
Supplement to Financial Mgmt Certificates Filed by 
Debtor Brian K Hawk, Joint Debtor Mary Ellen Hawk (RE: 
related doclUTient(s)27 Financial Management Course 
Certificate, ). (Jorgensen, Craig) 
Withdrawal U.S. Trustee's Motion to Dismiss Filed by 
U.S. Trustee US Trustee (RE: related document(s)23 
Motion to Dismiss Case For Presumption of Abuse under 
707b Filed by U.S. Trustee US Trustee. (Attachments:# 1 
Exhibit Debtors' Amended Means Test)(Reynard, Janine) 
filed by U.S. Trustee US Trustee). (Reynard, Janine) 
4/2/2014 CM/ECF LIVE- U.S. Banl<ruptcyCourt 
I 
I 
30 Order Disc1'.argiJ1g Deb igned on 4/23/2007 (RE: I I 
04/23/2007 (2 pgs) related document(s) 6 Meeting (Chapter 7)). (ems,) 
04/25/2007 
BNC Certificate ofMailing- Order ofDischarge. Service 
pgs) Date 04/25/2007. (Adrnin) 
32 Trustee's Notice of Assets & Notice to Creditors Filed by 
(1 pg) Trustee R Sam Hopkins. Claims due by 8/6/2007.Proofs of 
05/07/2007 Claim due by 8/6/2007. (Hopkins, R) 
33 BNC Certificate of Mailing- Notice of Assets Service Date 
05/09/2007 (5 pgs) 05/09/2007. (Adrnin) 
34 
12/20/2007 (22 pgs) Trustee's Final Report and Accounting. (Hopkins, R) 
35 Chapter 7 Trustees Notice ofFinalAccounting and Right to 
(1 pg) Object Filed by Trustee R Sam Hopkins. Objections to 
12/20/2007 Trustees Report due 1/10/2008. (Hopkins, R) 
36 Prior to the filing of the Final Accounting in this case, the 
Trustee submitted it to the U.S. Trustee. The U.S. Trustee 
has reviewed and approved the Chapter 7 Final Accounting 
in accordance with the January 1999, Amended 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Executive 
Office of the United States Trustee and the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts. 
Ilene Lashinksy, United States Trustee 
This is a TEXT ENTRY - No document is attached. 
12/20/2007 . (McClendon, Gary) 
37 BNC Certificate ofMailing- Notice ofFinalAccounting 
12/22/2007 (3 pgs) Service Date 12/22/2007. (Adrnin) 
38 Order ofDistnbution for R Sam Hopkins, Trustee Chapter 
(2 pgs) 7, Fees awarded: $416.40, Expenses awarded: $45.35; 
01/14/2008 Awarded on 1/14/2008 Signed on 1/14/2008. (ems,) I 
! 
39 Turnover ofFunds oflntermountain Gas Co in the amount 
I 
I 
01/29/2008 (1 pg) of$ 1.63 Filed by Trustee R Sam Hopkins. (ems,) 
40 Trustee's Supplemental Final Report. Rule 5009: 
4/2/2014 CM/ECF LIVE- U.S. BanlrnptcyCourt 
I 041111200s (2 5/11/2008. (Hopkins, I I 
41 Prior to the :filing of the Supplemental Final Accounting, the I I Trustee submitted it to the U.S. Trustee. The U.S. Trustee 
has reviewed and approved it in accordance with the 
January 1999, Amended MemorandumofUnderstanding 
I 
between the Executive Office of the United States Trustee I 
I 
and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. 
The U.S. Trustee has no objection to either the Trustee's 
certification that the estate has been fully administered or the 
Trustee's request that the case be closed. 
Robert D. Miller Jr., United States Trustee 
This is a TEXTENTRY-No document is attached. 
04/17/2008 . (McClendon, Gary) 
42 Order Approving Trustee's Supplemental Final Report, 
(1 pg) Discharging Trustee and Closing the Estate Signed on 
05/15/2008 5/15/2008. (drh,) 
I 
43 BNC Certificate ofMailing- Order Approving Trustee's I 
(2 pgs) Supplemental Final Report, Closing Case Service Date 
05/17/2008 05/17/2008. (Adrnin.) 
44 Motion to Reopen Chapter 7 Case. Fee Amount $260 
(6 pgs; 2 docs) Filed by Debtor Brian K Hawk, Joint Debtor Mary Ellen 
Hawk (Attachments: l Affidavit Supporting Verified 
10/27/2010 Application to Reopen) (Hawkes, Lowell) 
45 Receipt ofMotion to Reopen Case(06-40526-JDP) 
[motion,mreop J ( 260.00) Filing Fee. Receipt number 
10/28/2010 2863578. Fee amount 260.00. (U.S. Treasury) 
46 Order Granting Motion To Reopen Case (Related Doc # 
10/29/2010 (1 pg) 44) Signed on 10/29/2010. (drh) 
47 Notice Appointing R Sam Hopkins as the Trustee in the 
(1 pg) Reopened Case. Filed by U.S. Trustee US Trustee. 
10/29/2010 (Knrunei Mary) 
48 BNC Certificate ofMailing - PDF Document Service Date 
10/31/2010 (3 pgs) 10/31/2010. (Adrnin.) 
28 
4/2/2014 CM/ECF LIVE- U.S. Bankruptcy Court 
I 111031201 o 
4 BNC Certificate ofM Notice Appointing Trustee in a 
(3 pgs) Reopened Case Service Date 11/03/2010. (Adrnin.) 
50 Request to the Trustee to provide an update on case status. 
10/27/201 Status request due date 11/28/2011. (tw) 
Status Report Filed by Trustee R Sam Hopkins. (Hopkins, 
11/28/2011 (1 pg) R) 
52 Request to the Debtor's Attorney to provide an update on 
case status. Status request due date 10/14/2012. **This 
case was reopened on 10/29/10. Nothing filed since Trustee 
09/14/2012 appointed on 10/29/10. Please advise. (tw) 
53 Motion for Turnover Filed by Trustee R Sam Hopkins 
(2 pgs) Objections To Motion for Turnover due 11/5/2012. 
(Hopkins, R) Modified on 10/12/2012 to show correct due 
10/11/2012 date (cs). 
Notification by the Clerks Office: correction made on 
the date the order is due. No further action is required. 
(RE: related doclUTient(s)53 Motion for Turnover filed by 
10/12/2012 Trustee R Sam Hopkins) (cs) 
54 Response to (related document(s): 53 Motion for Turnover 
(3 pgs) filed by Trustee R Sam Hopkins) Filed by Debtor Brian K 
10/22/2012 Hawk (Hawkes, Lowell) 
55 Notice ofHearing Filed by Trustee R Sam Hopkins (RE: 
(1 pg) related document(s)53 Motion for Turnover Filed by 
Trustee R Sam Hopkins Objections To Motion for 
Turnover due 11/5/2012 .. , 54 Response to). Motion to 
Turnover Property hearing to be held on 12/11/2012 at 
09:00 AM Pocatello - US Courthouse, 
Bankruptcy/Magistrate Courtroom for 54 and for 53, 
11/13/2012 (Hopkins, R) 
56 Hearing Held 
Appearances: Lowen Hawkes, Counsel for Debtors 
I Malpractice Claim; R. Sam Hopkins, Trustee 
Report of Proceedings: Comments by the Trustee and 
Mr. Hawkes, ,vi.th questions by the Court. After 





02/28/2013 (2 pgs; 2 docs) 
58 
CM/ECF LIVE- U.S. Banlq-uptcyCourt 
the Debtors to turn o books, records or 
information etc., on condition that the Trustee first 
meet with Mr. Hmvkes. Tnistee to submit an 
appropriate order "'ith these conditions. 
is take place advance of entry order. 
Trustee may \vithdrawthe motion any point. [ESR: 
CS] 
(RE: related docrunent(s)53 Motion for Turnover filed by 
Trustee R Sam Hopkins) (drh) 
Chapter 7 Trustee's Report ofN o Distnbution: I, R Sam 
Hopkins, having been appointed trustee of the estate of the 
above-named debtor(s), report that I have neither received 
any property nor paid any money on account of this estate; 
that I have made a diligent inquiry into the financial affuirs of 
the debtor(s) and the location of the property belonging to 
the estate; and that there is no property available for 
distnbution from the estate over and above that exempted 
by law. Pursuant to Fed R Bank P 5009, I hereby certify 
that the estate of the above-named debtor(s) has been fully 
administered. I request that I be discharged from any further 
duties as trustee. Key information about this case as 
reported in schedules filed by the debtor(s) or otherwise 
found in the case record: This case was pending for 28 
months. Assets Abandoned (without deducting any secured 
claims): $ 14 7781.16, Assets Exempt: Not Available, 
Claims Scheduled:$ 195368. 73, Claims Asserted: Not 
Applicable, Claims scheduled to be discharged without 
payment (without deducting the value of collateral or debts 
excepted from discharge):$ 195368.73. Filed by Trustee R 
Sam Hopkins. (Hopkins, R) 
Order Approving Trustee's Report ofNo Distnbution and 
Closing Case (Ch.7) Signed on 2/28/2013. (cs) 
Court's Certificate of Service re 57 Order Approving 
Trustee's Report ofNo Distnbution and Closing Case 
(Ch. 7) 
A notice of entry of the related docwnent has been served 
on Registered Participants as reflected by the Notice of 
Electronic Filing. AN otice of Entry has also been served by 







CM/ECF LIVE- U.S. Banl<ruptcyCourt 
Lowell N Hawkes 132 tr Pocatello, ID 83201 (RE: 
related document(s)57 Order Approving Trustee's Report 
ofNo Distribution and Closing Case (Ch. 7)) (cs) 
BNC Certificate ofMailing- Order Approving Trustee's 
Report ofNo Distribution and Closing Estate (Ch.7) Notice 
Date 
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'j Transaction Receipt I 
06-40526-JDP Fil or Ent: filed Doc From: 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF HE SEVENTH JUDICIAL ISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS L. STRONG and 













INTERMOUNTAIN ANESTHESIA, P.A., 
and MARCUS E. MURPHY, M.D., 
Defendants. ) 
Case No. CV-06-7149 
________________________________ ) 
COPY 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
SEPTEMBER 7, 2010 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JON J. SHINDURLING 
Idaho Falls, Bonneville County, Idaho 
NANCY MARLOW, CSR 
Official Court Reporter 
605 North Capital Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
TELEPHONE (208) 529-1350 Ex. 1194 
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1 
2 
SEPTEMBER 7, 2010 
3 THE COURT: We will be on the record In Case 
4 No. CV-06-7149, Strong versus Intermountaln 
5 Anesthesia. Present on behalf of the plaintiff is 
6 Lowell Hawkes, in the courtroom. Present by telephone 
7 on behalf of the defendants Is Kevin Scanlan. 
8 This Is the time set for hearing with regard to 
9 the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to 
10 prosecute or, in the alternative, motion for summary 
11 judgment. 
12 I have received considerable filings from the 
13 defendant in that regard. I have not yet received 
14 anything from the plaintiff. 
15 MR. HAWKES: That's true, Your Honor. My 
16 understanding is this was a scheduling conference 
17 today. The motion to lift the stay was, in the 
18 alternative, with the other. Kevin had filed --
19 THE COURT: Well, I have signed an order 
20 llftlng the stay. 
21 MR. HAWKES: Yes, without a hearing. The 
22 practical problem we have here is that this case was 
23 In bankruptcy, and so the case is an asset of the 
24 bankruptcy, and I have never been able to get the --
25 either the trustee or Craig Jorgensen, the attorney In 
4 
1 submitted the documents relative to our position on 
2 the motion to dismiss, as well as, if we needed to get 
3 to It, the motion for summary judgment, but I don't 
4 know that I have anything further to add to the 
5 filings that have been submitted to the Court. 
6 THE COURT: All right. Well, I had anticipated 
7 we were addressing the summary judgment dismissal 
8 issues today. 
9 r have reviewed the submissions of Mr. Scanlan, 
10 and it appears to me, from the PACER report, or the 
11 PACER printout, that this matter was discharged and 
12 dosed by the Bankruptcy Court on May 15, 2008. The 
13 trustee was dismissed or discharged, so I don't know 
14 what there is left to -- I mean, it's been two years 
15 that the bankruptcy case has been over. 
16 MR. HAWKES: I don't have any problem with 
17 that, Your Honor. This ls a matter of Federal law. 
18 This case became an asset, and l don't know whether It 
19 was disclosed. If It was dlsclosed, then the 
20 trustee --
21 THE COURT: Well, you asked for the matter to 
22 be stayed so that the --
23 MR. HAWKES: No, I didn't ask. That's federal 
24 law. It's stayed automatically. I probably gave the 
25 Court notice of that, but --
6 
1 bankruptcy, to tell me whether the trustee released 
2 this case as an asset. So I'm not even totally 
3 comfortable being here asserting some claim over this 
4 case when it was. 
5 Now Kevin and I have talked about it candidly, 
6 and we both have been a little frustrated trying to 
7 get Information, but I do not have anything that tells 
8 me the trustee released this case without claim, and 
9 so I had understood that we were here to have a status 
10 conference and to schedule it, and then hopefully we 
11 can figure that out and see if I even have authority 
12 to act. 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Scanlan? 
14 MR. SCANLAN: Well, Judge, we filed the motion 
15 to lift the stay and had an order granted to that 
16 effect. And contemporaneously with that, we filed our 
17 motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment, 
18 which has been noticed up to be heard today. 
19 As far as I can tell, it's ripe. And, you 
20 know, ultimately, this Is a case that has wallowed for 
21 over four years since it was originally filed. And if 
22 at this point Mr. Hawkes doesn't have -- if Mr. Hawkes 
23 doesn't have any basis or authority to proceed in the 
24 case, I think that it's ripe to be dismissed. 
25 And if -- I think that, you know, we have 
5 
1 THE COURT: Well, you gave me an affidavit. 
2 MR. HAWKES: Yeah, advising that, because 
3 there's not a process whereby something is sent out 
4 automatically. 
5 THE COURT: Yeah, I understand that. 
6 MR. HAWKES: And I don't have any beef with 
7 Craig Jorgensen, but even including face-to-face 
8 efforts, I've said, I need to know, Craig, was this 
9 case disclosed as an asset? Because it is an asset, 
10 whether disclosed or not. 
11 And the way I read the motion, or what my 
12 understanding was, Is we were simply going to have 
13 some scheduling here today. I don't think just 
14 because a case is dismissed that I suddenly have 
15 authority and ownership of this case. 
16 I've seen people -- certainly read cases where 
17 people go to jail for not disclosing an asset and 
18 treating it as their own after a bankruptcy. And 
19 that's my concern here. I don't want to get in that 
20 box. 
21 THE COURT: Well, the trustee didn't conduct 
22 any supplemental proceeding. 
23 MR. HAWKES: No. It's my understanding it got 
24 dismissed, but if they don't disclose the case as an 
25 asset on the schedules, then somebody could be in 
7 
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1 serious trouble down the road if somebody pops up and 
2 says, hey, here's an asset that we didn't get to deal 
3 with in the bankruptcy. You go to jail. 

















Whether your client's In trouble or not, I don't know, 
but we're going to proceed. 
MR. HAWKES: That's your call. 
THE COURT: Yeah, it's my call. 
MR. HAWKES: It's the Federal overlay that I'm 
concerned about. 
THE COURT: And I'm sure Jim Pappas will let me 
know if I'm out of line, but that's my order. 
So where do we go from there? 
MR. HAWKES: Well, if that's where It Is, I 
would request a reasonable amount of time, if I've 
got to deal with a summary judgment, to get 
authorized, so that the Court, this Court doesn't put 
me in jeopardy of asserting ownership over an asset 
that I'm making a record here today I am not asserting 
ownership over, In the absence of clear authority 
21 from the Court that this claim -- that any claim to 
22 this case has been released. Give me some reasonable 
23 time to --
24 THE COURT: How much do you need? 
25 MR. HAWKES: Give me 60 days. 
8 
1 with nothing occurring as far as anyone either 
2 involving the bankruptcy trustee, getting -- making an 
3 effort to reopen the case or doing anything of that 
4 nature, at this point, we have now got a case that's 
5 more than four years old, and it's two years post the 
6 closure of the bankruptcy. We've got witnesses who, 
7 one, we've lost track of and, two, have moved out of 
8 state outside of our jurisdiction. 
9 We think at this point that it's appropriate 
1 THE COURT: Do you have any problem with that, 
1
1 
2 Mr. Scanlan? 
3 MR. SCANLAN: Well, Your Honor, I actually -- I 
4 think that at this point in time that the Court should 
5 be in a position to actually make the determination on 
6 the 
7 THE COURT: I understand that. Mr. Hawkes is 
8 saying that he feels like he is compromised because he 
9 doesn't feel like, without confirmation that this 
10 claim Itself has been freed up by the Bankruptcy 
11 Court, that he has authority to proceed, even though I 
12 have lifted the stay. 
13 MR, SCANLAN: Well, I think that the -- I think 
14 that the rnaterlals that we submitted demonstrates that 
15 the asset wasn't dlsclosed in the bankruptcy, and that 
16 for that reason judicial estoppel should cause It to 
17 be dismissed. 
18 But more significantly, we have had more than 
19 two years, and I have made efforts for approximately 
20 a year now to take steps to try to get this thing 
21 moved along, which really shouldn't be my burden; it 
22 should be the burden of Mr. Hawkes, Mr. Strong's 
23 attorney. 
24 By contacting Lowell Hawkes, apprising him of 











MR. HAWKES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Proceedings Concluded) 
10 for the Court to evaluate this case and make a 10 
11 determination on the failure to prosecute. 11 
12 THE COURT; All right. Well, I'm going to 12 
13 reset the dismissal summary judgment issue for the 1st 13 
14 of November at 9:30. 14 
15 I'll give you that much time, Mr. Hawkes, to 15 
16 get a response. That's 60 days roughly. 16 
17 MR. HAWKES: Okay. 17 
18 THE COURT: And we'll -- this has been lying 18 
19 dormant for a long time. Sixty days isn't going to 19 
20 hurt anything. I'll give you 60 days to figure out 20 
21 where you are. We'll hear this thing at that time, 
22 9:30, November 1st. 
23 Ali right? 
24 MR. SCANLAN: Thank you, Judge. 
25 THE COURT: Ali right. Thank you. 
10 
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I, NANCY MARLOW, Certified Shorthand Reporter 
and Notary Pub1ic in and for the State of Idaho, do 
hereby certify: 
That prior to being examined, a11 witnesses 
named in the foregoing proceeding were duly sworn to 
testify to the truth and nothing but the truth. 
That said proceeding was taken down by me in 
shorthand at the time and place therein named and 
thereafter reduoQd to comJPuterized transc:r:i.ption under 
my direction, and that the foregoing transcript 
contains a true and verbatim record of said 
proceeding and complies w;L th the rules to 
the best of my abi1i.ty and limitations of my computer 
software. 
I further certify that I have no interest in 
the events of this action. 
Dated this 24th day of October, 2010. 
NANCY MARLOW, CSR, in and 
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NOVEMBER 1, 2010 
THE COURT: We will be on the record then in 
Case No. CV-06-7149, entitled Strong versus 
Intermountain Anesthesia. Present on behalf of the 
plaintiff is Lowell Hawkes. Present on behalf of the 
defendant is Kevin Scanlan. 
MR. SCANLAN: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: This is the time set for hearing 
with regard to the motion to dismiss the last motion 
for summary judgment. I have received -- well, where 
is that bankruptcy notice that was with this? It was 
right there on top. 
I have received an automatic stay from the 
Bankruptcy Court with regard to a Bankruptcy Chapter 
VII filed by the Hawks. Different Hawks than --
MR. HAWKES: Hawk. 
THE COURT: Hawk. 
MR. HAWKES: Brian and Mary Ellen Hawk. 
THE COURT: Yes, the Hawks. 
MR. HAWKES: Yeah. 
THE COURT: I was going to say it's unrelated 
to Lowell. 
MR. HAWKES: Unrelated. 

























neut al a ain? 
MR. HAWKES: I believe it does, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Scanlan, did you receive this 
order from Judge Pappas? 
MR. SCANLAN: We received that notice sometime 
midafternoon on Friday. And I guess what I take from 
that notice is that the bankruptcy has been reopened. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. SCANLAN: And I have no other notice other 
than Mr. Hawkes' materials that he submitted 
indicating that as a result of that the automatic stay 
provisions are going to derail this case. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't know that it derai s 
it. It just puts it in kind of limbo for a minute. 
Just so that we're clear, I've received a 
Notice of Bankruptcy, Notice of Reopening the 
Bankruptcy and Automatic Stay signed by Mr. Hawkes, 
which was dated 29 October 2010. I have received an 
order reopening the estate in bankruptcy and 
appointing trustee signed by Judge Pappas. I have 
received the appointment of R. Sam Hopkins as the 
trustee dated October 29th. And it would appear that 
the stay is now again in place. I don't know that we 
can do anything about that, except you can approach 
































and I guess the way that 
one thing that I would 
encourage the Court to consider is the fact that we 
have other parties to this case. 
THE COURT: I understand, but I don't want to 
tangle with the Honorable Pappas. 
MR. SCANLAN: I'm not suggesting my clients. 
I'm suggesting that there is also another plaintiff. 
THE COURT: I understand that, but at least a 
portion of this now is in the possession of the 
trustee as an asset of an estate in bankruptcy. I 
have an obligation under Federal law to stay 
everything until that's resolved. Now the trustee can 
say, I'm not interested in this, or the trustee can 
say, I'm going to come in and participate, but the 
State Court jurisdiction is now superceded by Federal 
jurisdiction, and there is nothing I can do. 
MR. SCANLAN: And --
THE COURT: Unless you want me to sever. And 
that request has not been made. 
MR. SCANLAN: Okay. And at this point in time, 
do we have any notice that this case has ever been 
identified as an asset to the bankruptcy? 



























under law if the Hawks flea Chapter VII, any claim 
that they have may be a potential asset. I don't know 
what the filing is. That's the purpose of the 
temporary stay is to kind of put things on hold until 
that can all get sorted out. 
MR. SCANLAN: Okay. So is the Court entering a 
new stay in this case? 
THE COURT: I didn't. 
MR. SCANLAN: Okay. 
Judge Pappas did. 
THE COURT: I'm staying it pursuant to the 
Federal order. 
Now if you want to get relief from the trustee, 
I will be happy to proceed, but I've got to have it 
I've got to have that authorization. And I don't 
think that would be particularly hard to get, but it's 
up to you. 
So the matter will be stayed until further 
notice. 
Anything else? 
MR. HAWKES: I would be happy to tell you, 
Your Honor, how frustrating it's been at my end. 
not my desire to delay this at all. 
THE COURT: Oh, I understand that. 
It's 
MR. HAWKES: I have been going crazy to try to 



























that I finally heard from Jim Pappas. Not -- excuse 
me, Jim Spinner, who usually represents Trustee 
Hopkins, that they wanted the debtors to reopen it. 
When it boiled down to it, I think maybe 
everybody was dragging their feet because it takes 
$250 to reopen it. So I think that's why 
Craig Jorgensen and Hopkins were not getting back to 
me, or whatever. So I am ready to go with this case, 
but I am frustrated, and I am going to say, no more 
screwing around. 
You may remember some years ago in Northern 
Idaho an attorney went to prison because an old car 
that was transferred to a brother-in-law or something 
didn't get disclosed as an asset. And that's what I 
have been worried about here, just to be safe. 
THE COURT: Well, and that's why I'm being 
careful. I don't want to go to prison, either. 
MR. HAWKES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I appreciate that. But there are 
ways to get through this now if we will just take it 
step-by-step. 
MR. HAWKES: Well, we have it now where they 
have to deal with it. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 




























THE COURT: Al right. Thank you. 
MR. SCANLAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 





























I, NANCY MARLOW, Certified Shorthand Reporter 
and Official Court Reporter, Seventh Judicial 
District, in and for the State of Idaho, do hereby 
certify that the foregoing transcript is a true and 
accurate record of the proceedings had on the dates 
and at the place therein named, as stenographically 
reported by me and thereafter reduced to computerized 
transcription under my direction, and the foregoing 
transcript contains a true and verbatim record of said 
proceeding to the best of my ability. 
I further certify that I have no interest in 
the events of this action. 
Dated this 9th day of May, 2013. 
NANCY MARLOW, CSR, in and 
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DISCHARGING TRUSTEE AND 
CLOSING THE ESTATE 
The Supplemental Final Report having been considered and found to be in proper order; 
IT IS ORDERED that the accounts of said Trustee are APPROVED, the Trustee is DISCHARGED from 
and relieved of the trust; the surety or sureties thereon are released from further liability thereunder, except 
any liability which may have accrued during the time such bond was in effect and the estate is CLOSED. 
Dated: 5/15/08 lim D Pappas 
United States Bankruptcy Judge 
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EXHIBIT J 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT QI; 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OFJ~©~ILLE 
PATRICK AND CINDY WOODINGTON, ) 
individually, as husband and wife, and as a ) 
marital community, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
EASTERN IDAHO F..EALTH SERVICES, 
INC., assumed business name EASTERN 
IDAHO REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER; 
DON WEBER, M.D.; ROBERT L. CACH, 
M.D.; JAY MARSDEN, CRNA; 














Case No. CV-2010-2258 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER RE: MOTION TO STRIKE 
AND MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Received bv Mail 
MAY 0 
~ DUKE SCANLAN & HALL 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On September 5, 2007, Patrick Woodington underwent surgery for implantation 
of a dorsal column stimulator at Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center ("EIRMC"). 
On September 2, 2009, the Woodingtons filed a Medical Malpractice Pre-
Litigation Screening application with the Idaho State Board of Medicine ("Board"). 
On April 14, 2010, Patrick and his wife, Cindy Woodington, filed a Complaint 
naming Eastern Idal10 Regional Medical Center ("EIRMC"), Don Weber, M.D., Robert 
L. Cach, M.D., Jay Marsden, CRNA, and Intermountain Anesthesia, P.A. 
("Intermountain") as defendants. 
Marsden and Intermountain filed an Answer, asserting the statute of limitations as 
an affirmative defense, on March 9, 2011. 
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Marsden and Intermountain filed Motions for Summary Judgment on March 29, 
and a Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment on 
July 15, 2012. 
The Woodingtons filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and an Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Affidavit of Counsel") on 
July 5, 2012. The Affidavit of Counsel contains two exhibits. Exhibit A is a copy of the 
prelitigation screening application filed with the Board. Exhibit B is a copy of the 
prelitigation screening panel's Findings and Recommendations. 
Marsden and Intermountain filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Counsel on 
July 10, 2012. 
The Woodingtons filed a Memorandum in Response to Motion to Strike on July 
16, 2012. 
These matters came on hearing before this Court on July 18, 2012. 
II. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
A. Motion to Strike 
Whether to grant or deny a motion to strike rests within the court's discretion. 
State v. Carey, 152 Idaho 720,722,274 P.3d 21, 23 (Ct. App. 2012); State v. Molen, 148 
Idaho 950,961,231 P.3d 1047, 1058 (Ct. App. 2010). 
B. Motion for Summary Judgment 
A motion for summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
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as a matter law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). See Grover v. Smith, 137 Idaho 247, 46 P.3d 1105; 
Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 39 P.3d (2002). The burden at all times, 
on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact 
Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 21 P.3d 908 (2001). 
The United States Supreme Court, in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 4 77 U.S. 317, 106 
S.Ct. 2548 (1986), stated: 
Of course, a pa..'i:y seeking summary judgment always bears the initial 
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, 
and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact. But unlike the Court of Appeals, we find no express or 
implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion 
with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. 
On the contrary, Rule 56(c), which refers to "the affidavits, if any" 
( emphasis added), suggests the absence of such a requirement. And if 
there were any doubt about the meaning of Rule 56( c) in this regard, such 
doubt is clearly removed by Rules 56(a) and (b), which provide the 
claimants and defendants, respectively, may move for summary judgment 
"with or without supporting affidavits" ( emphasis added). The import of 
these subsections is that, regardless of whether the moving party 
accompanies its summary judgment motion with affidavits, the motion 
may, and should, be granted so long as whatever is before the district court 
demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment, as set 
forth in Rule 56( c ), is satisfied. One of the principal purposes of the 
summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported 
claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way that 
allows it to accomplish this purpose. 
Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (alterations in original). 
When assessing a motion for summary judgment, all controve1ied facts are to be 
liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party. Dodge-Farrar v. American 
Cleaning Services, Co., 137 Idaho 838, 54 P.3d 954 (Ct. App. 2002). In ruling on a 
motion for summary judgment, a court is not permitted to weigh the evidence to resolve 
controverted factual issues. Meyers v. Lott, 133 Idaho 846, 993 P.2d 609 (2000). Liberal 
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construction of the facts in favor of the non-moving party requires the court to draw all 
reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Farnworth v. Ratliff, 134 
Idaho 237, 999 P.2d 892 (2000); Madrid v. Roth, 134 Idaho 802, 10 P.3d 751 (Ct. App. 
2000). 
The Idaho appellate courts have followed the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Celotex, which stated: 
Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored 
procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a 
whole, which are designed "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action." ... Rule 56 must be construed with due 
regard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that 
are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a 
jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses 
to demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the 
claims and defenses have no factual basis. 
Id. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2555 (citations omitted); see Win of Michigan, Inc. v. Yreka 
United, Inc., 137 Idaho 747, 53 P.3d 330 (2002); Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 
473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002). 
A party against whom a summary judgment is sought cannot merely rest on his 
pleadings but, when faced with affidavits or depositions supporting the motion, must 
come forward by way of affidavit, deposition, admissions or other documentation to 
establish the existence of material issues of fact, which preclude the issuance of summary 
judgment. Anderson v. Hollingsworth, 136 Idaho 800, 41 P.3d 228 (2001); Baxter v. 
Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000). The non-moving party's case, however, 
must be anchored in something more than speculation, and a mere scintilla of evidence is 
not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 
41 P.3d 220 (2001). 
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The moving party is entitled to judgment when the non-moving party fails to 
a sufficient showing as to the essential elements to which that party will bear the 
burden of proof at trial. Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Adm in., 13 7 
Idaho 663, 52 P.3d 307 (2002). Facts in dispute cease to be "material" facts when the 
plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case. Post Falls Trailer Park v. Fredekind, 131 
Idaho 634,962 P.2d 1018, (1998). In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue of 
material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the 
non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Id 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Motion to Strike 
Marsden and Intermountain ask this Court to Strike the Affidavit of Counsel. 
They argue I.R.E. 413 and I.C. § 9-340C(l) preclude the admission of evidence 
pertaining to the prelitigation hearing process. 
The Woodingtons argue that the Affidavit of Counsel is necessary to confirm 
claims against Marsden and Intermountain were asserted in their application for 
prelitigation screening before the Board. The W oodingtons ask that the documentation 
be admitted for this limited purpose. 
I.R.E. 413 provides: 
Proceedings of medical malpractice screening panels. Evidence of the 
proceedings or of conduct or statements made in proceedings before a 
hearing panel for prelitigation consideration of medical malpractice 
claims, or the results, findings or determinations thereof is inadmissible in 
a civil action or proceeding by, against or between the parties thereto or 
any witness therein. 
LC. § 9-340C provides: 
The following records are exempt from disclosure: 
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(10) The records, findings, determinations and decisions any 
prelitigation screening panel formed under chapters 10 and 23, title 6, 
Idaho Code. 
I.R.E. 413 appears to act as a complete bar to the admission of evidence of the 
proceedings before a prelitigation hearing panel. However, without evidence pertaining 
to the commencement and conclusion of that process, there would be no way to 
determine whether the statute of limitations was tolled and/or when it expired on d1e 
various malpractice claims. The Woodingtons' Affidavit of Counsel should be admitted 
for that limited purpose. Marsden and Intermountain's Motion to Strike should be 
granted regarding all other uses of the Affidavit of Counsel. 
B. Motion for Summary Judgment 
Marsden and Intermountain note that Idaho Code § 5-219 establishes a two-year 
statute of limitations on professional malpractice claims. They argue that the 
Woodingtons filed their Complaint more than two years after the September 5, 2007 
surgery, which allegedly caused Patrick's injuries. The defendants note that neither of 
them are physicians, surgeons or an acute care general hospital, which would be subject 
to the provisions of Idaho Code § § 6-100 l, requiring a prelitigation hearing panel, and 6-
1005, tolling the statute of limitations while a claim is pending before the hearing panel. 
The Woodingtons argue the plain language ofldaho Code§§ 6-1001 and 6-1005 
act to toll the statute of limitations on their claims against Marsden and Intermountain as 
well as the other defendants. 
Idaho Code§ 5-219, specifying the statute of limitation applicable in professional 
malpractice cases, states, in part: 
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Within two (2) years: 
4. An action to recover damages for professional malpractice, or for an 
injury to the person ... ; ... the cause of action shall be deemed to have 
accrued as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of, 
and the limitation period shall not be extended by reason of any continuing 
consequences or damages resulting therefrom or any continuing 
professional or commercial relationship between the injured party and the 
alleged wrongdoer . . . . The term "professional malpractice" as used 
herein refers to wrongful acts or omissions in the performance of 
professional services by any person, firm, association, entity or 
corporation licensed to perform such services under the law of the state of 
Idaho .... 
Idaho Code § 6-1001 provides: 
The Idaho state board of medicine, in alleged malpractice cases 
involving claims for damages against physicians and surgeons practicing 
in the state of Idaho or against licensed acute care general hospitals 
operating in the state of Idaho, is directed to cooperate in providing a 
hearing panel in the nature of a special civil grand jury and procedure for 
prelitigation consideration of personal injury and wrongful death claims 
for damages arising out of the provision of or alleged failure to provide 
hospital or medical care in the state of Idaho, which proceedings shall be 
informal and nonbinding, but nonetheless compulsory as a condition 
precedent to litigation. Proceedings conducted or maintained under the 
authority of this act shall at all times be subject to disclosure according to 
chapter 3, title 9, Idaho Code. Formal rules of evidence shall not apply and 
all such proceedings shall be expeditious and informal. 
(Emphasis added). 
Idaho Code § 6-1005 provides: 
[I]n the interest of due consideration being given to such proceedings and 
in the interest of encouraging consideration of claims informally and 
without the necessity of litigation, the applicable statute of limitations 
shall be tolled and not be deemed to run during the time that such a claim 
is pending before such a panel and for thirty (30) days thereafter. 
(Emphasis added). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held: 
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When interpreting a statute, the Court begins with the plain 
language. "[I]f the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the Court 
need merely apply the statute without engaging in any statutory 
construction.... Statutory interpretation begins with the words of the 
statute, giving the language its plain, obvious and rational meanings." 
State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, 130 Idaho 727, 732, 947 P.2d 
400, 405 (1997). Further, the Court "[w]ill resort to judicial construction 
only if the provision is ambiguous, incomplete, absurd, or arguably in 
conflict with other laws. There is no need to go beyond the language of the 
statute, when that language is clear and unambiguous." Potlatch Corp. v. 
United States, 134 Idaho 912, 914, 12 P.3d 1256, 1258 (2000) (citation 
and internal quotations omitted). 
Pocatello v. State, 145 Idaho 497, 500-501, 180 P.3d 1048, 1051-52 (2008); Pioneer Irr. 
Dist. v. City of Caldwell, 2012 WL 1449597, *3 (Idaho 2012) ("Where a statute is 
unambiguous, its plain language controls."). "A statute is ambiguous where the language 
is capable of more than one reasonable construction." Porter v. Board of Trustees, 
Preston School Dist. No. 201, 141 Idaho 11, 14, 105 P.3d 671,674 (2004). 
The primary function of the Court is to determine and give effect to the 
legislative intent. Such intent should be derived from a reading of the 
whole act at issue. George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 
537, 539-40, 797 P.2d 1385, 1387-88 (1990). 
St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, Ltd v. Board o/Com'rs of Ada County, 146 Idaho 
753, 755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009). 
Section 6-1001 dictates that the prelitigation hearing panel is to consider personal 
injury claims "arising out of the provision of ... medical care." The plain language of 
Section 6-1001 does not limit the malpractice claims the Board hears to those against 
physicians, surgeons and acute care hospitals. Rather, the statute requires that any case 
before it involve a claim against at least one such party. In addition to claims against 
Marsden and Intermountain, this case involves claims for damages stemming from 
alleged professional malpractice by EIRMC, Dr. Weber, and Dr. Cach. EIRMC is a 
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licensed acute care general hospital. Dr. Cach is a physician and surgeon. Dr. Weber is a 
physician. Consequently, this case falls within the purview of Idaho Code§ 6-1001, 
requiring the compulsory filing of a claim before the Board's prelitigation hearing panel 
"in alleged malpractice cases involving claims for damages against physicians and 
surgeons ... or against licensed acute care general hospitals .... " Section 6-1005, tolls 
the statute of limitations while "such a claim" is pending. Because this case falls within 
the purview of Idaho Code § 6-1001, the statute of limitations was tolled during the time 
that the Woodingtons' claims were pending before the Board's prelitigation hearing 
panel. 
Patrick Woodington underwent surgery and anesthesia on September 5, 2007. It 
is from this date that the two-year statute oflimitations began to run. The Woodingtons 
filed their claims against Dr. Cach, EIRMC, Dr. Weber and Marsden and "any affiliated 
medical providers" before the Board on September 2, 2009. Although Marsden is 
affiliated with Intermountain, the prelitigation screening application never referred to 
Intermountain by name. Marsden was served with a copy of the application on 
September 4, 2009. The record does not indicate that Intermountain was ever notified the 
matter was pending before the Board. 
On October 2, 2009, the Board mailed a letter to the Woodingtons' counsel 
informing him that it would not consider the Woodingtons' claim against Marsden. 
Whether or not the Board was correct in its determination, that decision effectively 
disposed of the Woodingtons' claims against Marsden as of that date. The tolling of the 
statute oflimitations as to the claims against Marsden would have ended on November l, 
2009. The Woodingtons did not file their claim against Marsden in this Court until April 
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2010-after the statute of limitations had expired. Marsden's motion for summary 
judgment should be granted. 
Intermountain was never named as a defendant before the Idaho State Board of 
Medicine. Consequently, the Board's prelitigation hearing process could not toll the 
statute oflimitations on the Woodingtons' claims against Intermountain. Intermountain's 
motion for summary judgment should be granted. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
Marsden and Intermountain' s Motion to Strike is denied to the extent the 
Woodingtons' Affidavit of Counsel sheds light on when the statute of limitations expired. 
The Motion to Strike is granted as to all other purposes. 
Marsden and Intermountain's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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potential prejudice of incorporating two separate and individual surgical procedures into one action 
will not only confuse the issues for the jury, but also fails to meet the requirements for permissive 
joinder under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. It makes further sense to bifurcate these actions 
given the complications which are certain to arise as a result of Mr. Hawk's recent bankruptcy filing. 
Based upon the above, we believe bifurcation is appropriate, and request your signature 
stipulating to such bifurcation. Oddly enough we seem to keep running into this issue; hopefully, 
you recognize the appropriateness of splitting these two actions under the present circumstances. If 
you do not agree, please let me know so that we can decide how to proceed. 
Thank you for your attention to this issue. If you have any questions as regards to the above, 
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INTERMOUNT AIN ANESTHESIA, P.A. and 
MARCUS E. MURPHY, M.D., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 06-7149 
STIPULATION TO BIFURCATE 
COME NOW Defendants Intermountain Anesthesia, P.A. and Marcus E. Murphy, M.D., 
and Plaintiffs Thomas L. Strong and Brian K. Hawk, by and through their respective counsel of 
record, and hereby stipulate and agree to sever the proceedings and trial of the Complaint by 
Plaintiffs Thomas L. Strong and Brian K Hawk as against Defendants Intermountain Anesthesia, 
P.A. and Marcus E. Murphy, M.D. 
Such stipulation is on the grounds that such bifurcation will avoid confusion of the issues 
in the action filed by Plaintiffs, and will further avoid complications which may result from 
Plaintiff Hawk's recent bankruptcy filing. 
STIPULATION TO BIFURCATE -
DATED this day of April, 2014. 
HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT 
& BLANTON, P.A. 
Richard E. Hall - Of the Firm 
Kevin J. Scanlan Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
DATED this __ day of April, 2014. 
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MARCUS E. MURPHY, M.D., 
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Case No. CV 06-7149 
NOTICE OF HEARING RE: 
DEFENDANTS' RENEWED 
MOTION TO DISMISS, OR 
ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, Defendants have set for hearing before this Court their 
RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS, OR ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. Said motion shall be heard on the 12th day of May, 2014 at 9:00 am before the 
Honorable Jon J. Shindurling. 
DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS, OR ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT- I 
59 
DATED this 10th day of April, 20 
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Lowell N. Hawkes, Chartered 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
Facsimile (208) 235-4200 
ig U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
D Telecopy 
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fNTERMOUNTAIN ANESTHESIA, P.A. and 
MARCUS E. MURPHY, M.D., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 06-7149 
AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING 
RE: DEFENDANTS' RENEWED 
MOTION TO DISMISS, OR 
ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, Defendants have set for hearing before this Court their 
RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS, OR ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. Said motion shall be rescheduled to be heard on the 2nd day of June, 2014 at 
10:00 am before the Honorable Jon J. Shindurling. 
AMENDED DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS, OR ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 1 
0 I I 
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DATED this of May, 2014. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5th day oflv1ay, 2014, I caused to be served a trne copy 
of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following: 
Lowell N. Hawkes 
Ryan S. Lewis 
Lowell N. Hawkes, Chartered 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, ID 8320 I 
Facsimile (208) 235-4200 
D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D /Overnight Mail 
bd Telecopy 
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Case No. CV-06-7149 
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
AND 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Procedural Context 
The motion now before the Court was stayed "midstream" after being first 
filed following notice of a pending bankruptcy by Plaintiff Brian Hawk. The Trustee first 
closed the bankruptcy after being given notice that this claim may be an asset of the 
bankruptcy but without making that determination or asserting that it was. 
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AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 1 
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Because the potential federal felony exposure to everyone asserting 
any "control" over any potential bankruptcy hearing on this motion was stayed by 
this Court pending presenting the issue to the Bankruptcy Court and Trustee. Shortly 
thereafter, the Bankruptcy was reopened and the "Automatic Stay" pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
§ 362 went into effect. At the conclusion of that federal court process the bankruptcy was 
closed and counsel herein advised Defendants' counsel of that fact and that Defendants' 
stayed motion could now proceed. Ultimately there was never any determination that the 
claim of Mr. Hawk was an asset of the bankruptcy estate or that the Trustee so contended. 
Supplemental Filings 
This is Plaintiffs' Response in supplement to their prior filings. This 
Supplemental Response addresses the expanded issue of Intermountain Anesthesia, P.A., 
as a party to the Prelitigation proceedings before the Board of Medicine and the practice 
of medicine through entities, the Woodington decision of Judge Dane Watkins on May 1, 
2013, Rules 40 and 41 Dismissal where actual prejudice is shown, and judicial estoppel as 
it relates to the bankruptcy proceeding. 
Previously-filed Filings 
Plaintiffs previously filed the following in response to Defendants' motion: 
• Affidavit of Catherine L. Linderman, MD. (10-12-10) 
• Affidavit of Brian K. Hawk (10--14-10) 
• Affidavit of Mary Ellen Hawk ( 10-14-10) 
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• Affidavit of Thomas Lee Strong (10-1 10) 
• Affidavit of TeriLyn Chenoweth (I 15-1 
• Affidavit of Counsel (10-18-10) 
Plaintiffs' Affidavit of Counsel includes the combined deposition of both 
Defendants (9-29-10) together with the Exhibits to that Deposition, including the EIRMC 
medical records on Mr. Strong and Mr. Hawk. 
Facts Synopsis 
On June 25, 2004 Dr. Catherine L. Linderman scheduled six pain 
management patients for the permanent surgical implantation of pain-stopping peripheral 
nerve stimulators. Plaintiff Tom Strong was the first case. During his surgery he was left 
unattended by a relief "nurse anesthetist" who also negligently doubled the dosage of his 
IV anesthesia Propofol resulting in Mr. Strong suffering "Negative Pressure Pulmonary 
Edema." That condition results in bleeding in the lungs with resultant life-altering loss of 
lung elasticity. 
Defendant Marcus Murphy was Intermountain Anesthesia's oversight 
anesthesiologist on June 25, 2004 at EIRMC. Initially, rather than accept full 
responsibility for the anesthesia mishandling of, and injuries to, Mr. Strong he advised 
Dr. Linderman that he was going to limit the amount of anesthesia her remaining patients 
would receive! The result was to subject the second patient- Plaintiff Brian Hawk -
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to needless terrific during his surgery. That outrageous conduct occurred despite 
clear and unequivocal assurances from Dr. Murphy to Brian Hawk before surgery that he 
would be given sufficient anesthesia to be comfortable at all times. 
Defendant Murphy's essential medical defense has been to distance and 
absent himself from any responsibility for the patient care of Mr. Strong and Mr. Hawk 
that day. However, Dr. Murphy is the signatory supervising anesthesiologist M.D. on 
both the Pre-Op, Preanesthesia and Post-anesthesia forms and notes in the EIRMC 
patient charts for both Mr. Strong and Mr. Hawk. 1 EIRMC-S99,103 & 105; EIRMC-H32, 
45 & 46. Murphy's legal affirmative defenses are, incredibly, the assertion of patient 
fault, third-person fault, and unspecified "intervening causes." 
The deposition of Dr. Murphy and the medical record clearly established his 
asserted medical and legal defenses for which there was never any basis in fact or law. 
Murphy Depo. 108:3-9 (211d and 4111 Affirmative Defenses of Mitigation and Comparative 
Negligence), Murphy Depo. 108:13-24 (3rd Affirmative Defense of Third-party 
Negligence), Murphy Depo. 108:25-109:14 (8th Affirmative Defense of Pre-existing 
1 The "Anesthesia Record" for Mr. Strong (EIRMC-S 104) also shows the "Anes Provider" 
for Mr. Strong as CRNA Weight and "MM" that Dr. Murphy admitted stood for him, Marcus Murphy: 
Q. And then a slash and your initials, MM? 
A. My initials. 
- Murphy Depo 66:15-16 
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Condition), Murphy Depo. 109:16-112:14 (9th Affirmative Defense of Superceding 
* * * 
POINT ONE 
THE COMPLAINT AGAINST INTERMOUNTAIN 
ANESTHESIA IS NOT TIME BARRED 
Defendants' original motion sought to dismiss Intermountain Anesthesia 
arguing it was not subject to the tolling provisions of the Prelitigation Screening statutes, 
Idaho Code §6-1001 et seq. because the tolling of medical malpractice claims doesn't 
apply to entities, only individuals. 
Defendants' supplemental filing asks this Court to dismiss Intermountain 
Anesthesia on the basis of the Woodington v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, Case No. 
CV-2010-2258, decided by Judge Dane Watkins on May 1, 2013. In that case Judge 
Watkins - according to Defendants' recent supplemental memorandum -held: 
" ... the tolling provisions of §6-1005 only apply to claims 
against parties against whom a claim was filed before the 
pre litigation screening panel. (Id, Ex. J ., pp. 9-10). In 
Woodington, the plaintiffs did not assert a claim against 
Intermountain Anesthesia before the prelitigation screening 
panel." 
-Page 17, Defendants Memorandum in Support 
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other words, Defendants now acknowledge that a physician's entity 
through which he practices and bills patients is an appropriate party for both litigation 
and prelitigation. 
Defendants' have simply missed what was previously set forth at page 32 
of the Plaintiffs' October 18, 2010 Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss served 
and filed with this Court. Those filings pointed out that Intermountain Anesthesia was in 
fact named as a party to the Prelitigation process in this case: 
In fact, Intermountain Anesthesia was named as a party to the 
Prelitigation process. 
See Affidavit of Counsel, 'IT 5, Exhibit C 
The argument then boils down to one of whether physicians 
and other healthcare providers can practice exclusively as 
employees of Intennountain Anesthesia and then seek to have 
that entity immune from the failings of its employees. It 
cannot. 
It is admitted that Intermountain Anesthesia is a professional 
corporation that exists to provide anesthesia care to patients: 
3. "Intennountain Anesthesia, P.A." is an 
Idaho professional corporation with offices in 
Idaho Falls that was created January 25, 1993 
for the purposes of providing medical 
anesthesia care to patients." 
- Complaint & Jury Demand, 'IT 3 (12-20-06) 
* * * 
III. 
Dr. Murphy admits the allegations contained in paragraph 3 
of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
- Marcus E. Murphy, M.D.'s Answer to Complaint 
and Jury Demand, 1J Ill (2-13-07) 
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Defendants' argument ignores those provisions Idaho law 
that allow physicians to practice medicine as entities, take the 
econo1mc and legal advantages of an entity practice, do all 
their medical practice billings and contracts in the entity name 
only to then try and hide behind that entity when malpractice 
occurs. See Idaho Code §30-1306: 
Nothing contained in this act shall be interpreted to 
abolish, repeal, modify, restrict or limit the law now in 
effect in this state applicable to the professional 
relationship and liabilities between the person 
furnishing the professional services and the person 
receiving such professional service and to the 
standards for professional conduct. 
This Court has previously rejected the same argument in Morgan v. Demos, Chambers & 
Idaho Heart Institute, Case No. CV-06-4332. See Affidavit of Counsel, 11 4, Exhibit B. 
The September 29, 2010 Rule 30(b)(6) deposition oflntermountain 
Anesthesia and Defendant Murphy brought forth the admissions that Defendant Murphy 
was an employee of Intermountain Anesthesia and the entirety of the anesthesia given, 
and billings, were exclusively through that entity: 
Q .... you've never practiced anesthesia in 
Idaho Falls except with Intermountain, 
correct? 
A. That is correct. 
- Murphy Depo 27:24-28:2 
* * * 
Q. Yeah. You don't do any billing in your 
name personally, do you? 
A. I do not. 
- Murphy Depo 29:14-16 
* * * 
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 7 
& Hawk Intermountain Anesthesia, et al 
You don't receive any money directly from 
patients, do you? 
I do not. 
- Murphy Depo 30:1-3 
* * * 
Q. JOO percent of the money for your services 
goes to Intermountain Anesthesia, who in turn 
pays you as an employee? 
A. Intermountain Anesthesia pays me as an 
employee. 
- Murphy Depo 30:4-8 
This Court has already rejected2 on August 28, 2008 in the Morgan v. 
Demos case the argument Defendants again make: 
Here Drs. Chambers and Demos have acknowledged 
that they are employees of the Idaho Heart Institute. The 
advantages of a professional corporation require the law to 
view the corporation as a single legal entity; it would be 
incongruous to treat the professional liability of the 
employees separately from the liability of the employer. 
Defendants Chambers and Demos are physicians, and 
the Idaho Heart Institute is,for the purposes of the statute, 
a "physician" and the statute of limitation was tolled for the 
time the claim was before a pre-litigation panel and for 30 
days thereafter." 
- Morgan v. Demos, Chambers & Idaho Heart Institute, 
Bonneville County Case No. CV-06-4332 (8-28-08) 
2 This Court's decision in Morgan was made with the benefit of the March 11, 2003 
Memorandum Decision of The Honorable N. Randy Smith on the same subject in Bannock County Case No. 
CVPI-01-00070-B. Judge Smith rejected the argument made here stating the professional service corporation 
statute makes the corporation liable for "any negligent or wrongful acts or misconduct committed by any of 
its officers, shareholders, agents or employees ." 
A copy of the March 11, 2003 Memorandum Decision of Judge Smith is attached to the 
Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel and referenced therein as paragraph 14. 
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Interrnountain Anesthesia is a proper party and was specifically named 
prelitigation proceedings as shown in the prior filings on this motion. The 
Intermountain Anesthesia entity argument should be rejected for the same reasons this 
Court did on August 28, 2008 and Judge Smith did before that on March 11, 2003. 
POINT TWO 
RULE 40(cj DISMISSAL IS NOT PROPER 
Defendants now, by conclusory assertions, claim that the Hawk and Strong 
Complaints should be dismissed because of the prejudice of passage oftime.
3 Defense 
Renewed Memo, pp. 14-15. 
Defendants acknowledge the Rule 40( c) standard is "good cause" and also 
that this case has been delayed by federal law and the bankruptcy "Automatic Stay" under 
11 U.S.C. § 362. Defense Renewed Memo, pp. 11-12. 
Defendants, however, were promptly notified of the second closing of the 
bankruptcy shortly after that occurred and were in total control of noticing up this motion 
that was stayed by federal law; noticing up of this motion was specifically discussed 
between counsel. Any further "passage of time" for the hearing of this motion stayed 
3 Defendants also argue that joinder of these two claims was not required, though 
Defendants themselves never filed any motion to sever. Defendants seek a double-standard. 
The October 12,2010 Affidavit of Catherine L. Linderman, M.D. before this Comi explains 
in great detail that these two claims are totally intertwined in a common anesthesia fact scenario involving 
six patients on the same day at the EIRMC. 
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mid-stream federal law was totally within the control of defense counsel. See, 
Supplemental Affidavit of Counsely 'ff'lf 9-11. 
POINT THREE 
DISMISSAL UNDER RULE 41 (b)IS IMPROPER; 
DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT PROVEN ANY PREJUDICE 
Defendants argue that the claims against Defendants should be dismissed 
pursuant to Rule 41 (b) on the basis of "failure to prosecute" citing to Gerstner v. 
Washington Water Power Co., 122 Idaho 673, 837 P.2d 799 (1992). Defense Renewed 
Memo, pp. 15-16. Gerstner held that, while Court's should consider three factors relative 
to any dismissal under Rule 41 (b) the ultimate trumping factor in the analysis is whether 
the Defendant has established actual prejudice. The Court said: 
Regardless of whether current inactivity, or a prior period of 
inactivity, has prompted the moving pa1iy to request the court 
to dismiss a case, we believe it is an abuse of discretion to 
"punish a period of delay" where the defendant has not 
established prejudice stemming from the delay. Prejudice is 
an essential factor in the three-part deliberation process; it 
must exist regardless of the length of the delay and rationale 
for the delay. Prejudice must consist of more than general 
concerns about the passage of tilne and its effect on the 
memories of witnesses and the ability to prepare a case. 
There must be actual, demonstrated prejudice to the moving 
party. 
- Gerstner v. Washington Water Power Co. 122 Idaho at 677, 
837 P.2d at 803 (1992) 
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Defendants' have not established any "actual, demonstrated prejudice" and 
thus do not satisfy the required standard of Gerstner. Defendants merely conclude they 
"have been prejudiced ... now be forced, ten years after the date of alleged injury, to 
engage in fact discovery, querying witnesses and records custodians whose memory has 
been eroded by the passage of time." Defense Renewed Memo, pp. 16. Defendants 
expressions of concerns of possible prejudice was specifically rejected by Gerstner as 
mere say-so: 
Prejudice must consist of more than general concerns about 
the passage of time and its effect on the memories of 
witnesses and the ability to prepare a case. There must be 
actual, demonstrated prejudice to the moving party. 
- Gerstner v. Washington Water Power Co. 122 Idaho at 
677, 837 P.2d at 803. 
Defendants do not claim any witness had any information material to any 
specific defense asserted. Defense Renewed Memo, pp. 16. It is just as likely the 
information any non-party witness had would be beneficial to the Plaintiffs. 
The absence of information from a non-party witness is no proof of which 
party to the case that absent information would favor. If it even ever existed. 
In a more recent insurance bad faith case, Defendants sought to preclude an 
amendment to the pleadings on the basis of "prejudice". Weinstein v. Prudential 
Property & Cas., 149 Idaho 299, 310, 233 P.3d 1221 (2010). The Idaho Supreme Court 
was clear that "prejudice" means something more than mere declaration by the 
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Defendant. The Court held that prejudice requires a "showing" and not a mere statement 
of prejudice: 
"Liberty Mutual has failed to show ... that it was prejudiced 
by the granting of the motion .... Liberty Mutual contends, 
'Allowing Plaintiffs to argue for punitive damages at trial 
changed the character of the trial and prejudiced Defendants 
as a result.' In this cursory allegation, Liberty Mutual does 
not attempt to explain how the character of the trial was 
changed or hov,; it was allegedly prejudiced. . . . Liberty 
Mutual's unsupported statement that it was prejudiced by the 
amendment is insiif.ficient to show an abuse of discretion." 
- Weinstein v. Prudential Property & Cas., 149 Idaho 299, 
310-11, 233 P.3d 1221 (2010) 
The arguments for dismissal under Rule 41 (b) must be denied based on 
Defendants' own citation to Gerstner and the more recent Weinstein decision requiring an 
actual showing of prejudice. 
POINT FOUR 
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL IS AN EQUITABLE DOCTRINE 
THAT SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED ON THESE FACTS 
The Defendants argue as a matter oflaw that Plaintiff Brian Hawk's claims 
are barred by the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel citing McCallister v. Dixon, 154 
Idaho 891,303 P.3d 578 (2013), and Mowrey v. Chevron Pipeline Co., 155 Idaho 629, 
3 15 P .3 d 81 7 (2013). Defense Renewed Memo, pp. 7-10. 
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discretionary: 
As stated McCallister, judicial estoppel an equitable doctrine and is 
"The doctrine ofjudicial estoppel sounds in equity and is 
invoked at the discretion of the court. Sword v. Sweet, 140 
Idaho 242, 252, 92 P.3d 492, 502 (2004)." Mccallister v. 
Dixon, 154 Idaho 891, 894, 303 P.3d 578 (2013). 
Defendants apply this equitable doctrine as a legal doctrine. 
The entire process connected with the bankruptcy proceedings is set forth in 
the Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel. See, Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel, ,r,r 3-
10 (5-19-14). That Supplemental Affidavit makes it clear that the entirety of what 
occurred was at all times sensitive to compliance with both federal and state law and full 
disclosure principles. Thus, application of the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppcl here 
would be contrary to equity the cornerstone of the doctrine sought to be applied. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this l 81h day of October 2010 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 19th day of May, 2014 I faxed a copy of the foregoing 
to Richard E. Hall and Kevin J. Scanlan of Duke Scanlan & Hall PLLC, 1087 W. Rivers 
Street, Suite 300, Boise, ID 83707; FAX 208-342-3299. 
{;~awt~~--
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 14 
& Hawk v. lntermountain et al 
Lowell N. Hawkes (ISB #1852) 
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INTERMOUNTAIN ANESTHESIA, P.A. ) 
) 
AND MARCUS E. MURPHY, M.D., ) 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss 
BANNOCK COUNTY ) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-06-7149 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, being first duly sworn states as follows: 
l. I am lead counsel for the Plaintiffs herein and make this Supplemental 
Affidavit on personal and professional knowledge. 
2. By reference, I incorporate herein all prior filings, affidavits, and 
exhibits to those filings and affidavits. 
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3. In prior proceedings before Court I advised the Court that Plaintiff 
bankruptcy schedules had not disclosed as a potential 
asset of the bankruptcy. Our office only learned of the bankruptcy ailer we had filed the 
Complaint herein and when I so learned I faxed Mr. Scanlan with that information. The 
original of the motion now before the Court was actually filed while the original federal 
stay was in effect and after I had notified Mr. Scanlan that I had just learned of the 
bankruptcy. While that bankruptcy was still active I corresponded with the Trustee in an 
effort to meet and resolve any issues relative to the malpractice claim not being 
scheduled as a potential asset of the bankruptcy estate. The Trustee closed the 
bankruptcy without addressing the issue or notifying me of the intent to close the 
bankruptcy. 
4. Because federal law makes it a criminal offense for any person to assert 
possession or control over an asset to which a bankruptcy trustee may have the statutory 
right all counsel and the Court were at jeopardy herein in proceeding absence clearance 
from the federal Bankruptcy Judge Jim Pappas and the Trustee. 
5. Accordingly, I met with Pocatello attorney James Spinner, legal counsel 
to the Trustee in Mr. Hawk's bankruptcy, to advise him of the absence of this claim 
being set forth in the original bankruptcy schedules and my prior correspondence with 
the Trustee. I told him that I would do whatever he and the Trustee requested or required 
and that the entirety of my files were open to him and the Ttrustee but that, given the 
federal potential criminal liabilities for asserting any measure of control over a potential 
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bankruptcy asset I could not, and would not, proceed further on the pending malpractice 
until that was resolved before Judge Pappas. 
6. Some time after that meeting with Mr. Spinner he phoned me and told 
me that he and the Trustee, Sam Hopkins, had consulted and their request of me was that 
our office move to reopen the bankruptcy to make the requisite potential claim 
disclosures on the record since we were more knowledgeable than they were as to the 
facts relative to medical malpractice claim. My October 27, 2010 Verified Application to 
Reopen and Affidavit of Counsel filed with the Bankruptcy Court set forth the facts 
explained above. 
7. Incidental to Bankruptcy Judge Pappas reopening the bankruptcy I 
offered the entirety of my case files to Mr. Spinner and the Trustee and provided all that 
was requested by them. That included written synopses of the claim together with key 
documents such as the claim booklet and medical records presented to the State Board of 
Medicine Prelitigation Screening Panel Members. 
8. The process relative to the Trustee's determination on a medical 
malpractice claim as a potential asset is neither quick nor simple; among other things, it 
involves medical-legal expertise (or consultation) and evaluation of the whole claim and 
its components in light of exemptions available to the injured party to which the Trustee 
may have no potential claim. I had no control over that process undertaken by the 
Trustee, his legal counsel, and any consultant that may be involved. 
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9. Eventually, and following making the entirety of my files available to 
and counsel, that reopening process and the bankruptcy 
was closed the second time. There was never any determination that this malpractice 
claim of Brian Hawk was a non-exempt asset of the Bankruptcy estate; the Trustee 
ultimately did not contend it was an asset of the Bankruptcy to which he made any claim. 
10. Following the Trustee's second closing of the bankruptcy I spoke with 
Mr. Scanlan - incidental to working with him on other active litigation that the 
bankruptcy in this case had now been closed for the second time. We specifically talked 
about how Mr. Scanlan was now free of the federal Stay that had stopped hearing on this 
motion "mid-stream" and could reschedule this motion for hearing subject to scheduling 
and caseload demands. 
11. I anticipated, knowing something of the caseload demands we each 
carried, and having given Mr. Scanlan significant extensions on other litigation in which 
we were involved that it could take some period of time before he could work this case 
back into the mainstream of his demanding caseload. 
12. During the time interim of the automatic federal bankruptcy stay 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 and the second closing of the bankruptcy (and the resetting 
of this motion), nothing was said by Mr. Scanlan relative to perpetuating any testimony 
of any witness or employee of his client or otherwise preserving any evidence that 
somehow might be susceptible to loss or prejudice during that interim. I certainly would 
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have consented to and cooperated with the perpetuation of testimony or 
any 
13. Nothing in the recent filings sets forth any actual prejudice nor 
contends that any non-party potential witness, whether an employee of Defendant 
Intermountain Anesthesia or otherwise, had information that was material to the defense 
of this case.' And the prior deposition of Defendant Murphy established that there was 
no basis for any of the key affirmative defenses asserted: 
His [Defendant Murphy's] recent deposition and the medical 
record clearly established his asserted medical and legal 
defenses to be groundless fabrications for which there was 
never any basis in fact or law. Murphy Depo. 108:3-9 (211d and 
4111 Affirmative Defenses of Mitigation and Comparative 
Negligence), Murphy Depo. 108:13-24 (3rd Affirmative 
Defense of Third-party Negligence), Murphy Depo. 108:25-
109:14 (8111 Affirmative Defense of Pre-existing Condition), 
Murphy Depo. 109:16-112:14 (9111 Affirmative Defense of 
Superceding Cause). 
- Page 3, Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss and Motion forSummaryJudgment(10-18-10) 
14. In summary, because this malpractice claim of Brian Hawk was in fact 
specifically disclosed to the Bankruptcy Court, the Trustee, and legal counsel for the 
Trustee, it falls outside the scope of those judicial decisions applying "judicial estoppel" 
against civil claims not disclosed to the Bankruptcy Court. 
1 It would be customary and expected that incidental to even the Prelitigation proceedings 
and prior to suit being filed that lntermountain Anesthesia, its insurer and legal counsel would have 
statements from any necessary defense witnesses. On the basis of the current non-factual conclusory 
assertions of prejudice it is just as likely that any witness no longer available may have been more helpful 
to the Plaintiffs' claims and detrimental to the defense than any defense contention that the testimony would 
have been helpful to the defense. 
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15. Finally, relative to fact of a party 
Prelitigation Proceedings and that fact customary use 
of entities through which they practice medicine, attached hereto is the March 11, 2003 
Menwrandum Decision of The Honorable N. Randy Smith in Bannock County Case No. 
CVPI-01-00070-B that was previously furnished this Court in the Morgan proceedings. 
DATED this 19th day of May, 2014 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me May 19, 2014 
HO 
Residing a ocate 
My Commission expires April 21, 2015 
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RE: MOTION TO DISMISS 
f. UU! 
On December 16, 2002, the Court helct a hearing on the 
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim upon which Relief 
may be Granted, filed by Defendants Jobn Tatham, C.R.N.A. 
(hereinafter referred to as Tatham) and Anesthes Associates of 
Pocatello, P.A. (hereinafter referred to as AA) At the 
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, the Court allowed the pa s until February 14r 2003 
to r es to to ss. 
Court had not received any additional materials on the Motion to 
Dismiss by February 14, 2003, the Court then took the matter 
under advisement on that date. The Court now issues its 
decision. The Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss as to 
Defendant Tatham but DENIES the Motion as to·Defendant Fill.. 
FACTS 
On December 15, 1998, Dr .. Peter Schossberger, a surgeon 
with privileges at PRMC, performed back surgery on the Plaintiff 
Lane Foster. During Mr. Foster's surgery the anesthesiology 
team consisted of Dr. John B. Traul (hereinafter referred to as 
Traul) and Tatham both of whom were employees of AA. Neither 
Traul or Tatham are employees of PRMC, although Traul does have 
privileges at the facility. Almost irmo.ediately following the 
surgery, Mr. Foster's vision was lost. He is now blind in his 
rtght eye and has reduced vision in his left eye. 
On June 14, 2000, Plaintiffs filed a pre-litigation request 
with the State Board of Medicine. The State Board of Medicine 
led the Panel's Report and Conclusion on January 11, 2001. 
The Plaintiffs thereafter filed the Complaint on July 5, 2Q01 
leging that the defendants, negligently and improperly, failed 
to take appropriate precautions to protect Mr. Foster's eyes. 
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STAND.ARD OF REVIEW 
If, upon a motion to 88 r es of 
Civil Procedure 12 (b) ( 6), matters outside the pleading being 
challenged for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted are presented to and no{:. excluded by the court, "the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed 
of as provided in Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 56, and all 
parties shall be given a reasonable opportunity to present all 
material made inent to such a motion by Rule 5 6. " IDAHO R. 
CIV. P, .12(b). Indeedr the Idaho Supreme Court has held that 
when matters outside the pleading, in the form of a·ffidavits, 
are presented to· and considered by the court it is the duty of 
the court to treat such motion to .dismiss as a motion for 
summary judgment. Boesiger v, DeModenar 88 Idaho 337, 399 P.Zd 
635 (196S); citing Rush v. G-K Machin 
P.2d 280 (1961) 
Co., 84 Idaho 10, 367 
Rule 56 (c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allows 
that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. " Smith v. JVJe:ridiaJJ Joint School 
st. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 718, 918 P.2d 583, 587 (1996) 
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R 
ing IDAHO R. CIV. P. 56(c)); see also Idaho lding 
tractors cl OD V. of Coeur d ene, 6 Idaho 740, 
890 P.2d 326 (1995); Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745, 890 P.2d 
331 (1995). In making this determination, a Court should 
liberally construe the record in favor of the party opposing the 
motion and draw all reasonable inferences and conclusions in 
that party's favor. Smith, 128 Idaho at 718, 918 P.2d at 587 
(citing Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 
P.2d 29, 30 (1994)). Xf reasonable persons could reach 
differing conclusions or draw confl ing inferences from the 
dence, su:rmuary judgment must be denied, Id. (citing Harris 
v. Department of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 298, 847 P.2d 
1156, 1159 (1992)}. However, if the evidence reveals no 
disputed is sues of material fact I then summary judgment should 
be granted. Id., 128 Idaho at 718-;19, 918 P. 2d at 587-88 
(citing Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 437, 807 P.2d 
1272 (1991)). 
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue 
of material fact rests at all times with the party moving for 
surmnary j udgrnent. Id., 128 Idaho at 719, 918 P.2d at 588 
(citing Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 
(1994)). In order to meet its burden, t moving party must 
challenge its motion and establish through evidence the 
Register CVPI01-00070B 
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absence of any genuine issue of material fact on an element of 
nonmoving party's case. Id. v. Ins. 
Agency1 Inc., 126 Idaho 527r 530, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037 (1994)). 
If the moving party fails to challenge an element or ls to 
present evidence establishing the absence of genuine issue of 
material ct on that element, the burden does not shift to the 
nonro.oving party, and the :nonrnoving party is not required to 
respond with supporting evidence. Jd. (citing Thomson 1 126 
However, if the moving party Idaho at 530, 887 P. 2d at 1q38)) . 
challenges an element of the nonmoving party's case on the basis 
that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then 
shifts to the nonmoving party to come for:waxd with 9ufficient 
evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. Id. (citing 
Tingley, 125 Idaho at 90, 867 P.2d at 964). Summary judgment is 
properly granted in favor of the moving party, when 
nonmoving party fails to est ish the existence of an element 
essential to that party 1 s case upon which that party bears the 
burden of proof at trial. Id. (citing Thomson, 12 6 Idaho at 
530-31, 887. P.2d at 1037-38; Ba.dell v. Beeks, 115 "Idaho 101, 
102, 765 P. 2d 126 (1988)). The party opposing the summary 
judgment motion "rnay not rest upon the me:re allegations or 
denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's res~onse, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
Regi CVPI01-00070B 
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s that there is a issue tr " 
Id. (quot :r DAHO R. Crv, 1? , 5 6 ( e) ) . The nonmoving p 's case 
must be anchored in something more than speculation, and a mere 
scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine sue of 
fact. Tuttle v. Sudenga Industriesr Inc., 125 Idaho 145, 868 
P.2d 473 (1994)) (plaintiff who produces mere scintilla of 
evidence, or otherwise raises only slight doubt as to facts, 
will not withstand summary judgment); Nelson v. Steer, 118 Idaho 
409, 797 P.2d 117 (1990). If the nonmoving party does not come 
forward as provided in the rule 1 then sunmiary judgment should be 
entered against that party. State v. Shama Resources Ltd. 
Partnership, 127 Idaho 267, 270, 899 P.2d 977, 980 (1995). 
DISCUSSION 
The Defendants argue in their Motion, that the Complaint is 
barred by the statute of limitations, Idaho Code§ 5-219, as it 
relates to Tatham and ?>;A.. The operation was performed on 
December 15, 1998. The Complaint was filed on July 5, 2001. 
Idaho Code § 5-219 provides that actions for professional 
malpractice or for personal injuries must be filed within two 
( 2) years of the occurrence, act, or omission complained of, 
stating in part: 
4. nn action to recover damages for professional 
malpractice, or for an ury to , person, or for 
the of one caused by the wrongful act or ect 
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ach an implied warranty ox: impl covenant; 
provided, however, when the action is for damages 
arising out of the placement and inadvertent, 
accidental or unintentional leaving of any foreign 
object in the body of any person by reason of the 
professional malpractice of any hospital, physician or 
other person or institution pr~cticing any of the 
healing arts or when the fact of damage has I for the 
purpose of escaping responsibility therefor, been 
fraudulently and knowingly concealed from the injured 
party by an alleged wrongdoer standing at the time of 
the wrongful act, neglect or breach in a professional 
or conunercial relationship with the injured party, the 
same shall be deemed to accrue when the injured party 
knows or in the exercise of reasonable ca;re should 
have been put on inquiry regarding the condition or 
matter complained ofi but in all other actions, 
whethe;r arising from professional ·malpractice or 
otherwise 1 the cause of action shall be deemed to have 
accrued as of the time of the occurrence, act or 
omission complained of, and the limitation period 
shall not be extended by reason of any continuing 
consequences or damages resulting therefrom or any 
continuing professional or commercial relationship 
between the injured party and the alleged wrongdoer, 
and, provided fu:rther, that an action within the 
foregoing foreign object or fraudulent concealment 
exceptions must be commenced within one (1) year 
following the date of accrual as aforesaid or two (2) 
years following the occurrence, act or omission 
complained of, whichever is later. The term 
"professional malpractice 11 as used herein refers to 
wrongful acts or omissions in the performance of 
professional services by any person, rirm, 
association, entity or corporation licensed to perform 
such services under the law of the state of Idaho. 
This subsection shall not affect the application of 
section 5-243 1 Idaho Code, except as to actions 
arising from professional malpractice. Neither shall 
this subsection be deemed or construed to amend, or 
repeal section 5-241, Idaho Code. 
IDAHO CODE§ 5-219(4) (1998). 
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Therefore, under plain ·of the tute, case 
was not filed on time. The Plaintiffs however argue that the 
statute was tolled pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-1005. 
§ 6-1005 states as follows: 
Idaho Code 
There shall be no judicial or other review or appeal 
of sucb matters. No party shall be obliged to comply 
with or otherwise (be] affected or prejudiced by the 
proposals, conclusions or suggestions of the panel or 
any member or segment thereof; however, in 
interest of dUE:, consideration being given t.o such 
proceedings and in the interest of encouraging 
consideration of claims informally and without the 
necessity of litigation, the applicable statute of 
limitations shall be tolled and not be deemed to -run 
during the time that such a claim is pending before 
such a panel and for thirty (30) days thereafter. 
IDAHO CODE§ 6-1005 (1998). 
Therefore, if Idaho Code§ 6-1005 applies, the statute would be 
tolled from the date of the filing for the preli tigation panel 
to thirty days after the panel's decision. Here, the Plaintiff 
filed for the panel on June 14, 2000. The panel's decision was 
published on January 11, 2001. The· parties agree that such 
tolling would make the filing of the complaint within the time 
necessary to comply with the statute of limitations. 
The Cou;r,-t must then determin,:3 if Tatham and/or AA are 
allowed the tolling provisions under 6-1005. Pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 6-1001 only physicians I surgeons and acute care general 
hospitals are to be given hearing panels_ states: 
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The Idaho state board of n-iedicine, 
malpractice cases involving claims for ·damages against 
physicians and surgeons practicinq in the state of 
Idaho or against licensed acute care general hospitals 
operating in the state of Idaho, is directed to 
cooperate in providing a hearing panel in the nature 
of a special civil grand jury and .procedure for 
prelitigation consideration of personal injury and 
wrongful death claims for damages arising out of the 
provision of or alleged failure to provide hospital or 
medical care in the state of Idaho, which proceedings 
shall be informal and nonbinding 1 but nonetheless 
compulsory as a condition p:cecedent to litigation. 
Proceedings conducted or maintained under the 
authority of this act shall at all times be subject to 
disclosure according to chapter 3, title 9, Idaho 
Code. Formal rules of evidence shall not apply and 
such proceedings shall be expeditious and 
informal. 
IDAHO CODE § 6-1001 (1998) (emphasis c:,dded.). 
The Court must determine Tatham and/or AA 
f. U U::J 
are 
"physicians and surgeons practicing in the state of Idaho or 
against licensed acute care general hospitals operating in the 
state of Idaho. rr This decision presents an issue of statutory 
construction, an issue of law, which is subject to free 
appellate review. City of Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 128 
Idaho 219,' 221, 912 P.2d 106, 108 (1996); Harris v. Department 
of Health and Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 297, 847 P.2d 1156, 1158 
(1992). 
Judj_cial interpretation of a statute begins with the 
court's review the statuters literal words. 
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Burnight, 132 Idaho 654 1 659 978 P. 2d 214, 219 (1999); of 
se v. Indus. Comm,.n, 129 Idaho 906, 909, 935 P. 169, 172 
(1997). The court must give the language of the statute its 
plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Id. If the court finds 
the language clear and unambiguous, then it applies the statute 
according to its plain terms. The court need not resort to 
legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. Id. 
The court must give every word, clause, and sentence effect, if 
possible. In re Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819, 822, 828 
P.2d 848, 851 (1992). 
"Physicians and surgeons practicing in the state of Idaho 
or against licensed acute care general hospitals operating in 
the state of Idaho'1 is not defined by the statute. However, the 
Court finds the lahguage of the statute to be clear and 
unambiguous. The;refore, need not resort to legislative 
history or rules of statutory interpretation. Physicians, 
surgeons 1 and acute care general hospitals are the only entities 
required to go to a screening panel. 
Plaintiffs argue that the legislative intent of the statute 
would indicate that it should be more broadly applied, that 
Idaho Code §§ 6-1007 and 6-1012 evidence that the legislature 
intended words in Idaho Code § 6-1001 to be 
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encompass 1 of the me cal care :providers those 
stdtutes. However, the Court s s. 
Idaho Code § 6-1001 is not ambiguous, therefore the Court 
need not resort to legislative history to determine legislative 
intent. Further neither party p~esented any legislative history 
to the Court. If legislature intended a broader group of 
health care providers to be included in § 6-1001, the Court 
believes that they would have used the same language as is found 
in§ 6-1007 and§ 6-1012. As to statutory interpretation, Idaho 
Code§§ 6-1007 and 6-1012 address a broader group of health care 
providers, Idaho Code § 6~1001 does not. Statutes are pari 
materia if they relate to the same subject. Grand Canyon Dories 
.v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 124 Idaho 1, 855 P.2d 462 (1993). 
Such statutes are construed together to effect legislative 
intent. Id. Where two statutes appear to apply to the same case 
or subject matter, the specific statute will control over the 
more general statute. State v. Bar.nes 1 133 Idaho 378, 987 J?.2d 
290 (1999). Therefore, even i£ the Court were to try to 
determine legislative intent by rules of statutory 
interpretation, Idaho Code§ 6-1001 is the more specific statute 
and therefore would not be modified by the more general 
statutes. 
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Lastly, the Idaho State Bo of Medicine not issue a 
de sion regarding the claims of ability against and AA 
but only addressed the liability of Traul and PRMC. Since the 
board did not address the claims of liability against Tatham and 
AA, it seems thei;r: claims were not before the board. 
Alternatively, those claims were not against physicians, 
surgeons and/or acute care general hospitals. An agency's 
interpretation of its statutes is entitled to deference. Pearl 
v. Board of Professional Discipline of Idaho State Board of 
Medi , 137 Idaho 107, 44 P.3d 1162 (2002). 
Applying the above law to these facts, there i.s nothing in 
the record to indicate that Tatham is a physician, surgeon, or 
acute care general hospital. Therefore, there is no tolling of 
the statute of limitations during a prelitigation hearing as to 
Tatham. 
There is however evidence in this record that Traul was an 
employee of AA. Traul became an e:rnployee of AA in July 1998 
(later becoming a partner in July 1999). Traul and AA .stand in 
rel;;:,tion as master and servant, whereby the negligent acts of 
the servant, or employee, are imputed to the master, or 
employer, under the doctrine of respondea t super;;.or. Smith v. 
Thompson, 103 Idaho 909, 655 P.2d 116 (Ct.App. 1982). See PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON TORTS § 72, at 516 (5th ed. 1984). The historical and 
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economic genesis of the doctrine of t or, or 
vicarious l , lies in the fact that the tort is brought 
. about in the course of an undertaking for the benefit of the 
master, and that the master possesses the right to control the 
servant's course of conduct as well as the result to be 
accomplished through such conduct. See Mathauser, v. Hellyex:r 
98 Idaho 235, 5 60 P. 2d 1325 ( 197 7) ; Whalen v. Zinnr 60 Idaho 
722, 96 P.2d 434 (1939); State ex rel Dept. of Labor and Indus. 
Services v. Hill, 118 Idaho 278, 796 P.2d 155 (Ct.App. 1990). 
Because the 'employment' is a factor causing the tort, the law 
regards the busines.s as a unit and deals with the act of any 
member of it as the act and responsibility of 
employer. 
s principal the 
AA was incorporated under the Idaho Professional Service 
Corporate Act in June 1996 (File number C 115446). The Articles 
of Incorporation states 1 3 in pa~t: 
PURPOSES: This corporation may render to the public 
the professional services that a medical doctor duly 
licensed under the laws of the State of Idaho is 
authorized to render, together with allied 
professional services as defined in Idaho Code Section 
30-1303 (3), but such professional services shall be 
rende.red only through officers, employees and agents 
who are legally authorized to practice the above 
profession. 
Further, Idaho Code § 3 0-13 06 ( a provision of the Idaho 
Pro ssional Service Corporate Act) that a 
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zed this act shall rema liable for s employees. 
It states: 
Nothing contained in this act shall be interpreted to 
abolish, repeal, modify, res ct or limit the law now 
in effect in this state applicable to the professional 
relationship and liabili ti Eis between the person 
furnishing the professional services and the person 
receiving such professional service and to the 
standards for professional conduc.t. Any o cer, 
shareholder, agent or employee of a corporation 
organized under this act shall remain· personally and 
fully liable and accountable for any negligent or 
wrongful acts or misconduct COITliil.itted by him, or by 
any person under his direct supervision and control, 
while rendering professional services on behalf of the 
corporation to the person for whom such professional 
services were being rendered. The corporation shall 
be liable up to the full value of s property for any 
negligent or wrongful acts or misconduct conun.itted by 
any of its officers, shareholders, agents or employees 
while they are engaged on behalf of the corporation in 
the rendering of professional services. 
The relationship of an individual to a professional 
corporation organized under this act, with which such 
individual is associated, whether as shareholder, 
director, officer or employee, shall ih no way modify 
or diminish the jurisdiction over him of the 
governmental authority or state agency which censed, 
certified or registered him for a particular 
profession. 
IDAHO CODE § 30-1306 (1999), 
Therefore, because Traul a physician, AA is also 
considered a physician, for the purpose of Idaho Code§ 6-1005. 
The statute would then toll the statute of limit,ations as to AA 
£or any conduct for which Traul may be responsible. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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INTERMOUNTAIN ANESTHESIA, P.A. and 
MARCUS E. MURPHY, M.D., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 06-7149 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS, 
OR ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COME NOW Defendants Intennountain Anesthesia, P.A. and Marcus E. Murphy, M.D. 
( collectively "Defendants"), through their counsel of record, Duke Scanlan & Hall, PLLC, and 
submit the following reply memorandum of points and authorities in further support of their 
Renewed Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- I 
The bulk of the Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel and "Fact Synopsis" submitted 
by Plaintiffs should not be considered in deciding Defendants' motion. 
centerpiece of Plaintiffs' opposition to this motion appears to be the Supplemental 
Affidavit of Counsel. The vast majority of the averments made in this affidavit are inadmissible 
in evidence and, therefore, should not be considered in the Court's decision on this motion. 
When an affidavit is submitted in opposition to a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary 
judgment, its consideration in opposition to those motions is governed by Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(e). Idaho R. Civ. P. 12(b), 56(e); State v. Shama Res. Ltd. P 'ship, 127 Idaho 267, 
270-71, 899 P.2d 977, 980-81 (1995). "The requirements of Rule 56(e) are not satisfied by an 
affidavit that is conclusory, based on hearsay, and not supported by personal knowledge." 
Shama, 127 Idaho at 271, 899 P.2d at 981. "Only material contained in affidavits or depositions 
that is based upon personal knowledge or that is admissible at trial [can] be considered by [the 
c]ourt." Id. As the Idaho Supreme Court recently stated, "the nonmoving party cannot rely on 
mere speculation, and a scintilla of evidence is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material 
fact." Major v. Sec. Equip. Corp., 155 Idaho 199, 202, 307 P.3d 1225, 1228 (2013) (quoting 
Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 152 Idaho 632, 637, 272 P.3d 1263, 1268 
(2012)). 
The Idaho Supreme Court took up the admissibility issue in Shama, in which it upheld 
the district court's exclusion of affidavits submitted by McGary, a party opposing summary 
judgment, because the affidavits did not meet the Rule 56( e) standard, finding as follows: 
The affidavits presented by McGary, on the other 
hand, do not meet the requirements of Rule 56( e ). Rule 
56( e) requires that the affidavits be based on the personal 
knowledge of the affiants and that the affidavits shall 
present facts that would be admissible in evidence. The 
McGary affidavits were not based upon the personal 
knowledge of the affiants. The McGar; affidavits made 
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generalizations about all of the offerees and investors in 
Shama and declarations about information supposedly 
known by the Shama offerees and investors without 
statements by those individuals. Additionally, the 
affidavits made suppositions about the beliefs and 
expectations of other ojferees and investors. The McGary 
affidavits also presented insufficient and nonspecific 
statements denying that McGary committed securities 
fraud. These statements were conclusory in nature and 
were unsupported by any factual basis or foundation. 
Finally, the McGary affidavits contained statements of 
hearsay that would not be admissible into evidence. We 
conclude that because the affidavits were not based on 
personal knowledge, were insufficient and conclusory in 
nature, and contained statements of hearsay that would not 
be admissible into evidence, all in violation of Rule 56( e ), 
the trial court properly rejected the affidavits presented by 
McGary from consideration when ruling on the 
Department's motion for summary judgment. 
Id. ( emphasis added). Mr. Hawkes' affidavit suffers from similar issues and the bulk of it should 
be excluded from consideration in deciding this motion for the reasons set forth in Shama. Each 
offending paragraph of Mr. Hawkes' affidavit will be discussed in tum: 
Paragraphs 3-12: The averments of these paragraphs constitute the type of "insufficient 
and non-specific statements" that the Idaho Supreme Court refused to consider in Shama. While 
one of the key issues that Mr. Hawkes purports to address in his affidavit is the amount of time 
this litigation has been pending and the Plaintiffs' diligence in the prosecution of this litigation, 
the only specific date mentioned in these paragraphs is the October 27, 2010, the filing date of 
Mr. Hawkes' prior affidavit. General averments of non-specific action taken relative to the 
bankruptcy trustee, in addition to being of limited relevance, do nothing to add to the record 
concerning the Plaintiffs' diligence in this matter and, as such, should not be considered by this 
Court. 
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Paragraphs 10-12: Defendants, in addition to questioning the factual accuracy of these 
statements, question the admissibility of these statements for consideration connection with 
the motions currently before the Court. The primary issue before this Court is the Plaintiffs' 
diligent prosecution of their claims in this matter. The caseload demands of Defendants' counsel 
and Mr. Hawkes' purported consideration thereof in choosing whether to act in this matter are of 
no relevance to the issues currently before this Court and should not be considered. 
Paragraphs 13-14: These paragraphs should not be considered because, just like the 
offending affidavit in Shama, they contain legal conclusions. In these paragraphs, Mr. Hawkes 
offers legal conclusions concerning the validity of Dr. Murphy's defense, whether the 
Defendants have suffered actual prejudice as a result of delay in this matter, and the applicability 
of legal precedent applying the judicial estoppel doctrine to Mr. Hawk's claims. These 
conclusions are the function of this Court, not Mr. Hawkes, and his affidavit on these subjects 
should not be considered. 
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants respectfully request that paragraphs 3-14 of 
the Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel not be considered in deciding this motion pursuant to 
Rule 56(e). 
Fact Synopsis: An issue related to the Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel is the "Fact 
Synopsis" submitted by Plaintiffs as part of Plaintiffa' Supplement Response to Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment ("Opp. Memo."). (Opp. Memo., at 3-5). The Fact 
Synopsis contains multiple legal and factual conclusions that are unsupported by the Plaintiffs' 
citations to the record. To the extent this Court considers these statements, Defendants would 
urge the Court, to the extent it wishes to consider the information set forth in Plaintiffs' Fact 
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Synopsis, to rely on the cited materials themselves rather than Plaintiffs' characterization of 
materials. 
B. Claims against Intermountain Anesthesia are barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations. 
Contrary to the Plaintiffs' suggestion, Intermountain Anesthesia was not named as a party 
to the prelitigation screening panel proceedings, nor could it have been pursuant to Idaho Code § 
6-1001. As Idaho Code § 6-1001 provides, the prelitigation screening panel procedures are only 
applicable to "physicians and surgeons ... or against licensed acute care general hospitals .... " 
LC. § 6-1001. The non-binding opinion submitted by Plaintiffs from the Foster v. Traut matter 
shares this conclusion, noting "[i]f the legislature intended a broader group of healthcare 
providers to be included in § 6-1001, the Court believes they would have used the same language 
as is found in § 6-1007 and § 6-1012." (Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel, Ex. A, at 11 ). 
When construing a statutory scheme, statutes that are in pari materia, meaning relating to 
the same subject matter, must be construed together. City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep. 
Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 69, 72 P.3d 905, 909 (2003). When construing statutes in pari 
materia, if a statute on "one subject contains a certain provision, the omission of such provision 
from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different intention 
existed." Id In this matter, an in pari materia construction of Idaho Code § 6-1001 with Idaho 
Code § 6-1012 demonstrates legislative intent that only the providers named in § 6-1001 are 
proper parties to prelitigation screening panel proceedings. 
Idaho Code § 6-1012, concerning the standard of care in medical malpractice claims, 
provides that it is applicable to claims "against any physician and surgeon or other provider of 
health care, including, without limitation, any dentist, physicians' assistant, nurse practitioner, 
registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse anesthetist, medical technologist, physical 
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therapist, hospital or nursing home .... " LC. § 6-1012. The inclusiveness of this provision, along 
with "without limitation" language, demonstrates legislative intent that this provision apply 
to medical professionals generally. By contrast, § 1001 identifies three discrete classes of 
providers, not including professional associations, who are subject to prelitigation screening 
panel proceedings. This demonstrates legislative intent to exclude professional associations from 
those proceedings. This is also consistent with the manner in which the Board of Medicine 
carries out its duties pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1001, as noted in the Woodington decision 
previously provided by Defendants. (Affidavit of Kevin J Scanlan In Support of Renewed Motion 
or, Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. J, at 9). 
Here, although Plaintiffs contend that Intermountain Anesthesia was named in the request 
for prelitigation screening panel hearing, neither the panel's decision, nor the request for hearing 
clearly identifies Intermountain Anesthesia as a party. Exhibit C to the October 18, 2010, 
affidavit of Lowell Hawkes ("Hawkes Aff.") contains the Plaintiffs' requests for prelitigation 
screening panel. (Hawkes Aff., Ex. C). An examination of these requests shows that they appear 
to identify Dr. Murphy as a potential defendant and provide his business address. (Id.). Directly 
following this identification is the boilerplate language "Any professional corporation or entity 
connected with any of the above are also prospective defendants in professional liability 
litigation." (Id.). This hardly constitutes identification of Intermountain Anesthesia as a 
Defendant, but instead appears to identify it as Dr. Murphy's place of business as part of his 
business address. It appears the prelitigation screening panel shared a similar view, as 
Intermountain Anesthesia was not mentioned in the prelitigation screening panel's decision. 
Furthermore, under the in pari materia interpretation of Idaho Code § 6-1001, 
Intermountain Anesthesia could not be named as a party before the panel and, as such, claims 
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against it would not be subject to the tolling provisions of Idaho Code § 6-1005. Accordingly, 
Court should dismiss the claims against Intermountain Anesthesia because, without the 
benefit of the tolling provisions, they were not timely. 
Under the reasoning of Foster, the same would be true to the extent Plaintiffs contend 
that Intermountain Anesthesia is liable to the Plaintiffs for the acts or omission of the CRNAs in 
this matter. As the Court in Foster found, non-physician medical professionals, such as CRNAs, 
are also not included with the language of § 6-1001 and claims against them are not subject to 
tolling pursuant to § 6-1005. As such, to the extent the claims asserted against Intermountain 
Anesthesia in this matter are based on the acts or omissions of the CRNAs it employed, those 
claims are time-barred. 
Plaintiffs also argue that they are entitled to assert claims against Intermountain 
Anesthesia regardless of the statute of limitations by virtue of the doctrine of respondeat 
superior, which Plaintiffs contend renders Intermountain Anesthesia liable for the acts and 
omissions of Dr. Murphy as an employee of Intermountain Anesthesia. In support of this 
contention, Plaintiffs cite to the non-binding decision in Foster v. Traul, in which the court found 
that a claim could be pursued against a professional organization, even though direct claims 
against the organization were time barred, by virtue of vicarious liability under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior and Idaho Code§ 30-1306. (Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel, Ex. A, at 12-
14). The Plaintiffs' argument and the reasoning of Foster should be rejected, however, because 
of the exclusive nature of recovery provided by the Idaho Medical Malpractice Act, which 
provides the sole basis for recovery against Intermountain Anesthesia on the basis of 
professional negligence. 
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Idaho Code 6-1012 provides when a claim damages the 
or a is asserted against a care sole 
on that claim be whether medical professional complied with the standard health 
care practice applicable to those providing similar treatment in the same locality at the time of 
treatment. I.C. § 6-1012; Hough v. Fry, 131 Idaho 230, 233, 953 P.2d 980, 983 (1998). "The 
language of the statute clearly treats the provision of health care as a single act and not a series of 
steps, each of which must be analyzed to determine professional judgment." Hough, 131 Idaho at 
233, 953 P.2d at 983. Section 6-1012 represents the legislature's determination that liability 
exposure for healthcare providers "be limited and made more definable by a requirement for 
direct proof and a departure from the community standard of practice." Id. ( quoting 1976 Idaho 
Sess. Laws 951 ). Where the act complained of is directly related to the provision of health care, 
the standard set forth in section 6-1012 will apply. Id. Negligence has nothing to do with the 
application of section 6-1012. Id. 
Applying the provisions of section 6-1012, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that 
compliance with the applicable local standard of health care practice is the sole inquiry in 
medical malpractice cases, to the exclusions of other claims. This principle is evidenced by the 
Court's holding in Hoover v. Hunter, 150 Idaho 658, 249 P.3d 851 (2011). In Hoover, the Idaho 
Supreme Court upheld the summary dismissal of a medical malpractice claim because the 
plaintiffs failed to support their claims with proper expert testimony. Id. at 663, 249 P.3d at 856. 
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the district court erred in dismissing their fraud claim 
because they had pled all the facts of fraud with particularly and presented sufficient evidence to 
create a question of material fact on the issue of fraud. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court rejected this 
argument, adopting the reasoning of the district court: 
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gravamen of the claim is an action for ... wrongful death ... 
. [I]f it is medical professional's misconduct], their failure to do 
what they should have done that leads to your damages, it is an 
action malpractice, . . . we will treat it as a malpractice 
action, negligence action. 
Id. The Idaho Supreme Court found this holding to be consistent with section 6-101 noting that 
regardless of whether a malpractice claim may seem to sound in fraud, tort, or contract, the sole 
inquiry is compliance with the standard of health care practice, as set forth in section 6-1012. Id. 
Liability for a claim arising from medical treatment provided by Dr. Murphy, whether 
direct or vicarious, is governed by the Idaho Medical Malpractice Act. Because this is a medical 
malpractice action governed by Idaho Code section 6-1012, the Plaintiffs cannot rely upon the 
common law doctrine of respondeat superior as a means of resurrecting a claim that would 
otherwise be time-barred by the Idaho Medical Malpractice Act. Accordingly, this Court should 
find that the Plaintiffs' claims against Intermountain Anesthesia are time-barred and this 
statutory bar cannot be avoided by invocation of respondeat superior on the basis of Idaho 
Supreme Court precedent governing the exclusivity of claims under the act in suits for liability 
arising out of medical treatment. 
C. Rule 40(c) warrants dismissal of this matter due to the Plaintiffs' failure to 
demonstrate good cause for prosecution of this case for over one year. 
Plaintiffs' primary contention in opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss this matter 
is that the delay in this matter is entirely attributable to the bankruptcy stay and the Defendants' 
actions. Plaintiffs argue, without support, that "Defendants, however, were promptly notified of 
the second closing of the bankruptcy shortly after that occurred and were in total control of 
noticing up this motion that was stayed by federal law .... " (Opp. Memo., at 9). Plaintiffs' 
attempt to somehow shift the blame for their failure to prosecute this matter to Defendants is 
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inconsistent with the relevant inquiry 
Plaintiffs' argument conveniently under 
Rule 40( c) is whether good cause has been shown, the inquiry is not whether good cause has 
been shown for dismissal, but whether good cause exists for more than six months of inactivity 
on the part of Plaintiffs sufficient to prevent dismissal. Idaho R. Civ. P. 40( c ). This is consistent 
with the plain language of Rule 40( c ), which provides "in absence of a showing of good cause 
for retention, any action ... in which no action has been taken ... for a period of six (6) months 
shall be dismissed." Idaho R. Civ. P. 40(c) (emphasis added). 
The irrelevance of the activities of the defendant in determining whether a plaintiff has 
shown good cause to justify inactivity was emphasized by the Idaho Supreme Court in Rudd v. 
Merritt, 138 Idaho 526, 533, 66 P.3d 230, 237 (2003), in the context of determining whether the 
plaintiff had demonstrated good cause for failure to serve a complaint within six months of filing 
as required by Rules 4(a)(2) and 40(c). In that matter, the plaintiffs appealed the district court's 
dismissal of a medical malpractice claim pursuant to Rule 4(a)(2) on the basis of the plaintiffs' 
failure to demonstrate good cause for failing to make timely service of a complaint. Id. In 
affirming the district court, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the defendant's knowledge of the 
claim and participation in proceedings related to the claim does not constitute a waiver or other 
excuse for proper service. Id. This is the same theory behind Plaintiffs' arguments in opposition 
to Rule 40(c) dismissal in this matter and those contentions should be similarly rejected. 
Here, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants are somehow responsible for any delay in this 
matter because they were promptly informed of the conclusion of the reopened bankruptcy 
proceedings and could have filed this motion at any time, but did not do so. In addition to the 
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inquiry is why Plaintiffs' presumably also armed with the knowledge that allegedly 
conveyed to Defendants concerning the bankruptcy proceedings, took no action in this matter for 
over one year after those proceedings were terminated and, only then, when served with this 
motion. Plaintiffs have provided no justification for this inaction, nor is there any, other than a 
general failure of diligence as discussed in part D, supra. As such, Plaintiffs' claim must be 
dismissed under the language of Rule 40( c ). 
D. Defendants have provided ample evidence of prejudice flowing from Plaintiffs' 
failure to prosecute this matter. 
Plaintiffs' primary argument in opposition to dismissal pursuant to Rule 41 (b) is that 
Defendants have not demonstrated actual prejudice necessary to warrant such a dismissal. This 
argument completely ignores the evidence Defendants previously provided to the Court, which 
demonstrates substantial, actual prejudice flowing from Plaintiffs' inaction. The only support 
provided for Plaintiffs' position is a citation to Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Casualty 
Insurance Co., 149 Idaho 299, 233 P.3d 1221 (2010), which presents a situation factually 
distinguishable from the case at bar. In Weinstein, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the 
defendant's claim that it was prejudiced by the district court's allowance of an untimely 
amendment of the plaintiffs' complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages. Id. at 310, 233 
P .3d at 1232. The defendant's only identification of prejudice was the statement that "[ a ]llowing 
Plaintiffs to argue for punitive damages at trial changed the character of the trial and prejudiced 
Defendants as a result." Id The court found this was insufficient because the defendant did "not 
attempt to explain how the character of the trial was changed or how it was allegedly 
prejudiced." Id The court also noted that prejudice, if any, to the defendant was cured by the fact 
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was only days late and ample time for 
amendment was 
remained it was granted 
matter is 
Here, rather than the blanket assertion that prejudice will result from the passage of time, 
as made in Weinstein, Defendants have come forward with specifically identified evidence of the 
prejudice that will result if they are forced to try this matter after nearly ten years of delay on the 
part of the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs, rather than attempt to refute these assertions, instead characterize 
them as a blanket assertion of prejudice. As this Court will see from consideration of the 
briefing, that is simply not the case. (See Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss, at 2-4; Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute, at 
2-3; Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss, at 15-16; Affidavit of 
Kevin J Scanlan In Support of Renewed Motion or, Alternatively, Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Ex. G, at 5:14-6:5). If this matter is not dismissed pursuant to Rule 4I(b) as a result of 
nearly ten years of inaction and delay by the Plaintiffs, real and substantial prejudice to the 
Defendants will result as set forth in the above-identified briefing. 
Plaintiffs also argue, albeit confusingly, 1 that their failure to move forward with 
prosecution of Mr. Strong's claims in light of the delay in Mr. Hawk's claims is attributable to 
Defendants because the Defendants did not file a formal motion to bifurcate the claims. This, 
once again, improperly attempts to shift the Plaintiffs' burden to timely prosecute their claims to 
the Defendants. As set forth in the affidavit of counsel previously submitted to this Court, 
Defendants' requested that Plaintiffs bifurcate this matter, a request to which Plaintiffs' never 
responded. (Affidavit of Kevin J Scanlan In Support of Renewed Motion or, Alternatively, 
1 Plaintiffs make this argument in a footnote to their Rule 40(c) argument, despite the fact that the issue of 
joinder/bifurcation would be irrelevant to the Rule 40(c) analysis. (Opp. Brief, at 9 n.3). 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS, OR 
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Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs should not now entitled to 
on they failed to 
Defendants to move Mr. Strong's claim forward or take independent action to diligently 
prosecute that matter. 
Accordingly, the claims of all Plaintiffs should be dismissed as a result of their failure to 
prosecute. 
E. The equities of this matter require dismissal of all claims asserted by Brian Hawk 
pursuant to the doctrine of judicial estoppel. 
As an initial matter, Mr. Hawk contends that this Court cannot dismiss a claim as "a 
matter of law" on a motion for summary judgment or motion to dismiss when the basis for 
dismissal is equitable and contend that Defendants seek to apply judicial estoppel as a "legal 
doctrine." Hawk provides no explanation for this contention and it is unsupported by applicable 
precedent as Defendants have requested that this court apply judicial estoppel just as the Idaho 
Supreme Court has on multiple occasions to dismiss a claim that is barred by equitable 
considerations. Further, Defendants requested that this Court determine whether judicial estoppel 
is applicable according to the established discretionary framework. As such, Defendants fail to 
see how they have asked this Court to act contrary to the principles governing judicial estoppel. 
Mr. Hawk's other basis for opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss his claims on the 
basis of judicial estoppel is the contention that the application of judicial estoppel to Mr. Hawk 
would not be equitable. This argument ignores the fact, as pointed out in Defendants' prior 
briefing, that this matter is factually indistinguishable from other cases in which the Idaho 
Supreme Court has affirmed the application of the doctrine. (Memorandum in Support of 
Defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss, at 7-10). While Mr. Hawk appears to argue that his 
situation is somehow different, he does not explain how it is different. (Opp. Memo., at 13). 
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ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-13 
81 
Application the doctrine of judicial matter is 




Mowrey v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 155 Idaho 629, 315 P.3d 817 (2013), is to maintain the 
integrity of the judicial process by preventing litigants from gaining advantage in one action by 
taking positions inconsistent with those taken in another action. As the Idaho Supreme Court 
explained, it is this principle that has guided its jurisprudence on the interrelationship between 
bankruptcy filings and judicial estoppel in subsequent, undeclared litigation. As noted in Mowrey 
and McAllister: 
[t]he question of whether it was [plaintiffs] intent to conceal his 
claim until bankruptcy proceedings closed-so he can keep any 
potential recovery instead of satisfying his creditors-is not 
material; there is certainly a motive and an incentive to try 
concealing the asset for personal gain. Such concealment 
undermines the effectiveness of the bankruptcy system. Therefore, 
the district court did not abuse its discretion when it properly 
recognized judicial estoppel as applicable to situations of non-
disclosure of an asset in an earlier bankruptcy proceeding. 
Id at 633,315 P.3d at 821 (quoting McAllister, 154 Idaho at 895,303 P.3d at 582) (alterations in 
original) ( emphasis added). 
Under this framework, the relevant question, contrary to Mr. Hawk's suggestion, is 
whether Mr. Hawk was chargeable with knowledge of the bankruptcy claim at the time the 
original property schedules were filed, which, as the evidence already in the record establishes, 
he was. (Afemorandum in Support of Defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss, at 1 O; Affidavit of 
Kevin J Scanlan In Support of Renewed Motion or, Alternatively, Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Ex. E). Mr. Hawk's subsequent conduct after the bankruptcy schedules were already 
filed is irrelevant. 
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Rather than refute this evidence of awareness this action at the he filed for 
because it would be inequitable to do so. What Mr. Hawk fails to appreciate, however, is that the 
equities of the situation are focused on protecting the "effectiveness of the bankruptcy system." 
If, as Mr. Hawk suggests, a litigant be allowed to go back and amend his bankruptcy schedules 
when his non-disclosure is raised through a judicial estoppel motion, as occurred here, the 
litigant who is not met with such a motion would receive a windfall by being allowed to 
prosecute a claim that rightfully belonged to the bankruptcy estate. This would create an 
incentive for non-disclosure of potential claims in bankruptcy, which, as the Idaho Supreme 
Court has noted "undermines the effectiveness of the bankruptcy system" and is exactly the type 
of litigation abuse judicial estoppel was created to prevent. Accordingly, the equities of this 
situation not only support, but require the application of judicial estoppel to Mr. Hawk's claims 
and his claims in this matter should be dismissed on that basis. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that their motion be granted 
and Plaintiffs' claims be dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this 2?111 day of May, 2014. 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
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I that on the day May, 2014, I caused to a true 
copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following: 
Lowell N. Hawkes 
Ryan S. Lewis 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
13 22 East Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
Telephone (208) 235-1600 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
~ Facsimile (208) 235-4200 
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THOMAS STRONG, et al 
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Case No. CV-2006-7149 
MINUTE ENTRY 
On June 2, 2014, at 9:47 A.M., a Motion to Dismiss came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, sitting in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Ms. Mary Fox, Court Reporter, and Ms. Amanda Lyke, Deputy Court Clerk, were 
present. 
Mr. Lowell Hawkes appeared on behalf of the plaintiff. 
Mr. Richard Hall appeared on behalf of the defendant. 
Mr. Hall presented argument in support of defendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
Mr. Hawkes argued in opposition to the defendant's motion and requested the motion be 
denied. 
Mr. Hall presented additional argument in support of the defendant's motion and 
requested the Court grant the motion. 
After a brief discussion with the parties, the Court took the matter under advisement and 
will issue a decision in due time. 
!\IINFrE ENTRY - I 
was thus adjourned. 
c: Lowell Hawkes 
Kevin Scanlan 
MINUTE E:\TRY - 2 
District Judge 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS L. STRONG, et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
INTERMOUNT AIN ANESTHESIA and 
MARCUS E. MURPHY. M.D., 
I. 
Case No. CV-2006-7149 
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION 
TO DISMISS, OR ALTERNATIVELY, 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
On June 25, 2004, Thomas L. Strong ("Mr. Strong") and Brian K. Hawk ("Mr. Hawk") 
( collectively referred to as "Plaintiffs"), underwent individual surgeries, but both received pain 
treatment from Dr. Catherine Linderman ("Dr. Linderman"). Mr. Strong alleges that he suffered 
negative pressure pulmonary edema as a result of negligent supervision and administration of pain 
medication by a nurse anesthetist. As a result, Dr. Marcus E. Murphy ("Dr. Murphy"), Intermountain 
Anesthesia's oversight anesthesiologist, ordered a reduction in the pain medication of all of Dr. 
Linderman's patients. Consequently, Mr. Hawk experienced significant pain during his surgery. 
On May 24, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a prelitigation screening request with the Idaho State Board 
of Medicine ("the Board"). On October 9, 2006, Mr. Hawk filed a petition for bankruptcy in the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Comi, District ofldaho and on November 11, 2006, he filed an amended property 
schedule. Mr. Hawk did not list his cause of action in the original nor the amended property 
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On opm10ns. 2006, 
Murphy ("Defendants"). 
On March 7, 2006, this Court stayed this case, pending Mr. Hawk's bankruptcy proceeding. 
On April 7, 2008, the bankruptcy trustee issued his Supplemental Final Accounting, and on May 15, 
2008, the bankruptcy court approved the trustee's Supplemental Final Accounting and closed the 
bankruptcy case. 
On July 1,2010, Defendant filed a Motion to Lift Stay and a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 
Prosecute, or Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment. On July 16,2010, this Court lifted the 
stay and set the motion to dismiss for a hearing on September 7, 2010. At the hearing, counsel for 
Plaintiffs raised the issue of non-disclosure of the litigation during the bankrnptcy proceedings. This 
Court granted Plaintiffs 60 days to handle the bankruptcy matters. On October 29, 2010 and on 
Plaintiffs' request, the bankruptcy court reopened the case and on November 1, 2010, this Court 
orally ruled that this case was stayed until the bankruptcy matter was resolved. 
Other than a status report filed by the trustee on November 28, 2011, nothing was filed until 
the trustee filed a Motion to for Turnover October 11, 2012, stating that Mr. Hawk wrongfully 
refused to turnover documents relating to this case to the bankruptcy estate. Mr. Hawk opposed this 
motion and the trustee ultimately determined that the action was of no value to the estate. On 
February 28, 2013, the court entered an order closing the bankruptcy case. On April 14, 2014, 
Defendants' filed Defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss, Or Alternatively, Motion For Summary 
Judgment. On June 2, 2014, this Court held a hearing on Defendants' motion and now renders its 
decision. 
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decision to dismiss a case under I.R.C.P. 40(c) is discretionary. Morgan v. Demos, 156 
Idaho 182, 321 P.3d 732, 736 (2014). The question of whether good cause exists is a factual one that 
must be shown through sworn affidavit. Id 
states: 
Rule 40(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure governs the dismissal of inactive cases and 
In the absence of a showing of good cause for retention, any action, appeal or 
proceeding, except for guardianships, conservatorships, and probate proceedings, in 
which no action has been taken or in which the summons has not been issued and 
served, for a period of six (6) months shall be dismissed. Dismissal pursuant to this 
rule in the case of appeals shall be with prejudice and as to all other matters such 
dismissal shall be without prejudice. At least 14 days prior to such dismissal, 
the clerk shall give notification of the pending dismissal to all attorneys of record, 
and to any party appearing on that party's own behalf: in the action or proceeding 
subject to dismissal under this rule. 
In Morgan v. Demos, 156 Idaho 182, 321 P.3d 732, (2014), the Supreme Com1 
upheld this Court when this Court granted a defendant's motion to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 
40(c). In Aforgan v. Demos, this Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss after the 
case was inactive for 21 months and this Court found no good cause for the delay other than 
attorney neglect. Id 
This case involved two periods of over six months with no action. The first was 
between the May 15, 2008, termination of the first bankruptcy stay and the Defendants' July 
I, 201 O, Motion to Lift Stay and July 1,2010, Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute, or 
Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment. The second was between the February 23, 
2013, termination of the second bankruptcy stay and Defendants' April 14, 2014, Renewed 
Motion to Dismiss, Or Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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affidavits, this Plaintiffs' have not 
or 
are in contrary to requirements Therefore, Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss is granted under I.R.C.P. 40(c). 
b) Rule 41 (b) 
The decision whether to grant a motion to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 41 (b) is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court. Sys. Associates, Inc. v. Motorola Commc'ns & 
Electronics, Inc., 116 Idaho 615,618, 778 P.2d 737., 740 (1989). 
Rule 41 (b) governs involuntary dismals and, in relevant part, says, "For failure of the 
plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may 
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against the defendant." The guidelines 
employed by the trial court under a Rule 41 (b) motion entail a consideration of: ( 1) the length 
of delay occasioned by the failure to prosecute; (2) the justification, if any, for such delay; 
and (3) the resultant prejudice of the delay. Roberts v. Verner, 116 Idaho 575,577, 777 P.2d 
1248, 1250 (Ct. App. 1989). The unavailability of a witness that likely had important 
information is prejudicial when caused by unnecessary delay. Jackson v. Omnibus Grp., 
Ltd., 122 Idaho 347,350,834 P.2d 864,867 (1992). Under I.R.C.P. 41(b), the plaintiff has 
an affirmative duty to seek prompt adjudication of his claims. Nagel v. Wagers, 111 Idaho 
822,823, 727 P.2d 1250, 1251 (Ct. App. 1986)(overturned on other grounds). 
The facts creating the cause of action in this case occurred in 2004. Since the cause 
of action arose, this case has been delayed by Mr. Hawk's bankruptcy stay, Mr. Hawk's 
second bankruptcy stay for failure to list this cause of action as an asset, and for Plaintiffs' 
combined lack of prosecution after the second stay was lifted. The first bankruptcy 
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4 
was on case 
1, to 1, 
to Prosecute, or Alternatively, Motion 
bankruptcy proceeding terminated, Plaintiffs still did nothing for over a year. 
Plaintiffs had the affirmative duty to timely prosecute the case. Plaintiffs have not 
provided any reasonable explanation for the original failure to disclose this cause of action to 
the bankruptcy court, the two year delay after the original bankruptcy proceeding terminated, 
or the one year delay after the bankruptcy proceeding finally ended. This Court finds that any 
one of these delays was unjustified. 
Defendants pointed out that during this prolonged time, one potential witness died, 
one became undiscoverable, and one moved out-of-state. By citing these specific instances 
of prejudice, Defendants have affirmatively shown prejudice. Therefore, Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss is granted under I.R.C.P. 41(b). 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss, Or Alternatively, 
Motion For Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this_ ff day of July, 2014. 
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INTERMOUNTAIN ANESTHESIA, P.A. and 
MARCUS E. MURPHY, M.D., 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Case No. CV 06-7149 
JUDGMENT 
All claims asserted in Plaintiffs' Complaint and Jury Demand are dismissed with 
prejudice. 
DATED this l 'Vciay of August, 2014. 
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Case No. CV-06-7149 
PLAINTIFFS' 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
5 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS- RESPONDENTS, THEIR 
COUNSEL, AND THE CLERK OF THIS COURT. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN 
THAT: 
1. Plaintiffs-Appellants hereby appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court from 
the Judgment entered on August 12, 2014 pursuant to the Court's Opinion and Order 
Granting Defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, Motion for Summary 
PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 1 
Strong & Hawk v. lntermountain Anesthesia, et al 
33 
Honorable J. Shindurling Defendants' Motion to 
and subsequent 
2. Plaintiffs-Appellants have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme 
Court "as a matter of right" because the Judgment of August 12, 2014 is a "Final 
Judgment" within the meaning of Rule 11 (a)( I) Idaho Appellate Rules. 
3. Plaintiffs'-Appellants' preliminary statement of issues on appeal: 
(a) Errors and omissions oflaw in granting Defendants' Renewed 
Motion to Dismiss. 
(b) Errors in omissions of fact. 
( c) Errors in the application oflaw to fact and vice-versa. 
4. There has been no Order entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. Plaintiffs-Appellants request the entirety of the court files documents in 
this case be included in and made part of the Clerk's Record on Appeal excluding nothing 
and including, without exclusion of any other thing: 
(a) All motion filings of the parties, including memoranda and affidavits. 
(b) A reporter's transcript of all motion hearings and proceedings herein, 
excluding nothing, and that the reporter provide electronic disks or other 
media of all motion hearings and proceedings. 
( c) All documents not formally filed by the Court or Clerks but treated as 
"lodged" with the Court or Clerk, including memoranda, notes, and all 
papers contained in the court files. 
PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 2 
Strong & Hawk /ntermountain Anesthesia, et al 
3 
on 
(b) The fee for preparation of the transcript will be paid upon 
determination of the amount required. 
( c) The Clerk of the District Court is being paid $100 .00 with this filing 
in advance for preparation of the Clerk's Record. 
(d) The Supreme Court civil appeal Filing Fee of$129.00 payable to 
the Clerk of the District Court is tendered with this filing. 
( e) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20, Idaho Appellate Rules. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this gth day of September 2014 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 3 
& Hawk lntermounlain Anesthesia, et al 
83 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I on this gth day September, 2014 I faxed a copy of the 
foregoing to Richard E. Hall and Kevin J. Scanlan of Duke Scanlan & Hall PLLC, 1087 
W. Rivers Street, Suite 300, Boise, ID 83707; FAX 208-342-3299. 
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THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS L. STRONG and 
BRIAN K. HA WK, 
Plaintiff-Appellants, 
VS. 
INTERMOUNTAIN ANESTHESIA, P.A. 
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Case No. CV-06-7149 
PLAINTIFFS' 
AMENDED 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's September 17, 2014 Notice of Defect 
Plaintiffs-Appellants hereby file their Amended Notice of Appeal. 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS- RESPONDENTS, THEIR 
COUNSEL, AND THE CLERK OF THIS COURT. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN 
THAT: 
1. Plaintiffs-Appellants hereby appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court from the 
Judgment entered on August 12, 2014 pursuant to the Court's Opinion and Order 
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 1 




Dismiss, and all prior and subsequent orders, judgments, and decisions entered herein. 
2. Plaintiffs-Appellants have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme 
Court "as a matter of right" because the Judgment of August 12, 2014 is a "Final 
Judgment" within the meaning of Rule l l(a)(l) Idaho Appellate Rules. 
record. 
3. Plaintiffs' -Appellants' preliminary statement of issues on appeal: 
(a) Errors and omissions of law in granting Defendants' Renewed 
Motion to Dismiss. 
(b) Errors in omissions of fact. 
(c) Errors in the application of law to fact and vice-versa. 
4. There has been no Order entered sealing all or any portion of the 
5. Plaintiffs-Appellants request the Reporter's Transcript in both hard 
copy and electronic format. Specifically, Plaintiffs-Appellants request the following 
transcripts: 
(a) September 7, 2010 Hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and 
Motion for Summary Judgment (Reported by Nancy Marlow) 
(b) June 2, 2014 Hearing on Defendants' Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
and Motion for Summary Judgment (Reported by Mary Fox) 
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 2 




nothing and including, without exclusion of any other thing: 
(a) All motion filings of the parties, including memoranda and affidavits. 
(b) A reporter's transcript of all motion hearings and proceedings herein, 
excluding nothing, and that the reporter provide electronic disks or other 
media of all motion hearings and proceedings. 
( c) All documents not formally filed by the Court or Clerks but treated as 
"lodged" with the Court or Clerk, including memoranda, notes, and all 
papers contained in the court files. 
7. I certify that: 
(a) A copy of this Amended Notice of Appeal has been served on the 




Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital A venue 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Mfox@co. bonneville. id. us 
(b) The fee for preparation of the transcript will be paid upon 
determination of the amount required. An advanced payment will be made if 
requested. 
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 3 
Strong & Hawk Intermountain Anesthesia, et al 40. 
$ 
(d) The Supreme Court civil appeal Filing Fee of $129.00 payable to 
the Clerk of the District Court was previously tendered with the prior Notice of Appeal 
(9-8-14) filing. 
( e) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20, Idaho Appellate Rules. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this l st day of October, 2014 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
~~ tt&L~ OWELL~IA WKES • 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 1st day of October, 2014 I faxed a copy of the 
foregoing to Richard E. Hall and Kevin J. Scanlan of Duke Scanlan & Hall PLLC, 1087 
W. Rivers Street, Suite 300, Boise, ID 83707; FAX 208-342-3299; and by email to Mary 
Fox, Bom1eville County Courthouse, 605 N. Capital A venue, Idaho Falls, ID 83402; 
Mfox@co.bonneville.id.us; and Nancy Marlow at nmarlow@co.bonneville.id.us. 
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INTERMOUNTAIN ANESTHESIA, P.A. and 
MARCUS E. MURPHY, M.D., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
-~----~------ ------------------------~ 
Supreme Court Docket No. 42514-2014 
Bonneville County Case No. CV 06-7149 
RESPONDENTS' DESIGNATION OF 
ADDITIONAL RECORD ON APPEAL 
COME NOW the Defendants-Respondents, through their undersigned counsel of record, 
and pursuant to J.A.R. 28(c), hereby request the following additional documents be included in 
the clerk's record as follows: 
e The reporter's transcript of hearing on Motion to Dismiss/Summary Judgment 
Motion held before the district court on November 1,2010, as transcribed by: 
Nancy Marlow, CSR 
605 No1ih Capital A venue 
Idaho Falls, lD 83402 
Telephone: (208) 529-13 50, ext. 1194 
RESPONDENTS' DESIGNATION OF ADDITIONAL RECORD ON APPEAL -- I 
I 
42 
Clerk of the Court 
Supreme Court 
MARLOW, 
Official Court Reporter 
Post Office Box 1671 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83403-
: 208-529-1350 1 
November 17, 2014 
NOTICE OF LODGING 
Post Office Box 83 720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0101 
FAX: 208-334-2616 
RE: Thomas L. Strong and Brian K. Hawk vs. 
Hearings: 
Intermountain Anesthesia, P.A., and 
lvfarcus E. Murphy, M.D. 
Bonneville County Case No. CV-06-7149 
Supreme Court No. 42514 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment 
September 7, 2010 
Total Pages - 12 pgs 
Please be advised that the Reporter's Transcript in the above-entitled matter 
will be filed this date with the Clerk of the District Court, Bonneville 
County, via mail. 
This completes all hearings requested of me in the appeal of this matter. 
Sincerely, 
Nancy Marlow, CSR 
Official Court Reporter 




























Mary Fox, CSR 
Official Court Reporter 
Seventh Judicial District 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N Capital Ave 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
(208} 529-1350 Ext. 1194 
E-Mail: mfox@co.bonneville.id.us 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
DATE: 11/26/2014 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk of the Court 
Supreme Court/ Court of Appeals 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0101 
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO: 42514 
DISTRICT COURT CASE NO: CV-2006-7149 
CAPTION OF CASE: 
THOMAS L. STRONG and BRIAN K. HAWK VS INTERMOUNTAIN 
ANESTHESIA ET AL. 
You are hereby notified that a reporter's appellate 
transcript in the above-entitled and numbered case has 
been lodged with the District Court Clerk of the County 
of Bonneville in the Seventh Judicial District. Said 
transcript consists of the following proceedings, 
totaling 28 pages: 
1. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, JUNE 2, 2014 
Respectfully, 
Mary Fox, CSR 1008, RPR 
cc: District Court Clerk 
1 
45 
322 East Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 8320 l 
Telephone: (208) 235-1600 
FAX: (208) 235-4200 
Attorneys/or Plaintiffs 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY, IDAHO 
The Honorable Jon J. Shindur!ing 
THOMAS L. STRONG and 











INTERMOUNTAIN ANESTHESIA, P.A. ) 




Case No. CV-06-7149 
PLAINTIFFS' 
SECOND AMENDED 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
At the telephonic request of a Deputy Clerk of the Supreme Court, relative 
to a more specific designation of the Clerk's Record on appeal, Plaintiffs-Appellants 
hereby file their Second Amended Notice of Appeal. 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS, THEIR 
COUNSEL, AND THE CLERK OF THIS COURT. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN 
THAT: 
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to from the 
on 1 14 to s 
Granting Defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, Motion for Summary 
Judgment by the Honorable Jon J. Shindurling granting Defendants' Renewed Motion to 
Dismiss, and all prior and subsequent orders, judgments, and decisions entered herein. 
2. Plaintiffs-Appellants have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme 
Court "as a matter of right" because the Judgment of August 12, 2014 is a "Final 
Judgment" within the meaning of Rule l l(a)(l) Idaho Appellate Rules. 
3. Plaintiffs'-Appellants' preliminary statement of issues on appeal: 
(a) EITors and omissions oflaw in granting Defendants' Renewed 
Motion to Dismiss. 
(b) Errors in omissions of fact. 
( c) Errors in the application of law to fact and vice-versa. 
4. There has been no Order entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. Plaintiffs-Appellants request the Reporter's Transcript in both hard copy 
and electronic format. Specifically, Plaintiffs-Appellants request the following 
transcripts: 
(a) September 7, 2010 Hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and 
Motion for Summary Judgment (Reported by Nancy Marlow) 
(b) June 2, 2014 Hearing on Defendants' Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment (Reported by Mary Fox) 
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excluding nothing substantive and including, without exclusion of any other thing in the 
court files not itemized on the public docket listing: 












Complaint and Jury Demand 
Order of Assignment 
Defendant: Intermountain Anesthesia, P.A. Notice of 
Appearance of Kevin J. Scanlan 
Defendant: Murphy, Marcus E. MD Notice of 
Appearance of Kevin J. Scanlan 
Affidavit of Kevin J. Scanlan in Support of Defendant 
Intcrmountain Anesthesia, P.A.'s Motion to Dismiss 
Defendant Intermountain Anesthesia, P.A.'s 
Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss 
Defendant Intermountain Anesthesia, P.A.'s Motion to 
Dismiss 
Notice of Appearance (Kevin Scanlan for Marcus E. 
Murphy, M.D.) 
Notice of Hearing 3/13/07@ 8:30 a.m. 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to 
Strike (fax) 
Defendants' Motion to Strike (fax) 
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Notice of Hearing - 8:30 a.m. 
Affidavit of Counsel RE: Bankruptcy Stay 
Bankruptcy Stay 
Case Status Changed: inactive - Bankruptcy Stay 
Notice of Hearing vacated 2/13/07@ 8:30 a.m. (fax) 
Judge Change (batch process) 
Motion to Li ft Stay 
AHidavit of Jeffrey R. Townsend in Support of 
Defendants' J'vlotion to Lift Stay 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Lift 
Stay 
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute, or 
Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Kevin J. Scanlan in Support of 
Defendants 'Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 
Prosecute, or Alternatively, Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute 
Notice of Hearing Re: Motion to Lift Stay and Motion 
to Dismiss (8/11/10@9:00AM) 
Order for self-disqualification (Tingey) 
Disqualification Judge - Self (Tingey) 
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Notice of Hearing - Mtn hrg set 9/7 /10 at 11 :30 AM 
Minute Entry 
Notice of Hearing - (11/1/10 at 9:30 AM) 
Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum of Defendant 
Marcus E. Murphy, M.D. 
Notice of Deposition Duces Tccum of Defendant 
Intermountain Anesthesia, P.A. Pursuant to Rule 
30(b)(6) 
AMENDED Minute Entry (hrg held 9/7/10 at 
1 l :30 AM) 
Amended Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum of 
Defendant Intermountain Anesthesia, P.A. Pursuant to 
Rule 30(b )(6) 
Amended Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum of 
Defendant Marcus E. Murphy, M.D. 
Defendant Intermountain Anesthesia, P.A.'s Objection 
to Plaintiffs' Amended Notice of Taking Deposition 
Duces Tecum 
Atiidavit of Marcus E. Murphy, M.D. In Support of 
Supplemental Memorandum In Support of Defendants' 
Motion To Dismiss For Failure To Prosecute, or 
Alternatively, Motion For Summary Judgment 
Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
and Motion for Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Catherine Linderman, M.D. 
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Affidavit of Thomas Lee Strong 
Affidavit of Terilyn Chenowith 
Affidavit of Counsel 
Affidavit of Jeffrey R. Townsend in Support of 
Supplemental Memorandum (fax) 
Defendants' Reply To Plaintiffs' Response To Motion 
To Dismiss 
Notice of Reopening of Bankruptcy and Automatic 
Stay Order 
Minute Entry (Hearing date: 11/1/2010) 
Transcript Filed - Motion To Dismiss Summary 
Judgment Motion - Nancy Marlow 
Notice Hearing - RE: Defendants Renewed Motion To 
Dismiss, or Alternatively, Motion For Summary 
Judgment (Time Corrections Only) (for 5/12/2014 
10:00AM) 
Defendants' Renewed Motion 
Memorandum In Suppmi of Defendants' Renewed 
Motion 
Affidavit of Kevin J Scanlan In Support of Defendants' 
Renewed Motion To Dismiss, or Alternatively, Motion 
For Summary Judgment 
Notice of Change of Firm Name And Address 
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Amended Notice of Hearing (for 6/02/2014 at 
10:00AM) 
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Response To Defendants' 
Motion To Dismiss And Motion For Summary 
Judgment 
Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel 
Reply Memorandum In Support of Defendants' 
Renewed Motion 
Minute Entry (Hearing date: 6/2/2014 Time: 9:46 am) 
Opinion and Order Granting Defendants' Renewed 
Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Judgment 
Plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 41181 Dated 9/10/2014 
for 100.00) 
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal 
Plaintiffs Amended Notice of Appeal 
Respondent's Designation of Additional Record on 
Appeal (fax) 
This Plaintiffs' Second Amended Notice of Appeal 
(b) A reporter's transcript of all motion hearings and proceedings herein, 
excluding nothing, and that the reporter provide electronic disks or 
other media of all motion hearings and proceedings. 
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documents not formally filed by the Court or Clerks but treated 
as "lodged" with the Court or Clerk, or otherwise in the 
court files, 
I certify that: 
(a) A copy of this Amended Notice of Appeal has been served on 




Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital Avenue 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Mfox@co.bonneville.id.us 
(b) The fee for preparation of the transcript will be paid upon 
determination of the amount required. An advanced payment 
will be made if requested. 
(c) The Clerk of the District Court has been paid $100.00 in 
advance with the prior Notice of Appeal (9-8-14) filing for 
preparation of the Clerk's Record. 
(d) The Supreme Court civil appeal Filing Fee of $129.00 
payable to the Clerk of the District Court was previously 
tendered with the prior Notice a/Appeal (9-8-14) filing. 
( e) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20, Idaho Appellate Rules. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 211 c1 day of February, 2015 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
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I certify on this of 15 I faxed 
foregoing to Richard E. Hall and Kevin J. Scanlan of Duke Scanlan & Hall PLLC, 1087 
W. Rivers Street, Suite 300, Boise, ID 83707; FAX 208-342-3299; and by email to Mary 
Fox, Bonneville County Courthouse, 605 N. Capital Avenue, Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Mfox@co.bonneville.id.us; and Nancy 1\!lariow at nmarlow@co.bonneville.id.us. : 
and by first class mail, postage prepaid, to Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk, Idaho Supreme 
Comi, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-0101. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS L. STRONG and 
BRIAN K. HAWK, 
Plaintiff-Appellants, 
vs. 
INTERMOUNTAIN ANESTHESIA, P.A. 












STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
County of Bonneville ) 
Case No. CV-2006-7149 
Docket No. 42514 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATION 
OF EXHIBITS 
I, Ronald Longmore, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certify that the foregoing Exhibits were marked for 
identification and offered in evidence, admitted, and used and considered by the Court in its determination 
No Exhibits Reported 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the District Court 
this __ day of March, 2015. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATION OF EXHIBITS - 1 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS L. STRONG and 
BRIAN K. HA WK, 
Plaintiff-Appellants, 
vs. 
INTERMOUNT AIN ANESTHESIA, P.A. 
AND MARCUS E. MURPHY, M.D., 
Defendant-Respondents. 
STATE OF IDAHO 















Case No. CV-2006-7149 
Docket No. 42514 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Ronald Longmore, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing Record in the 
above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct and complete 
Record of the pleadings and documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules. 
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause, will be duly 
lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript (if requested) and 
the Clerk's Record as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand affixed the seal of the District Court this 
_', _day of March, 2015. 
Clerk of the District 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS L. STRONG and 
BRIAN K. HA WK, 
Plaintiff-Appellants, 
VS. 
INTERMOUNT AIN ANESTHESIA, P.A. 













Case No. CV-2006-7149 
Docket No. 42514 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __ day of March, 2015, I served a copy of the Reporter's 
Transcript (if requested) and the Clerk's Record in the Appeal to the Supreme Court in the above entitled 
cause upon the following attorneys: 
Lowell N. Hawkes 
1322 E. Center 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
Kevin J. Scanlan 
1087 W. River Street, Suite 300 
Boise, ID 83701 
by depositing a copy of each thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope addressed 
to said attorneys at the foregoing address, which is the last address of said attorneys known to me. 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - 1 
